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Abstract
The 7 year long GATT Uruguay Round (UR) of trade negotiations saw the first concerted
attempt to reform world trade in agricultural products which was badly distorted by
government policies to support domestic fanners. From the outset agriculture was the
single most divisive issue on the 15 point agenda, with conflicts between the USA and the
EC severely hampering the reform process. This study provides a review, and analysis, of
the alternative strategies proposed by the main participants in the UR, and the final UR
settlement, agreed in December 1993; it also provides an examination of the policy options
open to governments wishing to support farm incomes with minimal distortions to world
markets. The main participants accepted relatively early in the Round that an Aggregate
Measure of Support (AMS) would be needed to quantify the existing level of internal
support and then monitor reductions in it. Differences of opinion as to the calculation of
such an AMS existed until 1990 when the main participants proposed that the AMS be
based on the DECO Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), but adjusted for differing policy
coverage and the method of measuring market price support. Therefore, the PSE and the
changes to the PSE suggested by the major participants in the UR are examined, giving the
un surprising conclusion that by 1990 the USA and Cairns Group (CG) of exporting
countries were calling for a far greater reduction in agricultural support than the EC. In
addition, the USA and CG required that there be separate reductions in border protection
and export subsidisation while the Ee contended that an AMS should capture all
agricultural policies so that separate commitments would not be required. A partial
equilibrium, dynamic, stochastic simulation model, covering 7 main trading areas, for
wheat is developed to examine this contention; using the EC's 1990 proposals for reform,
it is found that a reduction in the AMS does lead to a commensurate fall in import tariffs,
but not in export subsidisation. The final UR agreement is analysed, using the model
developed previously to determine whether the commitments in each of the 3 areas (internal
support, border protection and export subsidisation) are compatible, in the sense that the
different targets can be met simultaneously. The conclusions of this analysis are that the
EC and USA are likely to have considerable difficulty in meeting the commitment to reduce
the quantity of subsidised exports if the current agricultural policies are continued. Finally,
it is acknowledged that although a significant aim of the agreed UR programme is raising
world prices above what they would otherwise have been, it also has the effect of limiting
the policy options of governments wishing to provide income support to fanners. The
analysis suggests that the need to meet the UR commitment on export subsidisation will
force the USA to cut expenditure on the Export Enhancement Program, and the EC to
reduce intervention prices further and increase the amount of effective set aside. In
addition, the cost of the compensatory payments policy is likely to result in continued
budgetary crises after 1996.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
For several decades agricultural trade has been considered a problem area in the
international arena. The development of increasingly complex systems of policies to
support domestic farmers has had a lasting impact on the global structure of production,
consumption and trade, thereby generating acute conflicts between the main trading
economies, the USA and the EC, and smaller exporters such as Australia, New Zealand
and Argentina. The primary concern of agricultural policy makers in many of the
industrialised countries is the welfare of domestic farmers, with little consideration for the
world market, except with regard to protecting domestic producers from competition by
lower-priced imports or disposing of surplus stocks. These domestic agricultural support
policies have led to a distortion of the location of world production, and of the extent and
direction of trade flowsl. In addition, while trade in industrial products has been covered
by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since 1947, agriculture has
received several derogations from the liberal trade principles embodied in it; for example,
Article XI forbids import restrictions other than tariffs but exempts agricultural products
from its provisions under certain conditions; the now infamous 'Section 22 Waiver',
introduced to allow the US to impose import restrictions on dairy products even though
there were no domestic supply control measures, has been used as a precedent for
imposing import quotas in several countries; primary product export refunds were excluded
from the general prohibition on export refunds in 1955 (Article XVI).
There have been several attempts to reduce the distortions to agricultural trade under the
auspices of GATT; in 1958 the Harbeler Report set out detailed recommendations for
reforming the principles of the GATT in relation to farm trade, calling for a free market
with the difference between world and domestic prices in those countries supporting their
farmers being eroded over a period of adjustment; in the Kennedy Round (1964-67), the
USA argued for a return to the original GAIT notion of a market-oriented trading system
for both industrial and agricultural products while the Tokyo Round (1973-79) again saw
agriculture on the agenda with a suggestion that negotiations should be oriented towards
liberalisation of agricultural trade while taking account of the special characteristics and
problems of the farm sector. Disagreements on fundamental issues, principally between
Rayner, Ingersent & Hine (1993) p62.
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the EC and the US, have meant that the results from all of these attempts at a liberalisation
of agricultural trade were disappointing.
The Uruguay Round (1986-93) was launched against a background of increasing
agricultural protectionism and saw the first concentrated attempt to reform world trade in
agricultural products. Its inclusion in the 15 point agenda was a reflection of US concerns
about the effects of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy and the rising costs of farm
policies in the USA. From the outset, agriculture emerged as the single most divisive issue
on the agenda with conflicts between the USA, CO and the EC severely hampering the
reform process. The UR, timetabled to finish in December 1990, took three more years to
complete largely due to the very slow progress in the agricultural section. The crux of the
disagreements in agriculture was the EC's insistence that agricultural trade could be
liberalised (though not completely 'free', a concept that the USA took 3 years to accept) if
the diverse farm income support polices were included in an Aggregate Measure of
Support, while the USA and CO insisted that liberalisation could only take place if specific
commitments were made in each of 3 areas - internal support, border protection and export
subsidisation.
Various studies of the effects of liberalising agricultural trade have been carried out since
the inception of the UR in September 1986. A useful review on the models and what they
say about the impacts of trade liberalisation can be found in Goldin and Knudsen (1990);
briefly, however, two of the most well known of the studies carried out since 1986 are
those of Tyers and Anderson and of Roningen and Dixit (SWOPSIM) (the models used in
these studies, along with other models, are reviewed in chapter 5). The studies by Tyers
and Anderson have shown that a phased, complete liberalisation of agricultural policies by
the OECD countries would have resulted in a 22 percent increase in agricultural prices by
1995 (weighted average of wheat, coarse grain, rice, meat, dairy products and sugar)2,
while the Roningen and Dixit (1989) study estimated that a complete liberalisation in 1986
would have lead to a wheat price some 36.7 percent above the level which did occur in that
year. On the other hand, results from the OECD's Ministerial Trade Mandate model have
shown that a 10% reduction in support by industrialised countries, from a 1982-85 base
period, would lead to a fall in grain prices of around 0.3%. If developing countries are
included in the liberalisation, the price increases predicted by the Tyers and Anderson
model and the SWOPSIM model are significantly muted.
These studies have concentrated on assessing the overall effects of varying degrees of
2 Tyers & Anderson (1991). table 2.
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liberalisation on the state of the world market. This study is an attempt to examine the
details of the process of the UR negotiations as they developed, emphasising the key
elements, and to analyse the final outcome with respect to the effects it is likely to have on
the behaviour of the EC and USA; after all, one of the main reasons for the inclusion of
agriculture in the UR was a desire to moderate the protectionist policies of these two.
Given this general background, the specific aims of this research are:
(i) to review the reform processes proposed in the Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations (UR);
(ii) to examine the reform processes for trade-distorting effects;
(iii) to analyse the alternative strategies proposed by the main participants during the UR,
and examine the final agreement;
(iv) to suggest the policy options open to governments wishing to support farm incomes
with minimal distortions to world markets.
The study takes the form of 7 chapters, each of which deal with a different aspect of the
negotiations and the remainder of this chapter provides a route-map of the way in which the
specific aims are met.
Chapter 2 gives an introduction to the domestic agricultural support policies of the USA
and Western Europe, concentrating on those for the cereals sector, from the 1930's to the
present day. For Western Europe this involves a discussion of the formation of the EC and
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In addition this chapter provides a discussion of
how the internal support policies led to external conflicts as the volumes traded on world
markets grew after the Second World War. The conflicts that occurred were usually dealt
with at a bilateral level, or under the auspices of the GATT. Thus the history of the GATT
and the treatment of agricultural trade by the contracting parties are also discussed, with a
brief discussion of the attempts to reform agricultural trade in the GATT rounds prior to the
UR.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the agricultural negotiations in the UR. The negotiating
positions of the leading participants, the USA, the EC and the Cairns Group, are
summarised and commented upon along with the major contributions of the GATT
Secretariat (the Geneva Accord (April 1989), the De Zeeuw Framework (June 1990) and
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the Dunkel Compromise (December 1991». The chapter ends at the final agreement
(December 1993).
In chapter 4, it is acknowledged that the main participants accepted relatively early in the
Round that an Aggregate Measures of Support (AMS) would be needed to quantify the
existing level of internal support and then monitor reductions in it. Differences of opinion
as to the calculation of such an AMS within a programme to reform agricultural policies
existed until 1990, when the main participants proposed that the AMS be based on the
DECD Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) but adjusted for differing policy coverage and
the method of measuring market price support. In the fourth chapter, therefore, the use of
AMSs in the UR is examined. This chapter begins with an examination of the PSE and the
problems associated with it as a measure of trade distortions. A commentary on the
changes to the PSE suggested by the major participants in the UR as solutions (the
Canadian 'Trade Distortion Equivalent'(TDE), the EC's 'Support Measurement
Unit'(SMU) and the CG/US 'Adjusted PSE'(APSE» to these problems follows; the ways
in which they take account of supply control policies, the choice of external reference price,
and the differing distortive effects of various domestic policies are discussed. An
illustration of the use of proposed AMSs in the reform processes follows. This shows that
for the EC's cereals sector, the EC's offer (autumn 1990) would have resulted in a
significantly higher level of support to cereal producers in 1995 than the US or CG offers.
The final section of this chapter contains a comparison of the amended AMSs and the PSE.
This involves estimation of a 'world' cereals price in 1995 by combining a forecast of real
international wheat prices with an assumed inflation rate of 3 per cent and an assumed
$IECU exchange rate (mean rate for mid-1987 to mid-1991). The forecast is generated
from an ARIMA (1,1,2) process with the degree of differencing being determined, before
the Box-Jenkins procedure was initiated, using unit root tests. The rather unsurprising
.conclusion of this analysis is that by 1990 the USA and Cairns Group (CG) of exporting
countries were calling for a far greater reduction in agricultural support than the EC. In
addition, the USA and CG required that there be separate reductions in border protection
and export subsidisation, while the EC contended that an AMS would capture all
agricultural policies so that separate commitments would not be required. Chapter 5,
therefore, is an attempt to examine the EC's expectations about the effectiveness of
reductions in an AMS.
The analysis in chapter 5 is carried out using a partial equilibrium, dynamic, stochastic
simulation model, covering 7 main trading areas, for wheat. A review of the modelling
procedures used in other studies precedes a presentation of the simulation modelling
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procedure which makes up the majority of this chapter. Following the review, it was
decided to construct a partial equilibrium simulation model for two reasons. Firstly, even
the simplest model is very information-intensive, and, given the time constraint of a Ph.D.
thesis, a partial equilibrium model was thought to be more appropriate. Secondly, and
more importantly, as pointed out by Winters (1990), partial equilibrium modelling is more
appropriate for a detailed examination of a particular problem or sector, in this case whether
reform targets can be met simultaneously in the wheat market, especially when linkages
between sectors and countries are specified. The world market is not modelled using a
formal oligopolistic structure as suggested by some commentators, although the USA and
EC are assumed to have some market power such that their stock decisions influence the
quantity supplied to the world market and hence the market price, however, this influence
is limited by domestic concerns over stock levels and world market share. The stochastic
nature of the model is introduced via yield estimations for individual areas.
The EC's contention about the effectiveness of reductions in an AMS is analysed, using the
EC's 1990 proposals for reform, for the EC wheat sector, under the assumption that
policies remain unchanged from those in existence at the time of the UR agreement
(including the policy changes embodied in the CAP reform and the 1990 FACT). Finally,
it is assumed that the policies in place at the time of the EC's proposal are continued (i.e. no
CAP reform) and the results examined.
In chapter 6 the actual UR agreement is analysed, using the model developed in chapter 5,
to determine if the commitments in each of the 3 areas are compatible, in the sense that the
different targets can be met simultaneously. The conclusions of this analysis are that the
EC and USA are likely to have considerable difficulty in meeting the commitment to reduce
the quantity of subsidised exports unless changes are made to their policies. In the second
section of this chapter, therefore, it is acknowledged that although the agreed UR
programme is aimed at increasing import demand (via the market access agreement) and
reducing the quantities of subsidised exports, thereby raising world prices above what they
would otherwise have been, it also has the effect of limiting the policy options of
governments wishing to provide income support to farmers. The policy options open to
the USA and EC at the time of the the 1995 Farm Bill and 1996 review of the CAP
respectively are therefore examined. The current policies are assumed to apply until these
dates, after which changes can be made to (i) the percentage of required set-aside in EC; (ii)
the administered prices (e.g. the intervention price); (iii) the compensatory payments in the
EC; and (iv) the Export Enhancement Programme. Although compensatory and deficiency
payments do not feature in the AMS calculation, making it easy for both the USA and Ee
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to meet the internal support commitment, the results suggest that the need to meet the UR
commitment on export subsidisation will force the EC to reduce intervention prices further
and increase the amount of effective set-aside. In addition, the cost of the compensatory
payments policy is likely to result in continued budgetary crises after 1996.
The conclusion to this study is presented in chapter 7. The chapter begins with a summary
of the results presented in chapter 4 to 6, and a discussion of the significance of these
results in relation to the questions posed in the course of the analysis. The results
presented in this study are, of course, dependent upon the the effectiveness of the model
used to generate them. A discussion of the limitations of the simulation model, and hence
the results presented in chapters 5 and 6, forms the next section of this chapter. Finally, as
with most research, the analysis of one set of questions throws up another, perhaps more
interesting, set and this thesis is no exception. As a con~equence, the concluding chapter
includes some suggestions for further research into this area.
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Chapter 2
Agriculture and the GATT
2.1 A~ricultural Protectionism: A Historical Perspective
For political reasons ranging from national food security to the preservation of rural life
(and winning elections), farmers have, for over a century, been granted special status by
the governments of industrial economies. They have been the recipients of government and
consumer transfers aimed at stabilizing and supporting farm incomes, and providing a
regular, sufficient supply of food to domestic markets. The systems of policies now used
by the economies providing comprehensive support (mainly those in Western Europe, the
USA and Japan) are complex, mainly to correct the imbalances caused by the principal
policy measures, which have had a lasting impact on the structure of production, the
patterns of consumption and international trade, domestic income distribution and welfare.
This section gives an overview of the different methods of agricultural support chosen by
the two main trading developed economies for the c,ereals sector! (the USA, and the
countries now forming the European Communities- (EC», together with some insight
into the rationale behind these choices and examines how the domestic policy objectives
have led to the growth of protectionism and the GAIT conflicts observed between the main
trading nations.
2.1.1 The Development of A~ricuItural Support Policies
The United States
Although there had been sporadic depressions in the agricultural sector of the US economy
since the late nineteenth century, and the question of agricultural income support had been
discussed extensively throughout the 1920s, the depression of the 1930s brought the first
actual government intervention in agricultural markets. The Agricultural Adjustment Act
(AAA) of 1933 was part of Roosevelt's 'New Deal' and was made politically necessary by
The USA and EC are not the only significant exporting countries but emphasis is placed on these two because
of their prominent role in the Uruguay Round and hence the remainder of the thesis.
2 Encompassing the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Steel and Coal Community (ESCC).
and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). which were merged in 1967. At the time of writing the
EEC has become one facet of the European Union. brought into being by the Maastricht Treaty.
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the chronically low incomes of farmers relative to the rest of the population and by the
increasing number of farm failures. It authorised the Federal government to control the
flow of agricultural produce onto the market in an attempt to raise prices to farmers.
Permissible measures included the setting up of voluntary agreements among processors
and distributors of agricultural produce to eliminate 'unfair' practices (the Marketing
Orders), payments to producers for land 'idled' (i.e, supply control) and for production on
an 'allotment' acreage, and the 'non-recourse' loan system. The latter became the
cornerstone of US agricultural policy and operates as follows. The government sets a 'loan
rate' (effectively a floor price) at the start of each marketing year. Farmers can borrow at
that rate before the harvest, using their expected crop as security. If, after the harvest, the
market price is above the loan rate the farmer can sell on the open market and repay the
loan. If the loan rate is above the market price the farmer forfeits his commodity as full
payment of the loan to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), a government financed
corporation created in October 1933. A notable exception to the loan rate system was the
sugar sector which continued to be supported via import controls (e.g. the Smoot - Hawley
Tariff of 1930); however, in 1934, production and import quotas were introduced along
with set-aside payments. The 1933 AAA also allowed for the use of 'benefit payments' to
boost the income of farmers who agreed to participate in a programme to reduce
production, paid for by a special excise tax on processors. The latter was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1936 and by 1938 a new AAA was passed which
emphasised conservation as the prime reason for the production controls and the supply
management programmes contained in the original Act. The payments to farmers for the
'conservation' measures they implemented were to be appropriated from the Treasury. The
1938 Act also implemented import quotas for processed dairy products to defend the
support prices set under the loan rate! Marketing Order system. Whether the price and
income supporting measures contained within the AAA would have solved the long
standing depression in farm incomes was never to be determined, as the shortages in
Europe caused by the Second World War (WW2) pushed prices high enough to make the
measures inoperative from 1940 until 1951 (with the exception of 1949). After this time
prices fell sharply as foreign demand was reduced following the end of the Korean war and
the phasing out of post WW2 relief in Europe ..
After WW2 the farm policy debate began in earnest with interested parties polarizing into
two groups; those advocating a reduction in the extent of government intervention with a
substantial lowering of the level of price support ('Republican party leaders, businessmen
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from the agribusiness complex, and most economists' (Cochrane pI44» , and those
advocating the maintenance of high prices as a means of supporting farm incomes
(,Democratic party leaders from the South and the Plains, the farm organisation leaders
who had led the battle for the agricultural adjustment legislation .... some government
economists, and form time to time some union leaders' (ibid). In addition technological
developments within the agricultural sector (improvements in the efficiency of machinery,
in yields, in the disease and drought resistance of crops, and the increased use of
commercial fertilizer) led to extensive restructuring of the industry and, perhaps more
importantly, an increase in the level of supply - 25 per cent in the 1940s3 Faced with an
inelastic domestic demand and slack exports, a situation of excess capacity and chronic
oversupply persisted thr~ughout the 1950s and 1960s. The US government refused to face
the consequences for farm incomes of tackling the excess capacity question by dismantling
the support system (or even reforming it substantially), so that it was effectively rolled over
from year to year with the level of price and income support in anyone year being
determined by the relative strength of the two lobbies. Although three major attempts were
made to break the stalemate (the Brannan Plan (1949) and efforts by E. Benson (1952-60)
and D. Freeman (1961-63», a compromise was not found until 1964.
For cereals the 1964 Agricultural Act has formed the basis of American agricultural policy
to the present day+ - adjustments have been made, but essentially the mechanisms
embodied in the original Act remain. The Act redefined the role of the market price support
mechanism as price stabilisation rather than income support. Thus levels of price support
(via the loan rate) for each commodity were reduced towards the world market rate.
Support of farm income, when needed, was in the form of direct income payments which,
in keeping with the 1936 AAA, would only be made if farmers participated in authorised
production control programmes when the over-supply situation became too burdensome.
In addition, the application of the direct payment was limited to the proportion of output
sold domestically; production destined for the export market was not covered until 1973.
The storage and surplus disposal schemes which had been a feature of US farm policy
since the 1938 AAA were retained to deal with any surpluses which occurred and any
possible short term shortages domestically and abroad.
Generally favourable world market conditions allowed farm income support policies to
continue in the same vein during the 1970s with only minor adjustments; if anything, farm
lobbies succeeded in increasing the amount of support potentially available to producers as
3 Cochrane (1989) p137.
4 The sugar, dairy. tobacco and peanut programmes were not changed by the 1964 Act.
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relatively high world market prices kept government costs low. Two significant
developments did occur, however, in the 1973 Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act.
One was the introduction of the 'Target Price'. which assured producers a set price for their
allowed production. including exports, through a deficiency payment representing the
difference between the Target price and market prices (or the loan rate. whichever was the
higher). A deficiency payments ceiling of $20,000 per producer of wheat. feed grains or
cotton was introduced to limit budgetary expenditure. The second was the considerable
discretion which the Secretary of Agriculture had in setting loan rates and target prices -
previously loan rates had been rigorously set according to a 'parity' formula.f (Note that
due to the high levels of world market prices, the measures in the 1973 Act did not become
operational in the 1974-76 period. The expected effects of the deficiency payments ceiling .
(discrimination against larger farmers which would encourage them the grow larger to
maintain total returns) could therefore not be analysed). In 1977 an alternative to forfeiture
to the CCC was introduced into the loan rate system for cereals. Previously participants
had either to repay loans or forfeit crops to the CCC after 9 months. The new alternative
was to place grain in a Farmer Owned Reserve (FOR) for up to 3-5 years (depending on
the programme), in the expectation of improved market prices, with the government paying
the storage costs and farmers receiving a payment (a FOR loan) for storing the grain. The
FOR loan rate was higher than the CCC loan rate. Note that for sugar the 1977 Food and
Agriculture Act introduced payments to producers without production controls, and
significantly increased import duties.
The 1980s began in optimistic mood. The 1981 Agriculture and Food Act (AFA) was
drawn up in the expectation of continuing high market prices, high inflation and a belief by
many in the government that the the key agricultural issue of the 1980s was going to be
. how to produce enough food for the world's hungry rather than curbing surpluses. Hence,
for those participating in production control programmes, high minimum target prices and
loan rates were set with a continuation of deficiency payments to make up any gap between
the market price (or the loan rate, whichever was the higher) and the target price.
Production control could take the form of the traditional set-aside or one of the crop-
specific acreage reduction programmes (ARP) introduced as part of the AFA. However,
market conditions were rather different from those expected in the early 1980s (mainly due
to changes in the macro economy and the dollar exchange rate). A situation of global
surplus necessarily changed the emphasis of US farm income support policies away from
S The 'Parity Price' was defined as that price which kept the ratio of farm prices received to the index of prices
paid by farmers equal to that which prevailed in the base period (1910-1914),
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encouraging surplus production, and towards curbing the excess supplies which were
having adverse effects on the levels of world market prices, stock-holdings and the US
budget. Adjustments to the AFA included the introduction of an export promotion policy in
1982 to complement the measures already operated by the CCC6; the establishment of a
'Payment In Kind' programme in order to ease the budget in 1983 under which farmers
were paid not to produce with payments being made in the form of government held
commodities rather than cash; and in 1984 the introduction of triggers for ARPs to limit
production further.
By the time the 1985 AFA was to be discussed, market conditions had not significantly
improved and the high budgetary outlays on agricultural policies prompted the Reagan
Administration (who wanted to reduce government intervention in all sectors of the
economy) to propose a change in US farm policy. It proposed an income 'safety-net' for
farmers rather than support through market intervention. Extensive discussions in the
House and Senate agricultural committees produced a less radical compromise which
nevertheless was aimed at encouraging a more market-oriented approach in the agricultural
sector. For cereals, cotton and rice loan rates were tied to a five-year moving average of
market prices, but were also subject to discretionary reductions of up to 20 per cent if the
previous season's prices were low or if the formula-determined rate was likely to affect
market competitiveness. Target prices were frozen for the first two years of the Act with
the provision for reductions in the subsequent three. The production control measures
(especially ARPs) were tied to trigger stock levels and an Acreage Conservation Reserve
was introduced to reduce soil erosion (which effectively restrained production further as
harvesting and grazing were not allowed on the affected land). As before, deficiency
payments were only to be paid to those participating in supply control. In the dairy sector a
'herd - buyout' scheme was introduced which, over a three year period, 'resulted in the
slaughter of about 1 million dairy cows (about 8 per cent of the total dairy cow population)'
(Gardner (1990». In addition, provision was made to cut support prices if CCC stocks of
butter or skimmed milk powder rose to unacceptable levels (an accumulation of more than 5
billion pounds). For sugar deficiency payments were ended so that price support relied
solely on import quotas. One significant extension of government intervention, however,
was in the international market. In response to what the US saw as 'unfair' trade practices
by other countries (principally the EC,) the Act introduced two new forms of export
assistance; the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) and the Targeted Export Assistance
6 A revolving export credit facility for importing nations; funds provided by the Secretary to provide export
subsidies to match those of foreign governments if required; and various food aid programmes (e.g. PL 480).
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Program (TEA). Under the EEP, trading firms which successfully tendered to export
specific commodities to specific markets were provided with bonuses from CCC stocks to
help reduce the price of such exports. Essentially it is a discriminatory export policy aimed
at winning back markets gained by other countries through 'unfair' trading. For similar
reasons, the TEA provided cash on CCC commodities to help US exporters expand their
foreign sales.
The effects of the 1985 Farm Bill were, initially at least, favorable to the agricultural sector
while the costs of the programmes reached record levels. Despite high world market prices
in 1989 (due mainly to the US drought of 1988) the programme costs remained high and
discussions for the 1990 Farm Bill centered on reducing government expenditure on
agriculture. The most important feature of the 1990 Bill was the introduction of the 'triple
base'scheme. Incorporated under the ARP, it is compulsory for all participants in the US
cereals scheme, and aims to reduce the amount of deficiency payments a farmer may
receive through a 15 per cent reduction in the crop area eligible for a deficiency payment.
The farmer may, however, grow another crop on the 15 per cent 'triple base' area, which is
not itself eligible for deficiency payments. Note also that the TEA was renamed as the
Marketing Promotion Program (MPP) and was expanded.
Western Europe 7
Government intervention in agriculture has a longer history in the countries of Western
Europe than in the USA. Brief interludes of market orientation have occurred, for example
in the mid-nineteenth century, but essentially the countries which now form the EC and the
European Free Trade Association (EFT A) have protected farmers from the vagaries of
agricultural markets for over a century'',
As in the US, the depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s prompted extensive
government intervention in the agricultural sector, although the preferred method of support
in most Western European states was tariff protection rather than the loan rate and
deficiency payments policies favoured by the US. Tariffs had been used by France,
Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Belgium prior to the depression to protect their farmers
from import competition and allow the agricultural sector to develop. As world prices of
agricultural produce fell, tariffs were raised to protect domestic farm incomes and
7 This section draws primarily on Tracy (1990).
8 The governments of Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands have been less enthusiastic about market
interventions than those of the other European countries but have nevertheless resorted to them when
circumstances dictated.
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production. Liepmann? has estimated that 'average potential tariff levels for foodstuffs
(an unweighted average of 38 important foodstuffs) as a percentage of export prices for
these countries were around 2 to 2.5 times higher in 1931 than in the previous depression
(pre the First World War); in some countries the 'average potential tariff level reached over
lOOper cent of export prices. The sustained fall in world market prices also prompted the
UK to impose tariffs on agricultural imports in the autumn of 1931. This was a significant
development given Britain's previous commitment to universal free trade.
Despite their high levels, tariffs alone did not prove to be an effective means of protection
as world prices were so low that exporters (primarily the US for cereals) were prepared to
sell at almost any price. A series of non-tariff barriers was thus introduced. The first of
these was the 'milling ratio', introduced by Norway in 1927, under which millers were
obliged to use a minimum percentage of domestically-produced wheat and/or rye. The ratio
of home-produced to imported grain was variable and could be set to reflect the market
situation. France and Germany adopted this measure in 1929, with much of the rest of
Europe following suit during the early 1930s. In almost all of the countries operating the
milling ratio scheme, the proportion of home-produced grain to be incorporated rose as the
crisis deepened, reaching almost 100 per cent in France, Germany, Italy and Sweden. In
addition, the general idea of what Tracy calls 'linked-utilisation' policies caught the
imagination of the policy makers such that similar measures were applied widely to feed
grains, to margarine in Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark (where a minimum
proportion of domestic butter or lard had to be included), and to several non-agricultural
products. The second form of non-tariff barrier to be implemented was the import quota.
The French government applied import quotas to provide emergency cover for a few
products in 1931. France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK later
adopted import quotas as an integral part of their agricultural policies.
As the 1930s progressed it became clear that the protectionist measures were not a panacea
for the problems of the agricultural sector. In France wheat surpluses and falling farm
incomes induced the government to introduce, firstly, fixed minimum prices and then,
when the costs of dealing with the resulting surpluses became too great, guaranteed prices
supported by government purchasing of part of the crop. The guaranteed prices were set
significantly above world market prices which encouraged increased production while
suppressing domestic demand. As the surpluses continued to rise, France became a net
exporter of wheat for the first time. In Britain, a 10% ad valorem tariff was imposed on
9 Referenced in Tracy (1990) pages 22 and 123.
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most goods (although wheat, maize, meat, livestock and wool were exempted). However,
pressure from the Empire countries, whose exports were mainly agricultural, led to an
agreement to exempt all goods from the Empire from duties. This weakened the UK's
efforts to protect agriculture form import competition. The British solution to the farm
income problem involved commodity by commodity measures rather than the less
commodity specific solution pursued by other Western European countries 10. Individual
products were supported through various combinations of subsidies, import restrictions
and marketing schemes. The latter were established in the 1931 and 1933Marketing Acts,
and allowed a 'substantial' majority of producers of anyone commodity to adopt a
marketing scheme regulating minimum and sometimes maximum prices and other aspects
of the production process. The marketing scheme, if approved by Parliament, was to be
binding on all producers of that commodity. Marketing schemes were set up for milk,
potatoes, hops and pigs. For wheat, a deficiency payments scheme was enacted with a
guaranteed price set above the market price and a subsidy equal to the gap between them
paid to farmers. The payment was initially limited by a production ceiling to discourage
excessive expansion of production; it did not, and wheat production rose at the expense of
oats and barley such that by 1937 guaranteed prices were introduced for these products
also. Under the centrally-planned fascist economies of Germany and Italy, agriculture was
treated as any other industry. The agricultural sector was organised, in accordance with
government plans, such that all aspects of food production, distribution, trade and prices
were regulated by state marketing boards. The aim of the government plans was self-
sufficiency (i.e. increased production). Even the more liberalised exporting economies
(Denmark, Switzerland and the Netherlands) were forced to intervene in agricultural
markets as their exports were threatened by the protectionist policies of their neighbours.
As in the other European countries, the policies implemented included minimum prices
coupled with state subsidies, marketing arrangements and milling ratios although the
emphasis of the policies was not import control but was necessarily more export-oriented.
During, and for sometime after the end of, the Second World War the overriding aim of
agricultural policy in most of Western Europe was to increase domestic production. The
income support policies developed in the 1930s, but abandoned during WW2, were
reinstated and expanded. For example, in Britain the deficiency payments scheme and the
Marketing Boards were reintroduced; in France the guaranteed prices and government
purchasing programmes were joined by a policy to promote the mechanisation of
agriculture, thereby releasing labour for industry. Western Germany particularly needed to
10 ibid p152.
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increase food production as it was cut off from its traditional sources of supply in East
Germany. Imports provided the bulk of the food supply, financed partly by the Marshall
Plan from 1948, while the domestic sector developed. The support policies implemented by
West Germany were similar to those of France, with 'stable' prices being maintained by the
State Import and Storage Boards purchasing and selling commodities at the appropriate
time, and controlling imports.
The various support policies successfully stimulated production so that by 1951 crop
production had reached pre-war levels in most Western European countries. Production
continued to rise mainly due to the considerable technical progress in agricultural inputs
(especially in machinery) which occurred throughout the 1950's, and the continuation of
policies to encourage production. However, food consumption grew relatively slowly after
the initial post war shortages had been overcome. The governments of Western Europe
were therefore faced with large and increasing surpluses in many products. In addition,
incomes per head in agriculture were still.well below those in other sectors in most
countries 11. The emphasis of the support policies thus moved away from a general
increase in production towards selective expansion and improved efficiency. However, the
same basic mechanisms of income support were retained; these tended to stimulate
production, so an increasingly complex set of policies evolved to try to curb production
while at the same time dealing with the problem of low farm incomes.
The Common Agricultural Policy
The six founding countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) - France,
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy - agreed in the Treaty of
Romel- that a 'common market' should be established in all sectors including agriculture.
The common market would allow free trade across the borders of the Member States but
have a common level of protection against goods originating elsewhere, in the form of a
common external tariff. Article 39.1 of the Treaty sets out the objectives of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). These are to provide adequate supplies of food to consumers,
at reasonable prices, from a stable market, while at the' same time ensuring a 'fair' standard
of living for the agricultural community and increasing agricultural productivity through the
promotion of technical progress and the rational development of the factors of production.
It proved difficult (and somewhat acrimonious) to establish a common market in
11 ibid p219.
12 The treaty establishing the EEC and its organisations (the Commission, the Parliamentary Assembly (now
the European Parliament), and the Court of Justice), and the EAEC, 1957.
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agricultural products because of the variation in the national policies of the Six, which were
well-established and which the governments were loath to give up without a fight. The
final package of measures which formed the CAP was not agreed for all products until
1970, even though the basic system was agreed in 1962. The support system envisaged in
1962 rested on the management of surplus stocks to maintain high internal market prices
and protection against the lower prices on world markets through a variable import levy
(VIL). The Commission was to establish, annually, a 'Target' price for the internal market
which in turn determined the price at which intervention buying (by the various national
Intervention Boards acting under EEC legislation) would occur. Any chronic surpluses
could be disposed of in 'Third countries' (those not belonging to the EEC) with the aid of
'export restitutions'. In theory, the latter were to represent the difference between internal
EEC and world market prices; in practice they were sometimes subject to political tinkering.
The VIL was to be equal to the difference between the fluctuating, lower world price and a
fixed minimum import price, the 'Threshold' price, which was also set annually by the
Commission. The import levies applied initially to intra-EEC trade, but were progressively
removed as internal prices were harmonised. All common prices were expressed in
Agricultural Units of Account in the absence of a common European currencyl-. The
common polices were to be financed by national contributions to the European Agricultural
Guidance and Guarantee Fund; the guidance section was to deal with 'structural'
spending, and the guarantee section with expenditure on export restitutions and
intervention.
The support system finally agreed by the Six was essentially the 1962 system, i.e. an
amalgamation and extension of the traditional support measures in the major countries
(France and Germany). It was agreed that any country wishing to join the common market
would have to accept the CAP as it stood, subject only to transitional derogations (the
acquis communautaire principle).
ThIS was the position in January 1973 when Denmark, Ireland and the UK became
members of the EC14. The new Member States had a six year period to progressively
adjust their internal support prices to Community levels. The UK needed additional
derogations from the CAP to allow the continued operation of the marketing boards and
give some preference to imports from Commonwealth countries (mainly through bilateral
agreements on import quotas or 'voluntary' export restraints). Its deficiency payments
13 The Unit of Account was replaced by the European Currency Unit (ECU) in 1979.
14 Recall that the three communities had become one by this stage.
2-11
scheme had become costly and the government had already begun replacing it with other
measures. The EC was again enlarged in 1981 with the accession of Greece and in 1986
when Spain and Portugal joined; the same principle of acquis communautaire applied.
The CAP framework did little to relieve the problem of excess supply within the EC,
indeed it moved from being a net importer to a net exporter in a relatively short period of
time. Neither did it satisfactorily improve the structure of the farm sector. Expenditure on
agricultural support grew throughout the 1970s reaching crisis point by the mid 1980s.
The Commission introduced a series of measures aimed at curbing the growth of the
agricultural budget. In the cereals sector, the over-supply situation was particularly bad
(along with that in the dairy sector where production quotas were introduced in 1984).
Guarantee thresholds were introduced in 1982 to reduce the price incentives to over-
production 15. Although these were intended to penalise farmers when the production
thresholds were exceeded the policy was not very effective as the penalties were not
automatic and the agriculture ministers of the Member States, under pressure from the farm
lobbies, found several ways of mitigating the effects of the penalties, e.g. by raising prices.
In 1986 the co-responsibility levy was introduced; this effectively made producers
themselves pay towards the storage costs of intervention. The situation did not improve
and in 1988 the EC introduced the 'stabiliser mechanism'. Under this mechanism a total
maximum guaranteed quantity (MGQ) for all cereals of 160 million tonnes was set.
Production above the MGQ induced a 3 per cent cut in the intervention price for the
following year. In addition, the unit co-responsibility levy would be 6 per cent of the
intervention price rather than 3 per cent if the MGQ was not exceeded. A land retirement
scheme ('set-aside') was also introduced as part of the stabliser package, with farmers
being paid to set-aside land from crop production and put it to some other use e.g. grass.
Farmers who set aside at least 30 per cent of their arable land were exempted from any co-
responsibility levy on the first 20 tonnes of their sales.
The stabiliser mechanism did not control the over-supply situation within the EC. In 1991
budgetary crises again forced a review of the policies. In the cereals sector the basic co-
responsibility levy was increased from 3 per cent to 5 per cent of the intervention price, and
a special one year set-aside scheme was introduced. Under this scheme farmers set-aside a
minimum of 15 per cent of their land given to all supported crops, in return for a
reimbursement of the 5 per cent co-responsibility levy. However, the policy of supporting
15 Durum wheat and rice were not covered by the guarantee thresholds.
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farm incomes by maintaining internal prices significantly above world prices remained
central to the CAP.
In July 1991 major modifications to the CAP were proposed in what became known as the
. MacShany Plan. The proposals were aimed at solving the CAP's major problem - that of
over-production. The plan essentially involved various combinations of support price
reductions and quantity restrictions in each of the important agricultural sectors. In the
cereals sector, a cut in the intervention prices of 42% by 1995196 was proposed.
'Compensatory payments' for the price reduction would be paid if farmers agreed to set-
aside 15% of their arable crop land (although set-aside compensation would only be
payable on the first 7.5 ha of this land). The compensatory payments would be made on
the basis of a fixed, average EC yield thereby disadvantaging more efficient producers,
while the limit on the set-aside payments would have disadvantaged larger producers'v,
The MacSharry Plan proved too radical for many of the Member States. Britain in
particular was unhappy with the proposals to limit the area on which set-aside payments
would be made because of the higher proportion of larger producers in the UK.
Adjustments were under the Portuguese Presidency of the Council in 1992.
The final reform package, known as the 'Cunha Reforms'!", was most radical in the
cereals market but even here price reductions were limited to 29% of the intervention price
during the 199213 to 1996n period, a figure which itself was only arrived at after it was
decided to remove co-responsibility levies for the following four marketing years (this was
thought by commentators to be a concession to Germany in order that the reforms could be
sold to her farmers without too much resistance) In addition, as a concession to the British
(with the largest proportion of farms too big to qualify for the MacSharry compensations in
the Community) and the French, the acreage limit on the compensatory payments was not
included in the agreement and the decision on whether the payments would be degressive
or fixed was postponed until the review in 1996/97.
Concerns over the budgetary costs of the reform plan were voiced from the start.
However, although the Commission acknowledged that the new scheme would cost more,
it argued that the fundamental oversupply problem would be tackled with the area to be set
aside in the first year of operation set at 15% of the base area. Special concessions for
16 A farmer with 1000 ha of arable land would have been required to set aside 150 ha but would only have
received compensation on 7.5 ha, leaving 142.5 ha uncompensated. (Agra Europe no. 1448 pEl2).
17 A comprehensive summary of the Cuhna Reforms can be found in Agra Europe no. 1492 (May 22 1992)
ppP/3-P/II.
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small farms and some slippage meant that the actual area set aside was much lower than this
(around 9% of the base area). At the time of writing the final effects remain to be seen.
2.1.2 Domestic Farm Income Support and External Conflict
From the discussion above we can deduce that the primary concern of agricultural policy
makers is the welfare of domestic fanners. The support policies of the industrial countries
were not developed with any significant consideration for the world market, except with
regard to protecting domestic producers from competition by lower-priced imports, and
from excessive variations in world market prices, or disposing of surplus stocks. With the
small volumes of cereals traded globally during the 1930s and the general trend towards
protectionism in the developed nations, the effects of domestic income support policies on
other countries were of no great concern. However, after WW2 the reconstruction
programmes in Europe (and to some extent Japan) induced an extended period of economic
boom in the industrialised countries (Warnock (1988), ch.IS) and an expansion of trade in
all commodities. As the volumes offarm products traded grew, the effects of domestic
agricultural policies began to be felt on the world market, and with them the potential for
conflicts between trading countries increased.
To summarise, the agricultural policies of the industrialised countries had the effect of
expanding output, depressing domestic demand, reducing world market prices for
agricultural products and distorting the relative prices of agricultural and manufactured
goods (World Bank (1986), p124). In more detail, during the period following WW2 the
US emerged as the dominant economic and trading power. However, as Europe and Japan
recovered and began to export again, a situation of excess capacity emerged. US
agriculture faced new and increasing competition on world markets. The potential for
conflict arose mainly from the diversity of the policies operated by the major exporting
countries. In the cereals sector the US was (and still is) a major cereals exporter; its
policies were thus oriented towards maintaining farmers' incomes through internal
measures with no need for import protection. Potential distortions to a 'free' international
market by the US stemmed from the effects of its domestic policies on production, and
hence the volumes to be exported, and the export promotion policies needed to dispose of
the surpluses - both of which put downward pressure on world market prices. The EC, on
the other hand, was initially a net importer of cereals and import restrictions were used as
an integral part of the CAP. However, as in the USA, the high internal prices stimulated
production. This was in addition to the increased production due to technical
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improvements, and the EC became a net exporter; these exports, like those of the US,
enjoyed government support (albeit in a different form from the US export support). The
US and the EC thus became competitors (see figure 2.1) and the differing domestic policies
of the two, which had in effect caused the situation, took on a new significance. While the
US argued that the VIL and export restitution systems hindered the free movement of
(American) agricultural products on international markets, the EC could similarly point to
the US import quotas for sugar and dairy products. Conflicts have, perhaps
understandably, arisen periodically between these two since the 1960s.
Net exports of wheat
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Figure 2.1
(Note: EC includes 6 member states up to 1972,9 up to December 1980, 10 to December 1985, and 12
thereafter.)
In addition to the more general trade distortion arguments above, the EC's import
restrictions in particular have drawn criticism from countries who also claim to have been
adversely affected, for example, New Zealand, Australia, and the ACP (African, Carribean
and Pacific) states. Conflicts have often arisen over the amount of imports allowed into the
EC under concessions granted to the ACP countries and over the special treatment of
Commonwealth countries when the UK joined the Community. Particular problems have
been the preferential treatment given to butter imported from New Zealand when the EC has
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been the preferential treatment given to butter imported from New Zealand when the EC has
an excess supply of butter, and the arrangements with the sugar producing ACP countries
which gave no concessions to Australia (which had been the largest sugar supplier to
Britain prior to its joining the EC).
The conflicts that have occurred have usually been dealt with either at a bilateral level or
under the auspices of the GAlT - the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
2.2 The History of the GATT18
The history of the GAlT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) is intertwined with
that of the preparation of the charter for the International Trade Organisation (ITO) - an
institution of the Bretton Woods international system which was never ratified.
The 1944 Bretton Woods conference, Which laid the foundations of the current
international fmancial system, recognised the need for an international organisation with the
aim of reducing the level of protection within the world trading system (although the exact
nature of such an organisation was not detailed). Discussions on the charter of the ITO
continued over the three years following the Bretton Woods meeting with the main
conference being held in Geneva in 1947. This conference was divided into three main
parts (often referred to as a 'three-ring circus'); one section dealt with continuing
preparations for the ITO charter; a second was devoted to a multilateral agreement to
reciprocally reduce tariffs; and a third to the development of 'general clauses of obligations'
(rules) relating to the tariff commitments. Together, the second and third sections
constitute the GATT. The GATT was not intended to be an organisation per se, but a
multilateral treaty, similar to the bilateral treaties which existed at the time, under the
umbrella of ITO when it came into being; indeed many of the clauses of the GATT were
written on the understanding that they would be revised at a later date to bring them into
line with those of the ITO charter. However, the ITO never came into being, principally
because the US Congress refused to approve it, and the GAIT was left as the main method
by which international trade was to be liberalised.
The story does not end there however. Although the GAlT is today the principal method
of reforming international trade, the treaty as such never came into force. The GATT was
18 The following sections draw upon Catholic Institute (1989), Curzon (1965), Dam (1970), F.A.O (1983),
Jackson (1989) and Witzke et al (1989).
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concluded at the 1947 Gevena conference while the charter for the ITO was not to be
completed until 1948. Many negotiators in Geneva felt that the GATT should be brought
into force much earlier. As a result, a 'Protocol of Provisional Application' (PPA) was
agreed, under which eight nations would provisionally implement the GAIT on 1 January
. 1948 while other contracting parties would follow suit soon afterward. The PPA called for
contracting parties to implement Part II of the GATT 'to the fullest extent not inconsistent
with existing legislation', while Parts I and III were to be fully implemented without
exception. Part I of the GAIT contains the 'Most Favoured Nation' clause which obliges
contracting parties to provide all other contracting parties with the most favourable trading
conditions that it grants to anyone country. This clause is in many ways the cornerstone
of the Agreement. Part II of the GAIT contains most of the substantive measures relating
to tariffs, quotas, subsidies, anti-dumping policies, national treatment and so on. Part ill is
mainly procedural. The PPA.in effect granted countries the right to retain legislation which
contravened Part II of the GAIT (these were called 'grandfather rights'). After the collapse
of the 1948 talks on the ITO charter no definitive implementation of the GAIT took place,
so that 'grandfather rights' still apply to protective legislation which was in force prior to 1
January 1948!
Despite its rather chequered origins, obligations made under the auspices of the GATT by
the contracting parties are binding under international law.
2.2.1 The GATT Structure and Decision Making Process
As the GATT was not to have been the main body for dealing with problems in
international trade, its drafters did not provide for a structured organisation (the present
GATT Secretariat is de jure not the GAIT secretariat but is leased from the Interim
Commission of the ITO set up in 1948). All decisions are made by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES (written in capitals to indicate the contracting parties acting jointly). Over time
the CONTRACTING PARTIES have used Article XXVl9 to devise procedures and
working methods such that the GAIT has now evolved to act as though it were an
organisation. Briefly, the GAIT operates as follows. Annual 'sessions' are arranged for
the purpose of taking joint action on matters affecting the implementation or administration
of the Agreement. The need for the major trading nations to discuss trade questions more
frequently lead to the creation of the Council of Representatives (the Council). It meets to
19 Article XXV: 1 'Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet from time to time for the purpose of
giving effect to those provisions of this Agreement which involve joint action and. generally. with a view to
facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement.'
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deal with any urgent matters which may arise and can establish subsidiary bodies such as
Committees or Working Groups to deal with particular problems (the latter working in
greater detail). Membership of the Council is open to all those contracting parties who
wish to be represented and special rules exist to allow contracting parties who are not
members representation when discussions concern them. Recommendations by the
Council have to be approved by the CONTRACTING PARTIES at a council session (or in
a postal ballot if necessary). Generally, there is no voting and a consensus of opinion is
taken by the Chairman of the CONTRACTING PARTIES; only when the consensus is not
conclusive, or in doubt, or when a decision is required about a 'waiver', or if specially
requested, will a vote be taken. Each contracting party has one vote and most decisions
require a simple majority. The trade liberalisation aim of the GATT has been fulfilled by a
series of 'Rounds' which have provided countries with opportunities to negotiate
significant tariff reductions, principally in industrial products (see section 2.2.3). Disputes
between contracting parties, usually regarding the legal rights and obligations of trading
partners, or the legality of certain non-tariff measures, are not handled as legal matters per
se but are referred to the relevant working parties or panels of experts for preliminary
discussion and then to the CONTRACTING PARTIES for a final decision. The decision
is thus more a political rather than a judicial matter, so that the disputees may have all
relevant factors taken into account, not just the legal ones. If CONTRACTING PARTIES
rule against a member then the latter should make the necessary corrections.
2.2.2 The GATT Rules for Agriculture
The original GATT had little to say about agriculture, and drew no conceptual difference
between trade in farm and industrial products; protectionist measures in the agricultural
sector were therefore covered by the general obligations of the Agreement and the 'free'
trade principle was to be applied except where special commodity agreements regulated
trade. However, US negotiators obtained special dispensations for agricultural trade in
order that the GATT would be ratified by the Senate. These were designed to provide as
full an accommodation as possible for US farm policy, such that, for agriculture, the
GATT became a de facto extension of US farm legislation, based on interventionist
principles. The safeguard for US agricultural policy came in Article XI which forbids
import restrictions other than tariffs but exempts agricultural products from its provisions
under certain conditions. The US could effectively impose import restrictions on
agricultural products if the imports potentially threatened government farm income support
in the form of production restriction policies.
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Subsequent amendments to the GATT rules only served to further incorporate the
protectionist policies pursued in agriculture, for example the now infamous 'Section 22
Waiver'. This was introduced to allow the US to impose import restrictions on dairy
products even though there were no domestic supply control measures. The waiver was
also applied to cereals, cotton and peanuts. In addition, although other countries were not
covered by this waiver, they have tended to use it as a precedent for imposing import
quotas on their own agricultural imports. On the same day the 'hard-core' waiver was
passed, allowing countries to continue with some of the import restrictions imposed under
the balance of payments criteria (Article XII), for a transitional period, while industries
adapted to a free market situation. Agricultural restrictions formed the vast majority of
measures continued under this waiver. When the general prohibition on export refunds
was introduced into the GAIT in 1955 (Article XVI), primary product export refunds were
explicitly excluded if the subsidy did not result in the exporter having more than an
'equitable share of the contracting parties in such trade in the product'. Article XVI has,
however, proved to be particularly weak in limiting export subsidies as the 'equitable'
market share condition imposed on their use was never quantified, and several challenges
under the Article (particularly against the EC) have not been successful due to differing
interpretations of what constitutes an 'equitable' market share. Article XVII was
introduced in 1955 to deal with the quantities marketed by governments, and stated that
commercial considerations should govern such trade - no derogations or waivers were
applied to this Article. The formation of the EEC brought into being Article XXIV (as part .
of the Dillon Round) which recognised the right of contracting parties to enter into customs
unions on the condition that duty levels did not exceed those already existing in the
individual countries. Although the US secured some significant concessions in the form of
zero tariff bindings on soya and protein meal (i.e, free entry to the EC market for these
goods), the EC believed that the CAP policy instruments had been accepted under the
GATT. This belief has since been challenged, principally by the US, who argued that the
CAP should be liable to reform under the GAIT. Of some concern is the legality of the
variable import levy (VIL); Article XXIV provides for a common external tariff ~hich is
not 'on the whole higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties' of the
members of the customs union. The VIL could mean duties greater than those provided for
under this Article. Indeed Orville Freeman (US Agricultural Secretary during the Dillon
Round) likened the VIL to 'moving the high jump bar to disqualify even the most proficient
competitor' .
The treatment of agriculture under the GAIT has been called into question on more than
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one occasion. In 1958, the Harbeler Report set out detailed recommendations for
reforming the principles of the GAIT in relation to farm trade. It called for a free market
with the difference between world and domestic prices in those countries supporting their
farmers being eroded over a period of adjustment. The report 'succeeded in seriously
offending several European contracting parties, ...[but it] had a limited policy impact largely
because of US ambivalence towards its recommendations's'', The GATT Programme of
Action Directed Towards an Expansion of International Trade, Committee 11, although
simply a fact finding body popularized the idea of a liberalised market for agricultural
products. Its third report in 1962 argued that the proliferation of non-tariff barriers
seriously impeded the ability of the GAIT to deal with farm trade problems and advocated
a rapid adjustment to a free market system. The conclusions of the report highlighted the
real problem of dealing with agricultural protectionism within the GAIT structure.
The GAIT, as its name suggests, was primarily concerned in its early years with reducing
tariff protection. This it has done with some success in the industrial sectors which relied
more heavily on tariffs as forms of support, but the diversity of the measures used in the
agricultural sector necessarily called for a different approach. The approach of the
CONT~~.ACTING PARTIES was to virtually ignore the protectionist measures in the
agricultural sector except to change the rules to fit in with the various national policies; in
other sectors domestic policies were developed to fit in with the GAIT rules-].
In general three possible approaches to solving the problem of resolving conflicts in
international trade in agricultural products can be identified.
(i) Change the GAIT rules applying to agriculture to make the treatment of export
subsidies and the non-tariff barriers used in the sector consistent with the treatment of
other sectors, thus committing contracting parties to reducing these methods of
protection. This would allow countries to continue with internal farm income support
policies with the ensuing problem of over-supply, but without border protection and
export subsidisation downward pressure would be exerted on internal support prices.
(ii) Organise trade through a series of commodity agreements such that either each
contracting party had an equitable share of the market or prices could be maintained at
a higher level. The latter was proposed by the EC in the Pisani-Baumgeitner paper
(1961) as a way of reducing the level of domestic protection, not by price cutting
20 Catholic Institute (1989) p4.
21 Hathaway (1987) p104.
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(which could have proved politically difficult for both the US and the Ee) but by
raising world prices.
(iii) Reduce the level of overall support, including border measures, export subsidies and
domestic price support, either through a series of commitments to reduce individual
support measures for a particular commodity, or reducing an aggregate measure of
support (AMS) which would account for all of the support policies used in a
particular sector
The latest GAIT Round - the Uruguay Round - has attempted to deal with the problem of
agricultural trade in a way that previous rounds have not. The following section examines
the attempts made within the GAIT rounds prior to the Uruguay Round to reform
agricultural trade in the light of the three approaches outlined above, while chapter 3 will
examine the UR itself in the same way.
2.2.3 The Early Rounds
Seven rounds of trade negotiations had taken place prior to the Uruguay Round. The initial
conference was held in Geneva in 1947; the GAIT itself was drafted to embody the results
of the tariff negotiations of this round. Further conferences were held in Annecy (1949)
and Torquay (1951), primarily to facilitate the accession of those countries who had not
participated in the Geneva round, although some tariff reductions were negotiated at
Torquay. Another set of conferences held in Geneva (1955-56) mainly dealt with the
accession of Japan and minor rule changes (e.g. the Section 22 waiver which, in the
context of the GAITs total coverage, was a minor change). The more well-known, and
perhaps more significant, rounds began with the Dillon Round (1960-62), which was
followed by the Kennedy Round (1964-67) and the Tokyo Round (1973-79).
The Dillon Round
The Dillon round was primarily concerned with the inclusion of the embryonic EEe within
the GAIT framework, which necessitated rule changes. As has already been stated, the
result of discussions was the addition of Article XXIV to the GAIT to allow for customs
unions. The tariff discussions of the round were split into two parts; the first decided on
the levels of the common external tariffs of the Six. At the insistence of the other
contracting parties, the common tariffs were established such that losses in anyone non-
EEe member country were balanced by gains. The process took nine months. The second
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part of the Round was aimed at a product-by-product tariff reduction (including the new
EEC tariffs). Although progress was made in industrial sectors, the reductions were less
than the 20 per cent expected. In agriculture, the new Article was taken by the EEC to
mean an acceptance of the CAP with very little adjustment (concessions on access to EEC
markets). However, soon after the Dillon Round agreement the US position changed;
concerns about the CAP's effects on US agricultural exports becam~ the dominant feature
of US attitudes to agricultural trade.
The Kennedy Round
As in earlier rounds the emphasis of the Kennedy Round was on the reduction of tariffs.
The US proposed a change in the method of tariff reduction from a product-by-product
approach to some form of linear tariff reduction (i.e. a set percentage reduction in all
tariffs). For industrial products this was implemented with an average tariff reduction of
35 per cent (table 2.1). In agriculture, growing US hostility towards the CAP lead to a
remarkable U-turn by US negotiators. They argued for a return to the original GATT
notion of a market-oriented trading system for both industrial and agricultural products.
This was essentially an attack on the VIL system of the CAP. Having spent most of the
Dillon Round negotiating the necessary changes in member states duties on imports from
third countries, the Community was understandably unwilling to dismantle the CAP, and
indeed advocated the extension of the CAP's principles to the world market. The central
elements of the Community's position were the setting up of 'world commodity
agreements' and the binding of support levels (as measured by the difference between
domestic prices and an external reference price which would take into ac~ount realistic
production costs and the price-depressing effects of subsidised exports). Contracting
parties would agree a reference level below which exporters would not sell; thus the cost of
domestic support would be reduced by raising world prices rather than cutting domestic
support prices.
The approaches of the EEC and the US were fundamentally different. The US essentially
proposed a change in the GATT rules for agriculture to bring them into line with those for
other sectors, while the EEC proposed organising trade to reduce the need for subsidised
exports and import levies (mainly as a cost-cutting exercise). Both positions were
understandable given the trading positions of the two - the EEC being a high-cost producer
and the US facing what it believed was as unfair competition. As a result of these
differences, little progress was made on agriculture in the Kennedy Round, although some
limited, temporary success was achieved in the cereals working group in the form of the
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International Grains Arrangement (IGA) which was aimed at price stabilisation. The IGA
had a short life, however, as surplus grain production pushed prices below the established
minimum and countries proved unwilling to restrain output.
The Tokyo Round
Agriculture was again on the agenda in the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) during which
negotiations were to be oriented towards liberalisation of agricultural trade while taking
account of the special characteristics and problems of the farm sector. Disagreements on
fundamental issues, principally between the EC and the US, persisted throughout the
Round, so that while industrial tariffs were cut by on average a third, tariff reductions in
the agricultural sector were restricted almost entirely to tropical products. As in the
Kennedy Round, the EC stated that the principles and mechanisms of the CAP were not a
matter for negotiation. The Community saw the appropriate GATT action to be commodity
arrangements aimed at market stabilisation rather than liberalisation. The US on the other
hand stuck steadfastly to the free market ethos. Fundamental questions were raised about
the US commitment to this by, for example, Canada and France, who argued that
deficiency payments in support of loan rates set below production costs represented export
subsidies rather than the 'decoupled' (not related to or affecting production) income
payment claimed by the US. The Tokyo Round did produce two commodity agreements
(for dairy products and for meat), but neither had the strength to stabilise world markets for
those products. .
Overall, the GATT has been successful in reducing tariff levels among the contracting
parties for industrial products (see table 2.1). The question of non-tariff barriers,
particularly in agriculture and in the service sector, has not been addressed so successfully.
The diverse measures used to support farm incomes in the industrialised countries, and
perhaps ~ore importantly, the differing ideologies of the EC and US with respect to free
trade in agricultural products, have made it difficult for any progress to be made within the
GATT framework.
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Table 2.1
The extent of the GATT
No. of Value of trade
countries covered
($ biUiQn)
Geneva (1947) 23 10
Annecy (1949) 33 nla
Torquay (1950) 34 nla
Geneva (1955156) 22 2.5
Dillon (1960/62) 45 4.9
Kennedy (1964/67) 48 40
Tokyo (1973n9) 99 155
Notes: nla not available
Source: Jackson (1990) p53
Average tariff
cut
(%)
35
nla
n/a
nla
nla
35
34
2.3 Conclusion
The original GATT made no distinction between trade in agricultural products and
industrial products - both were to be liberalised. The US, however, using its very
powerful position in the international arena after the Second World War, managed to gain
derogations from the GATT rules for its agricultural sector, such that the GATT rules for
agriculture became de facto an extension of US farm policy and allowed trade restrictions
to be imposed if imports threatened the effectiveness of domestic farm-income support
policies. The development of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) challenged US
dominance in the world cereals market and prompted them to attack the mechanisms of the
CAP on several occasions. Initially the main bone of contention was the EC's variable
import levy, but as the EC became a net exporter the export subsidy system was also
attacked. Attempts to reduce the level of protectionism within the framework of GATT
rounds have not on the whole been successful. The methods of reform suggested have
included changing the GATT rules such that agricultural trade was treated in the same way
as trade in other products, and organising agricultural trade to stabilise and raise prices on
the world market, thereby reducing the need for domestic price support. An additional
possible approach, reducing the overall level of support, has been introduced in the
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. In the next chapter, the proposals of the main
participants in the Uruguay Round on agricultural trade reform will be discussed in the light
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of the three possible methods highlighted in section 2.2.2 (namely changing the GATT
rules, organising trade and reducing the overall level of support).
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Chapter 3
The Uruguay Round
3.1 Towards Another Round
The success of the GATT in liberalising trade in manufactured goods led to a steady
increase in the volumes traded on the world market in the post-war period. However, a
recession in the developed countries in 1974-75 heralded the beginning of what has been
called the 'new protectionism', based on increased use of 'voluntary' export restraints and
'orderly marketing arrangements'. By the early 1980s, the world trading system was
characterised by a general slowdown in the growth of volumes traded, a significant debt-
induced reduction in developing country imports, a widespread disregard for the
established GATT rules, and a widening of trade imbalances, especially in the US and
Japan. A GATT ministerial meeting was called in 1982 to reaffirm the commitment of
contracting parties to the free trade principle. In the event, disagreements emerged as to
which rules should govern trade. In 1983 a new major round of trade negotiations was
proposed which would bring areas of trade not previously covered under the auspices of
GAIT and, where necessary, amend the rules, in addition to reducing the level of trade
restrictions. Although Japan made the first formal proposal for a negotiating round, the US
was the principal instigator of the round, possibly because the Reagan administration saw
trade talks as a way of easing domestic protectionist pressures. The agenda for the
negotiations largely reflected American concerns. These included agreements on
liberalising trade in services (possibly through a General Agreement on Trade in Services -
GATS) and high in technology goods, the liberalisation of import controls in the newly
industrialising countries, establishing international rules on 'intellectual property', and,
perhaps most importantly, the reduction of protection in agricultural markets.
The problems in agricultural trade stem partly from underlying structural factors!- but
have been exacerbated by government intervention in support of domestic agriculture by the
industrialised countries - largely the US, the Ee and Japan. These agricultural policies
The structural problems are summarized by Hine et aJ (1989a pI) as follows
'in the rich countries, the two main factors increasing demand - population growth and rising incomes -
operate only weakly for foodstuffs. In the poor countries, demand for food and feed is strong but is
constrained by shortages of foreign exchange.'
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have caused considerable damage to the economies of smaller agricultural exporters, for
example Australia and New Zealand, and developing countries. In addition, the policies
are very costly to consumers and taxpayers in the industrial countries and concerns about
large transfers were also growing. The US had some strong allies in its call for agricultural
trade liberalisation (especially Australia and New Zealand), although the EC made it clear
that the principal mechanisms of the CAP were not negotiable, this being a (justifiable)
response to suspicions that the US would mount an attack on the Community's export
refund and variable levy systems as it had in earlier rounds. The scene was thus set for the
Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations to become yet another forum for the US and the EC to
air their differences over agricultural policy. After much haggling, during which
agriculture emerged as the single most divisive issue when setting the 15 point agenda, the
UR was finally launched in September 1986.
3.2 The Early StaKes
3.2.1 The Punta del Este Declaration
In the Punta del Este Declaration, which set the framework for the UR, all of the
participants recognised that world trade in agricultural products was badly distorted by
government policies to support domestic farmers. The Declaration called for 'greater
liberalisation of trade in agriculture' and 'more operationally effective GATT rules and
disciplines' regarding 'all measures affecting import access and export competition'.
However, substantial differences of opinion between the US and EC as to how far
agricultural support should be reduced resulted in a non-specific commitment to a) improve
'the competitive environment by increasing discipline on the use of all direct and indirect
subsidies and other measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade, including the
phased reduction of their negative effects and dealing with their causes', and b) reduce
import barriers including those relating to animal health (sanitary) and plant (phytosanitary)
regulations. With hindsight, although this represented a significant departure from earlier
rounds where internal policies were regarded as non-negotiable, the lack of methodological
direction in the early stages of the UR inevitably meant that the negotiations would become
dominated by the ideologically opposed positions of the US and EC rather than a forum for
real discussion. The initial proposals for the implementation of the Punta del Este
Declaration mainly dealt with methodological issues, such as how support was to be
reduced, and indeed, what the final aim should be; the magnitude of the reductions in
agricultural support was not quantified. The proposals offered various ways of reducing
3-3
the overall level of support to agriculture (individual commitments to cut export
subsidisation, import protection and domestic income support, the latter largely being
through reductions in an aggregate measure of support (AMS)), with some changes to the
GA'IT rules to facilitate this.
3.2.2 The Initial Negotiating Positions
Negotiations began in February 1987 and by the end of 1988 seven proposals for the
implementation of the Punta del Este Declaration had been tabled.
The USA presented the first proposal in July 1987; it contained a call for the elimination of
all policies which distorted agricultural trade, including sanitary and phytosanitary
regulations, by the year 2000 - the now infamous 'zero option'. More specifically the
negotiating framework in the US proposal had four main elements:
(a) agreement on a measure of agricultural support (such as the OECD Producer Subsidy
Equivalent (PSE)) and a schedule for reducing it to zero over a ten-year period;
(b) agreement on comprehensive commodity coverage;
(c) the drafting of country programmes for the phasing out of support in the context of
binding GA'IT arrangements;
(d) agreement on the monitoring arrangements.
The US paper distinguished between agricultural support payments which affect production
and pricing decisions and direct 'decoupled' income support: the latter would not be within
the scope of the negotiations. Policies singled out for exclusion from the reform process
were restricted to ad hoc emergency payments and foreign and domestic aid programmes
while market-price support policies, income support and infrastructure supports (e.g.
research) were covered by the proposal. Itwas clear from the outset that the EC and Japan
would not accept these proposals as they stood and that they therefore represented an
extreme position which the US would have to tone down during the negotiations.
The proposal submitted in October 1987 by the Cairns Group (CG)2 - a group of
fourteen countries with an interest in agricultural trade expansion, which are, in general,
countries 'with a comparative advantage in agriculture whose export interests have
increasingly been frustrated by the export subsidy battle between the US and EC' (Hine et
2 The members of the Cairns Group are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Fiji, Hungary,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay.
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al. ,1989a, p20) - fell in the middle ground, but was philosophically closer to the US
position in its concern to liberalise agricultural trade, differing from it with regard to the
method of achieving freer trade. The long-term aims of the CG were the binding of all
levies on all agricultural produce at zero or near zero levels, and special GATT disciplines
for all other support measures relating to agriculture. In the shorter-term, however, the CG
proposed 'early relief measures' committing exporters to the non-disruptive release of
stocks, s freeze on existing trade barriers and subsidies affecting trade, increased access
levels and the introduction of phased reductions in export and production subsidies. An
'intermediate reform programme', operating over a ten-year period, was proposed to
provide the basis of the long-term reform. It was envisaged that the intermediate
programme would require additional specific commitments to reduce support to agreed
levels (as measured by the PSE or a variant of it), with special emphasis on the most trade-
distorting policies. Like the us, the CG also proposed the exclusion of 'decoupled'
income support from the negotiations.
The E.C position (October 1987) represented a political and philosophical framework for
implementing the Punta del Este Declaration which was far removed from that of the US
and CG. Although the EC had conceded to the US demand that agriculture should be on
the Uruguay Round agenda, it sought to restrict the parameters of the reform debate,
insisting thatall of the CAP mechanisms be retained. Thus the EC stressed the need for
long-term liberalisation of agricultural trade as opposed to the shorter-term full
liberalisation stance taken by the US and CG. The emphasis of the EC proposal was on
raising world prices, through market intervention, in order to reduce the costs of farm
income support, whilst the US and CG view was that market instability (including price
cuts) was a necessary short-term cost of achieving higher equilibrium market prices in the
longer term. The EC did, however, accept the need for a significant long-term reduction
(not elimination) of support spending and was prepared to consider levels of protection
being bound under the GATT. Originally the EC advocated a phased, commodity-specific
approach using a measure of support based broadly on the OECD's Producer Subsidy
Equivalent (PSE). The chosen measure would, the EC argued, need to give credit for
production restraints as they put upward pressure on prices and hence reduced the amount
of farm income support. In a later proposal (October 1988), the EC suggested that the
support cuts be made over a five-year period beginning in 1984 to give the EC credit for the
introduction of milk quotas in the 1984/85 marketing year. In the important cereals, sugar
and dairy sectors, the EC proposed short-term actions to induce market stability in order to
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reduce subsidy levels - for cereals and cereal substitutes the Community proposed
minimum export prices and one-year renewable market sharing arrangements; for sugar it
supported a reduction in world exports but not a redistribution of market shares or the
renegotiation of the International Sugar Arrangement (the latter being important to
developing country exporters). More controversially, the EC proposed that the GATT
should allow 'more balanced protection': in other words the EC should be allowed to
'rebalance' its support. In practice, this would have meant the withdrawal of the GAIT
zero bindings of import restrictions on soyabeans and cereal substitutes in order to reduce
the budgetary cost of support to the oilseed sector and stimulate the use of domestic cereals
for animal feed.
The Japanese proposal (December 1987)was the most conservative. While conceding that
some degree of liberalisation in its import policy could be discussed, this was to be
subordinated to social issues such as food security, rural development, regional
employment and environmental protection. Japan argued for the elimination of export
subsidies (hardly a significant concession for a major importer!), and on the issue of
improved market access proposed that tariffs could be reduced using traditional GAIT
'request-and-offer' procedures while quantitative restrictions would, in principle, be
gradually eliminated. Japan proposed the clarification (but retention) of the rules covering
the use of waivers contained in Article XI:2 which permitted the retention of import quotas
to buttress food security. The use of aggregate measures of protection and support such as
the PSE was considered to be unnecessary.
The Nordic Countries position (December 1987) was somewhere between that of the EC
and the CG. The paper called for a reduction in the overall level of agricultural support and
protection to be achieved through a removal of internal subsidies, price reductions, a
reduction on subsidised exports and special measures for supply management.
While the major input of the developin&nations in the Uruguay Round was through the
Cairns Group, other contributions came from food-importing developing countries. A
proposal in September 1988 by Egypt, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco and Peru, supported by
a number of other developing countries, envisaged a formula reduction of tariffs to zero or
very low levels and changing the GAIT rules to improve the competitive environment. It
stressed, however, that the new rules would have to take account of the special
circumstances of developing countries with respect to their dependence on agricultural
trade. Korea (October 1988) also stressed the need for developing countries to be treated
3-6
differently especially with regard to developing agricultural infrastructure and security of
supply in basic foodstuffs. It proposed strengthening the GATT rules and the progressive
reduction of trade-distorting subsidies (over a longer time frame for the developing
countries).
3.3 The Mid-Term Review
Held in December 1988 in Montreal, the Mid-Term Review was to have marked the
beginning of serious negotiations. The objective was to reach agreement on the broad
parameters of multilateral trade reform in all of the 15 negotiating areas. In the event,
progress was only made in 11, with intellectual property rights, textiles, safeguards and
agriculture proving to be the sticking points. As in other rounds, the US and the EC were
the main protagonists with the Cairns Group representing the middle ground.
Before the meeting, the prospects of an agreement of sorts seemed possible. In preliminary
meetings in Washington and Brussels, the US had indicated a willingness to move towards
the CG plan for a schedule of short-term scaling-down of agricultural support - something
the EC was prepared to negotiate upon - although it still maintained its insistence that
commitments on the long-term elimination of support were a prerequisite to any
discussions on lowering it in the short-term. In Montreal, when negotiators were asked to
determine whether the aim of the Round was 'the elimination or the substantial reduction of
trade-distortive support and protection', the US refused to budge from its position while
the EC refused to consider any undertaking which would effectively dismantle the CAP.
Indeed the EC maintained that the long-term goal of the round should be the lowering of
support. The CG, in an attempt to overcome the difficulties, urged the US to drop its 'zero
option' in return for a 10 per cent cut in farm support before December 1990. While not
agreeing with figures in the CG plan, the EC had shown itself willing to use it as a basis
for negotiation. The US, on the other hand, feared (with considerable justification) that the
EC would offer only modest cuts and insist that the reductions made in support since 1984
be taken into consideration. If this were the case then the gain to the US in terms of
reduced competition for US farm exports would have been small.
With the main participants remaining at opposite ends of the reform spectrum, the Montreal
talks ended in an impasse. The only achievement in the Trade Negotiating Group (TNG)
for agriculture, albeit an important one, was the freeing of markets in developed countries
for developing countries' products.
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A decision was made to adjourn the talks until April 1989, and the Director General of the
GAIT, Arthur Dunkel was charged with resolving the impasse on agriculture, a difficult
task given the seemingly unbridgeable differences between the US and the EC. However,
Dunkel was able to reconvene the TNG for agriculture in April 1989 to discuss a text which
was based on the Chairman's report from Montreal.
3.4 The Geneva Accord
The Dunkel paper emphasised the short-term aspects of the negotiations and, perhaps more
significantly, did not call for the elimination of all trade-distorting agricultural support, but
rather 'substantial, progressive reductions of agricultural support and protection sustained
over an agreed period of time'. It included a recommendation for s freeze on support and
production control measures at the levels seen in 1988/89 for the remaining twenty months
of the UR (by implication criticising the United States' relaxation of their set-aside
programme in early 1989). The paper also took the realistic view that, unless some
recognition were given for CAP modifications made since 1984, the negotiations would
remain in stalemate (Agra Europe no. 1331, p Ell). A compromise starting date of
September 1986 was thus suggested to give credit for measures implemented since the
Punta del Este Declaration in 1986 which contributed to the reform process. It suggested
that the GAIT rules and disciplines should be strengthened and made more operationally
effective, with any new rules applying to all countries. In addition, a timetable for the final
stages of the negotiations was agreed; p~icipants were to submit proposals by December
1989 on 'all aspects of long-term reform ... including terms and use of AMS, decoupled
income support and other ways to adapt support and protection'; and a final ministerial
meeting to agree the reform process was set for December 1990. On the issue of export
subsidies, the paper recommended a freeze at the average level in the two most recent fiscal
years followed by progressive reductions.
At the Geneva meeting an accord was reached with relatively few adjustments to the Dunkel
text with the US abandoning the 'zero option'. The Accord should have provided the
impetus for a move away from methodological discussions towards negotiations on the
magnitude of support cuts. However, the papers presented to the GAIT after Geneva were
again methodological.
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3.5 The Post Geneva Accord Proposals. Autumn 1989
3.5.1 US
Although the US had officially abandoned the 'zero option' at Geneva, its October 1989
paper did not depart entirely from it. It contained proposals for the elimination of export
subsidies and export taxes (except food aid) over a five-year period beginning in January
1991; the elimination of domestic support affecting production and pricing decisions over a
ten-year period; and the reduction of all import protection to zero (or very low) tariffs over
a ten-year period. In order to achieve this, all bilateral deals, such as voluntary export
restraints (VERs) and minimum import price arrangements, would be banned and all other
border measures would be converted to tariff-equivalents or tariff-quotas, which would
also be phased out over the ten-year reform period. After ten years, the final bound tariff
would be the only permitted form of import protection. This became known as the
tariffication proposal. In addition, the US proposal also contained a recommendation that
all GATT derogations, including the US 1955 waiver. be eliminated.
On internal support. the US proposed a three-tier approach to reform. Existing domestic
farm support would be divided into three categories: those which were very trade-distorting
('red' policies) and would therefore be phased out over the ten-year period; those which
were harmful to trade (but less so than those in the first category) which would require
'GATT discipline' ('amber' policies); and those which were deemed not to be trade-
distorting ('green' policies). Measures faIling into the first category would include
administered price policies, income support policies linked to production or marketing
(including deficiency payments). input or investment subsidies not provided to producers
or processors of agricultural produce on an equal basis, and certain marketing programmes
(for example transport subsidies). On the other hand, the following policies would be
permitted: income support measures not linked to production or marketing. environmental
and conservation programmes. bona fide disaster and domestic food aid, general services
(including certain marketing services such as inspection and grading). resource retirement
programmes (for example, set-aside) and certain stockpiling of food which did not directly
affect price or income support. All other policies would be allowed only under strict GATT
disciplines and these too would be reduced during the reform period using an AMS such as
the OECD PSE.
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3.5.2 CG
The CG proposals followed the liberalising objectives of the US proposal, but took into
account considerations such as food security and the maintenance of modest support in the
farm sectors of less developed countries. The paper stated that the long-term aim of the
Uruguay Round should be 'the establishment of a fair and market-oriented agricultural
trading system'. The CG envisaged a reform process over a ten-year period which
provided no scope for raising protection of any product except under 'carefully
circumscribed safeguard provisions'. On border protection, the CG also proposed the
tariffication of all non-tariff barriers with the resulting tariffs, and existing tariffs being
reduced to zero (or very low levels) by the end of the reform period. As in the US
proposal, all GAIT waivers, protocols or other derogations and exceptions would be
eliminated. It also proposed minimum access levels into markets where protection had the
effect of prohibiting imports of agriculturalproduce (for example the Japanese rice market).
Export subsidies would be phased out over the ten years, new export subsidies would be
prohibited, and measures to prevent subsidised exports being disguised as food aid would
be introduced. In the short term, the level of export subsidies would be frozen in
accordance with the Geneva Accord. Internal support would be reduced on the basis of
agreed percentage cuts in an AMS which would be calculated using the average support
levels in 1986-1988. Like the US, the CG also made a three tier classification of support
policies but the emphasis of the reduction process in the CG proposal was on market price
support policies and direct payments so that the effective price farmers received for their
output, and the quantities subsidised, would be lowered.
3.5.3 EC
The EC paper, submitted after those of the US and CG, stressed that the aim of the Round
could only be to progressively reduce support 'to the extent necessary to re-establish
balanced markets and a more market oriented agricultural trading system' and that the
setting of a final absolute level of support was not an objective. The EC proposal rested on
the reduction of internal support with the commitments being made on the basis of the
Community'S chosen AMS, the Support Measurement Unit (SMU), using 1986 as a base
year (as agreed in the Geneva Accord). The reductions would be agreed as percentage
reductions in the SMU, which would not necessarily be of the same magnitude for all
products or groups of products, over an initial five-year period. Further reductions would
be negotiated in the fourth year of the initial period. The EC paper made it clear that it
found the US tariffication proposal unacceptable, arguing that protection based exclusively
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on tariffs which would then be reduced to zero would lead to instability in world markets,
which would in tum be imported into domestic markets and lead to 'consequences for
production and trade which are not the result of normal competition'. However, the EC
recommended 'partial tariffication' of some border protection measures and deficiency
payments, subject to the 'rebalancing' of protection. This controversial proposal would
have allowed the EC to increase support for oilseeds and cereal substitutes in return for
reducing support on other products. The partial-tariffication proposal involved replacing
variable levies and non-tariff barriers with a tariff consisting of two elements - a fixed tariff
which would be reduced in line with reductions in the SMU, and a variable element (the
corrective factor) which would be used to offset world price and exchange rate fluctuations
beyond certain limits. The EC did not make explicit proposals for the reduction of export
subsidies, except to say that they would be reduced as a result of the reductions in the
SMU.
The meeting of the TNO on agriculture in December 1989 to discuss progress in the Round
produced positive reactions from the US and CG given the EC's willingness to consider
some form of tariffication (although this was dissipated somewhat by the EC's insistence
that the Community's dual pricing system would remain intact). However, at meetings
early in 1990, the main protagonists seemed as far apart as ever. The EC's proposals were
condemned by the CO for 'coming from the minimalist end of the reform scale' while the
CO, EC and Japan called into question US motives in the Round. The proposals for the
1990 Farm Bill did not confirm the US's commitment to thelong-term (theoretical) rhetoric
of their GATT proposals; they were essentially a continuation of the support policies with a
few refinements and an increased export enhancement programme to help US exporters
regain markets lost by the 'unfair' trading practices of other countries (i.e. the EC) .
.Attempts by Aart de Zeeuw, chairman of the GATT agricultural committee, to assemble a
document outlining and refining the negotiating positions of the participants in order that
the Round could progress were hampered by the attitudes of the EC and Japan, while the
US restated that it would not settle for modest reforms in agriculture simply to achieve
overall accord in the Round.
3.6 The De Zeeuw Framework
The final draft text from the OATT Secretariat was issued in June 1990 to provide a
framework for agreement at the July meeting of the agriculture TNC. The text highlighted
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the major issues which would have to be resolved at the ministerial meeting in December
1990 and aimed to direct the negotiations away from methodological argument and towards
discussions on the magnitude of cut in agricultural protection by offering possible solutions
in four broad, but interrelated, areas.
(a) Import Protection
- conversion of all border measures other than normal customs duties into tariff-
equivalents, irrespective of the level of existing tariffs;
- upward movement of these tariff equivalents to be prohibited while downward
movements were negotiated;
- maintenance of current access opportunities through the use of, amongst other things,
tariff quotas;
- where only minimal imports existed, the establishment of a minimum level of access
from 1991/92 using tariff quotas ;
- all existing tariff rates to be frozen in the short-term at current levels.
Tariffs and tariff equivalents would then be reduced from 1991/92 levels at an average
rate over a number of years; both to be agreed. Provision would be made for temporary
tariff increases in exceptional circumstances.
(b) Export subsidies
The paper suggested that participants agree that all budgetary assistance for exports be
effectively reduced more than other forms of support and protection (this proved to be a
major sticking point for the Ee), and that the basis for negotiating a reduction in export
assistance should be the three most recent marketing/financial years:
(c) Internal support measures
Policy coverage would include market price support measures (i.e. those which
maintained 'producer prices at levels above those prevailing in international trade'),
direct payments to producers (including deficiency payments), and measures to reduce
the costs of agricultural inputs and marketing. Policies which did not distort markets
would be excluded from 'progressive and substantial reduction'. An AMS would be
used to measure support levels and the cuts. This would be calculated for each
commodity, using a base year of 1988 and a fixed reference price based on 1986 - 1988
data. The latter could be re-assessed periodically.
(d) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and Barriers
A GATT Working Group- would complete the text to form the basis of negotiations
3 A Working Group consists of a number of specialists who are assembled to deal with particular discussions or
disputes.
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in this area.
The paper was a political compromise incorporating ideas from each of the major
proposals, and was intended to enhance the chance of a final agreement in December. The
July meeting of the TNG agreed that the paper should be 'used as a means to intensify the
negotiations' - in other words it was not to form the basis of a final agreement .. The
meeting did, however, agree a strict timetable for the remaining fifteen working weeks of
the Round.
1 October 1990 Countries to submit detailed lists of their current farm support
measures.
15 October 1990 - Offers to be tabled on reducing surport to farmers.
23 November 1990 - Documents for the final December meeting to be ready.
Mr Dunkel, Director General of the GATT, stated that the final documents would have to
reduce to the barest minimum the number of policy decisions that ministers would have to
take in December, and stressed the need to adhere to the timetable if the Round were to
produce any agreement.
3.7 The 'Final' Ne2otiatin2 Positions of the Major Players (December
1990)
In accordance with the timetable agreed at the July meeting of the TNC for agriculture, the
US and CG submitted detailed proposals for the long-term reform of agricultural trade in
October 1990. Both proposals reflected the compromise paper put forward by De Zeeuw
(although the American paper contained some significant amendments). Disagreements
within the EC, firstly between Commissioners and then between ministers in the
Agriculture Council, meant that the EC did not submit its text until November. The EC's
paper followed the format of its earlier proposals in calling for a reduction in the SMU as
the main method of reform rather than accepting the three area programme of the De Zeeuw
framework. The papers offered some numerical indication of the reductions each of the
participants was prepared to make in agricultural support, and as such represented a move
forward. However, the EC, as expected, offered a far lower reduction than either the US
orCG.
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3.7.1 Import Protection
There appeared to be a consensus among the protagonists about the need to deal with both
tariff and non-tariff barriers to agricultural imports independently of any commitment on
other support policies. The US retained the 'tariffication' proposal of earlier papers under
which all non-tariff barriers would be converted to percentage ad valorem tariff equivalents
'based on the average gap between external and internal prices during the 1986-1988 base
period's, These newly converted tariffs would be reduced by an average 75 per cent
over ten years with the maximum permissible ad valorem tariff allowed by 2000 being 50
per cent. Where products are currently subject to an effective import ban (for example in
the Japanese rice market), a minimum access level of 3 per cent of domestic consumption
would be established, using tariff-quotas, and subsequently expanded over ten years (in
other cases, a minimum access level of 3 per cent of imports would be provided through
tariff-quotas). The US proposed that farmers should be shielded from abrupt swings in
world market prices or exchange rates. To prevent trade causing severe disruption to
domestic market prices, a "tariff snapback" was written into the paper to allow for increases
in protection of a particular commodity if imports exceeded 120 per cent of the previous
year's level or if import prices fell below 75 per cent of the average price in the 3 preceding
years. This represented a more generous safeguard than in the 1989 paper, where imports
would have had to exceed 120-160 per cent of year-earlier levels to qualify for protection,
and was probably a response to pressure from the EC and Canada.
The CG proposed a 75 per cent 'trade weighted' reduction in border protection over the
ten-year reform period (1991 to 2000) with a minimum reduction of 50 per cent on each
agricultural tariff line. This would be achieved through cuts in tariffs and in non-tariff
barriers which would be converted to tariff-equivalents (i.e. tariffication). These
conversions would be subject to the maintenance of current access opportunities through
tariff-quotas; where prohibitive measures existed a minimum access level of 5 per cent of
domestic consumption would be provided in 1991192 through tariff-quotas. In both cases,
the tariff-quotas would be expanded at the same rate as the tariffs are reduced over the
reform period. Any tariffs which remained higher than 50 per cent at the end of the reform
period would be reduced to that level.
The EC's partial-tariffication plan was elaborated upon with the fixed element of the tariff-
equivalent being reduced over the five-year period to 1995/96 by an annual amount
reflecting the SMU reduction for that year. For the purpose of calculation, the fixed
4 US Agriculture Proposal presented to the GAIT IS October 1990.
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element would be defined as the difference between a representative price, based on the
average world market or import price for the years 1986-1988, and the average Community
support price (in most cases the intervention price), increased by 10 per cent to maintain
'Community preference', for the same period; in most cases, this would give lower
effective import protection than under the current variable levy system. The EC did not,
however, indicate the extent of the reduction in the fixed element; Commission proposals
for a 30 per cent cut were rejected by the Council in favour of a less specific commitment to
reduce tariffs 'once a year by an absolute amount which reflects the incidence of the SMU
reduction' (Agra Europe no.1414 p P/3). A 9 per cent uncounted franchise on the 'variable
element' (the gap between world market prices and the external representative price) would
mean that any world price fluctuation (in either direction) of less than this magnitude would
be borne by domestic exporters rather than the EC budget. In a move away from the
December 1989 proposal, however, compensatory payments (deficiency payments and
other direct producer subsidies) would be only partially converted to tariff-equivalents to
avoid 'unacceptable' consumer price increases. The Community view remained that
tariffication would only be acceptable 'to the extent that it will be possible to remedy
serious imbalances noted in support and protection measures'. In practice, this
'rebalancing' would mean the imposition of fixed tariffs on oilseeds, protein crops, maize
gluten and non-grain feeding stuffs (NGF) plus the introduction of tariff-quotas on oil seeds
and NGFs. The size of these tariff-quotas would be based on average imports for the
period 1986-1988. The fixed tariff would be 6 per cent for oilseeds and NGF's and 12 per
cent for other products on the list. The EC's rebalancing proposal was, however, not
accepted by either the US or the CG.
3.7.2 Export Competition
This area proved to be one of the major stumbling blocks at the abortive December 1990
meeting, as the EC was alone in insisting that export subsidies should not be singled out
for special treatment (as had been suggested by De Zeeuw) because they would
automatically be reduced as the overall level of support was reduced. Indeed the EC paper
maintained the Community view that agreement could be reached to maintain the levels of
export refunds such that 'insofar as world market prices remain stable' they would not
exceed the difference between internal prices and some agreed world reference price and
would not be greater than any import levy for the same product. In addition, the subsidy
granted on processed products would be limited to that for the basic agricultural product
content. The paper called for a formal GATT statement concerning the control of export
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credits (such as those under the US Export Enhancement Program) and an improvement of
the rules on food aid and preferential sales. On the other hand, the US and CG proposed
separate reduction targets for export subsidisation. The US called for a 90 per cent
reduction in export subsidies on primary agricultural products over ten years; for processed
products export subsidies would be phased out over six years. Using the annual average
for 1986-1988 as a base period, these reductions in export subsidies would be on the basis
of both the total budget outlay on such programmes and the physical quantities exported
with the aid of subsidies. The CG also proposed that total budgetary outlays on export
assistance, including deficiency payments and per unit export subsidies, and the quantities
of subsidised exports, be reduced by no less than 90 per cent from the average annual level
in the years 1987-89. In 'addition, the extension of export subsidy schemes to products or
markets which did not qualify for export assistance in 1987-1989, would not be allowed.
Special rules would apply for food aid.
3.7.3 Internal Support
The US plan called for a reduction of 75 per cent in trade-distorting internal support,
between 1991 and 2000, on the basis of a commodity-specific AMS, expressed as the total
monetary value of support, using the average of 1986-1988 as a base. The 75 per cent cut
would apply to 'the most trade-distorting' domestic subsidies while a cut of 30 per cent
would apply to a single-sector wide AMS applied to policies that were 'generally available
to all commodities's. The so-called 'green light' policies (income safety-net policies,
environmental protection, domestic food aid, marketing and research services) would not
be liable for any reductions under the US proposal; however, they would have to be
implemented in such a way as to have a minimal impact on trade. Under the CG proposal,
trade-distorting internal support would be reduced by no less than 75 per cent over a ten-
year period starting in 1991192, using (where possible) commodity-specific AMSs as
reference tools, expressed in total monetary value. The base year for the AMS would be
1988, with reductions being subject to a cut-off level of 5 per cent of the value of
production, below which further reductions would not be required. The EC's paper
contained an offer to reduce support and protection for the Community'S major products by
30 per cent between 1986 and 1995/96. The level of support would be measured by the
Community'S preferred AMS, the SMU, expressed in total monetary value for the
following groups of products; cereals and rice, sugar, oil seeds and protein pulses, olive oil
and animal products. Budget-induced reforms of the CAP which had taken place since
S ibid.
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1986 would reduce the required cuts in support from 1991192 to 1995/96.
3.8 The 'Final' Meetin2
Although the December 1990 meeting was to have produced a final "agreement in all of the
15 areas identified in the Punta del Este declaration, in the event the agricultural discussions
dominated the proceedings, and ultimately it was the EC's rejection of separate
commitments to reduce export refunds which caused the breakdown of the entire
negotiations. The other participants appeared to be prepared to negotiate on the depth and
timing of the cuts, but were not prepared to concede to the EC's argument that reductions in
the SMU would automatically lead to commensurate cuts in export subsidisation and border
protection, so that specific commitments in these areas would not be necessary. In
addition, the US and CG remained adamantly opposed to the EC's rebalancing proposal.
An attempt at compromise by the Swedish farm minister, Mats Hellstrom, who chaired the
agriculture TNG in Brussels, was swiftly rejected by the EC. The Hellstrom 'non-paper'
was based on a 30% reduction in subsidies over a 5-year period, beginning on 1st January
1991, using support levels in 1990 as a base. Internal support would be reduced in equal
instalments on a commodity -by-commodity basis. The policies which had had the most
distorting effects on the world market would bear the brunt of the cuts, but the use of an
AMS was not specified. On import protection, the Hellstrom paper called for a 30% cut in
border protection over the 5-year period but did not specify the method to be employed,
thus requiring ministers to agree the principles of 'tariffication' or 'partial tariffication'.
Commitments on export subsidies would be on the basis of reductions in budgetary
outlays, per-unit export subsidies or the quantity of a product receiving export assistance.
Food aid would be excluded. The approach deprived the EC of its claimed 'credit' for
support reforms since 19866, and would have represented an effective doubling of its
commitment to liberalisation. In addition, the rebalancing mechanism was ignored and
specific reductions in export subsidies included. It is hardly surprising therefore that the
EC representatives took less than an hour to reject it.
Although the EC did make some minor concessions during the dying hours of the meeting,
they were not enough to prevent the CG and the US from leaving the negotiating table, and
6 In fairness to the Ee it is unlikely that the US would have accepted 1990 as the base year for the liberalisation
process as it too was effectively claiming credit for policy reform since 1986 by proposing a base of 1986-
1988.
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the talks ended in disarray.
3.9 Developments After December 1990
The Uruguay Round negotiations were restarted by Mr Dunkel in February 1991 as
officials from all of the contracting parties (including the EC) undertook to reach 'specific
and binding commitments to reduce farm income support in each of three areas; internal
assistance, border protection, and export subsidies' (FT 2212/91)7. However, the EC
did not abandon its rebalancing proposal and continued to insist that the base year for any
GATT agreement should be 1986. It also maintained that it could not improve on the
commitment to reduce support by 30 per cent over a ten-year reform period. The US and
CG maintained their more liberalizing positions. By May 1991 it was clear to all observers
that the GATT officials and the other participating countries were tired of the battle between
the US and EC in the agricultural negotiations; the US and EC were reprimanded by Mr.
Dunkel for having spent the whole of the Round dealing in rhetoric. He warned that 'the
days of passing the buck all around the globe as a means of avoiding the crucial political
challenges in trade policies are long gone' (Agra Europe no.1440 p P/3). However, in mid-
1991 the prospects for an agreement improved slightly. In June Congress extended the US
'fast track' negotiating authority for two years. This ensured that any agreement reached in
the GATT negotiations could not be altered by Congress, but had to be ratified, or rejected,
in its entirety; without this safeguard it is unlikely that the other contracting parties would
have continued with the Round. In addition, internal pressures for an agreement in the
agricultural negotiations as a prelude to agreements in the important areas of services and
intellectual property grew in the US such that a compromise on agriculture could be
envisaged. Perhaps the most encouraging development, however, was the continued
budgetary crisis. in the EC, which prompted the Commission to suggest substantial
revisions of the CAP. The Community insisted that these proposed reforms were
independent from the GATT, and that they in no way changed their negotiating position,
but the extent of the proposed cuts in support prices, especially in the cereals sector (35 per
cent over 3 years), indicated to the US and CG that the EC was serious about agricultural
policy reform (see chapter 2, section 2.1.1 for an exposition of the 'MacSharry Plan' for
EC agricultural policy reform).
Despite the optimistic signs there was a worrying lull in the serious negotiations during the
7 Some pundits argue that the EC 'did not object' to the formula rather than actually supporting it.
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summer of 1991. What can only be called 'bickering' took over. Occasionally. significant
persons made general commitments to reach an agreement. for example. the leaders of the
seven leading economies (G-7) in July. and a tentative proposal by the EC Commission to
improve its offer to the UR in September (this effectively amounted to abandoning the 1986
base year; however, as EC spending on agriculture had risen so much in 1990/91 as to
virtually wipe out any 'gains' made since 1986 anyway, this was not such a significant
move as it might first appear), but no progress was actually made. The US was accused of
losing interest in the UR in favour of the negotiations on a 'North American Free Trade
Area' (between Canada, Mexico and the US). The EC was accused by the US and CG of
employing rhetoric rather than 'putting flesh on the bones' of its "new" proposals.
Australia and Canada blamed the Ec/uS export subsidy 'war' for the plight of their cereal
farmers; Canada threatened unspecified retaliatory steps against the EC if progress was not
made by the end of the year towards ending the subsidy war' (FT 8.10.91). Meanwhile
Japan, which had remained in the background at the Brussels meeting, re-stated that it
would not accept UR proposals which included the tariffication, and subsequent
liberalisation of Japanese rice imports. In early June, Carla Hills, the US Trade
Representative, declared that the Round would be finished by Christmas 1991, but later,
more pessimistically, stated that March 1992 would be a more realistic date. (Given that
the US Presidential election campaign would have been underway by then, March 1992
was probably the last possible date for an agreement in order to give the US time to ratify
it.) In the autumn of 1991, however, the prospects for an agreement began to improve. At
an EC-US summit in The Hague on November 9, President Bush scaled down US targets
for reductions in export subsidies from the original 90 per cent over 10 years to 30-35 per
cent over 5 or 6 years. This represented a considerable narrowing of the gap between the
US and EC and prompted a tentative resumption of negotiations, albeit with several
difficult methodological issues to be solved. Firstly, agreement was needed on whether the
commitment on export subsidisation should be in terms of budgetary expenditure or
volumes exported, the EC favouring the former while the US stated that this would not
result in as significant a reduction in subsidised EC cereals exports as it envisaged.
Secondly, although all protagonists agreed that tariffication should be adopted, the technical
details of how this should occur, and whether a mechanism allowing adjustments to the
resulting tariffs for currency and world price fluctuations should be incorporated, still had
to be decided. Thirdly, the USA maintained that the EC rebalancing proposal was
unacceptable while the EC insisted that it could not reach an agreement without it; in
December, however, the EC scaled down its rebalancing proposal such that import
protection would only apply to certain cereal substitutes rather than all oil seeds (Agra
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Europe 1470, pE3). Finally, while the USA conceded that its deficiency payments scheme
was 'amber box' (i.e. production positive), the EC wished to classify compensatory
payments proposed as part of the MacSharry plan as 'green box' (i.e. non-distorting). It is
clear that the MacSharry compensatory payments cannot be classified as 'production
neutral'; they are conditional on land being set aside, and adjustments can be made to the
amount received in each marketing year if land is bought or sold.
The Dunkel Compromise Paper
On December 20 Arthur Dunkel issued a 'Compromise Paper' which was intended to have
been a 'take it or leave it' document aimed at inducing a satisfactory end to the negotiations
in all areas in as short a time as possible. The agricultural section was split into 3 main
sections: agreement was to be reached on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the
differential treatment of less developed countries and on the reduction of support to
farmers. The latter was to be a three point programme with the now familiar reductions in
import protection, export subsidies and internal support. All non-tarrif import protection
would be converted to tariff-equivalents (full'tarrification'). Adjustments to the tariffs
would only be allowed if either imports reached 125 per cent of average imports in the
previous three years or prices fell below a trigger price equal to the average reference price
in 1986-1988. These newly converted tariffs and all existing tariffs would be subject to a
36 per cent reduction over the 6-year reform period (1993-1999), with a minimum
reduction on 15 per cent on each product. A minimum-access requirement of 3 per cent of
domestic consumption in 1993, rising to 5 per cent in 1999, would also be established.
The rebalancing proposal of the EC was left out of the Dunkel paper. On export subsidies,
Dunkel proposed a 36 per cent reduction in budgetary outlays and a 24 per cent reduction
in the quantities exported with export subsidies over the reform period using 1986-1990 as
the base period. Internal support would be reduced by 20 per cent by 1999, on the basis of
an agreed AMS, using 1986-1988 data to form the base figure. Criteria for determining
internal support policies which would not be subject to control, set out in an annex to the
agreement, effectively precluded the EC from including the MacSharry compensatory
payments in the 'green box', Reaction to the paper was mixed. Predictably it was the CG
who largely accepted the Compromise paper while the US and EC (along with Canada,
Japan, Norway, Switzerland and Korea) stated that it would provide a basis for further
negotiation. The EC in particular identified three main objections; (0 too large a concession
on import protection, (i i) the lack of any consideration of rebalancing and (i ii) the
classification of compensatory payments as production positive. Moreover the continued
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(and sometime acrimonious) domestic debate over the CAP reform proposed by MacSharry
meant that the Agriculture Council was in no mood to have any external constraints put on
their decision-making process.
The negotiations had seemingly reached stalemate until, after a prolonged debate, the EC
Council finally accepted a CAP reform package in May 1992. Adoption of the 'Cunha
Reforms' (a weakened version of the MacSharry plan described in section 2.1.1) cleared
the way for a resumption of at least US-EC negotiations. The breakthrough came in
November 1992, six years into the Round, with a bilateral agreement between the EC and
the USA which became known as the 'Blair House' Accord.
The Blair House Accord
Also known as the Washington Accord, the Blair House Accord amended the Dunkel
Compromise in several key areas. On border protection, the Accord called for a 36%
reduction in tariffs (after tariffication) over 6 years. For the Community, the initial tariff
would be the difference between the world market price and the intervention price,
increased by 10%, equivalent to a permanent 10%Community Preference. In other words,
even if the EC's internal price fell to the external reference price level, a 10% ad valorem
tariff would still remain (Rayner et al. 1993, p1520). On internal support, a reduction of
20% in a global AMS from a 1986-88 base was agreed, but direct aids (per hectare and
headage payments) adopted under the CAP reform programme were explicitly excluded
provided the aids were paid as part of a production limiting scheme. The classification of
these payments as 'green box' also meant that the deficiency payments paid under the
American programs would be exempted. On export subsidisation, the EC agreed to
comply with the Dunkel text except in the area of the quantitative reduction in subsidised
exports, where the commitment would be to a 21% reduction from base period exports
(compared to 24% in the Dunkel draft). This concession was viewed as potentially very
important; Guyomard et al. (1992) estimated that of the three areas for reduction, the
export subsidy reduction was the only one which could be binding on the EC (especially
with respect to grains and beef) and the USA (due to the Export Enhancement Programme).
Following the Blair House agreement, the emphasis of the UR negotiations moved away
from agriculture to other areas of contention (services, the MFA, market access).
December 1993 was set for the final meeting, at which the heads of government were to
sign the agreement.
3-21
3.10 The Urueuay Round Aereement for Aericulture
After 7 years of negotiation, the UR agreement was finally signed on 15th December 1993,
the last day of the US President's 'fast track' authority. Subject to ratification by the
government of each contracting party, the Agreement will run from July l st 1995 to June
30th 2001. For agriculture the agreement was essentially the same as that agreed bilaterally
by the USA and EC in Washington. The detail of the agreement is given below under the
three recognised headings of import protection, internal support and export subsidisation.
Import Protection
It was agreed that all border protection measures are to be changed into ad valorem
customs duties (i.e. "tariffication"). Once established, the tariffs are to be reduced by 36%
over the 6 year period, from a base level calculated using average 1986-1988 data (note that
for developing countries the requirement is reduced to a 24% cut in tariffs over 10 years
(1995-2005), but the base period remains the same). The 36% reduction is of a simple,
unweighted, mathematical average of all tariffs. To prevent strategic manipulation of the
system (such that a single tariff remains unchanged, or is increased while another is
reduced by more than 36% for example), each individual tariff must be reduced by a
minimum of 15% over 6 years.
In principle, the duties calculated under the tariffication scheme should be the difference
between the average cif price over the reference period and the average domestic wholesale
price. However, the EC's tariff schedules (which were accepted by the other
CONTRACTING PARTIES) were firstly calculated as the difference between the fob
world market price and the intervention price, increased by 10% to maintain Community
Preference, and secondly calculated using the 'market ECU' (defined as the 'green' ECU
multiplied by the switchover coefficient). The latter implies that the levels of protection
afforded to EC farmers by the end of the reform period could be around 20% lower than it
would appear from the EC's tarrif schedules; "Assuming that the green ECU is still in
existence in 1995, the Commission will have to take each of its monetary commitments
agreed under the GAIT and divide them by the current switchover coefficient ...in order to
render these amounts in green ECUtI (Agra Europe no.1578 pEW). The current (March
1994) switch over coefficient is 1.207509.
Included in the agreement are several 'safeguard clauses' which allow countries to increase
tariffs on certain goods in order to prevent domestic markets being damaged by a surge of
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imports, provided that a set of specific conditions are met. The conditions are essentially a
high trigger level of imports or a low trigger level of world market prices.
The agreement also requires each country to make 'minimum access' provisions in all
sectors; import opportunities must be opened at least to the equivalent of 3% of internal
consumption, rising to 5% by 2001. In order to achieve these minimum access targets,
tariff-quotas will be established with the tariff fixed at 32% below the basic tariff, whatever
its level (i.e. these tariffs will also be subject to an average 36% reduction). In cases where
market access is already guaranteed by an import quota (for example, the butter access
agreement between the EC and New Zealand), the existing opportunities for access must be
maintained, at least at the average 1986-88 level.
Internal Support
Domestic agricultural subsidies are to be included in a global AMS, which is then to be
reduced by 20% over the 6-year period (13.3% in the developing countries). The AMS is
to expressed in monetary terms, for each product, using the 1986-88 base period.
Countries in which the current total AMS does not exceed 5% of total agricultural
production need not reduce domestic support further (for developing countries this de
minimis percentage is 10%).
Certain policies are exempt from the reduction - the GATT text states that "direct payments
under production-limiting programmes shall not be subject to commitment to reduce
domestic support." This is on the condition that: (i) the payments are based on fixed areas
and yields; (ii) they are made on 85% or less of the base level of production; (iii) livestock
payments are on a fixed number per head. The compensatory payments introduced in the
'Cunha' reform of the CAP do not strictly meet these criteria but were exempted from AMS
reduction in a political move to reach an agreement.
In addition to the direct payments, other types of subsidy are placed in the 'green box'.
These policies must not have the effect of providing price support and must be provided via
a publicly-funded government programme, for example research into pest control. Public
stockholdings for food security purposes and domestic food aid are also exempt.
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Export Subsidisation
On export subsidies, the agreement is for the dual commitment of reducing budgetary
expenditure on export subsidies by 36% over 6 years and reducing the volume of
subsidised exports by 21% over 6 years (for developing countries 24% and 14%
respectivelyj'i, Both commitments are based on a 1986-90 reference period, although
there is some flexibility in the phasing of the reductions. The agreement states that where
1991192 subsidised export levels exceed those of the base period, the former may be used
as the starting point for the reductions. However, by the end of the reform period, the
resulting reduction must be the same, namely a 21% reduction in the volume of subsidised
exports from the average 1986-90 level. This concession was won by the EC to avoid
having to make drastic cuts in subsidised exports of beef and cheese in the first year of the
reform period; however, it also allows the EC (and any other qualifying country) to export
more of the product covered by this clause, in absolute terms, over the reform period than
would otherwise have been permissible. For example, the Commission has calculated that
it will be able to export an additional 8.1 million tonnes of cereals while the USA will be
able to export an extra 7.453 million tonnes of wheat than would have been possible under
the Blair House formulation of the export subsidy reduction'',
The Peace Clause
An important element in the final agreement as far as the EC and USA are concerned is the
so-called 'Peace Clause'. This states that agricultural policy measures are not subject to
challenge through the GATT (or its successor the World Trade Organisation (WTO)) as
long as they do not contravene the provisions of the UR. In effect this clause formally
recognises the right of contracting parties to pursue income-supporting agricultural policies;
in the EC it was seen as giving legitimacy to the CAP while ensuring that any future CAP
reform would not be forced on the Community by the WTO. Note that the Peace Clause is
to run from 1995 to 2003, three years longer than the rest of the UR Agreement (this was
seen as a major victory for the EC).
3.11 Conclusion
The UR was the longest and most wide-ranging of all of the GATT Rounds to date. It
8 Food aid exports are excluded from the agreement
9 Agra Europe Supplement. December 1993. p16.
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produced an agreement in many difficult sectors, including agriculture. The agricultural
deal was essentially designed by the EC and the USA (this was not unexpected given their
dominant positions in the agricultural trading system); however, the other contracting
parties saw the deal as a way to end the USIEC export subsidy 'war', thus allowing them
to benefit from envisaged increases in world market prices. The agriculture agreement
concentrated on reducing the trade-distorting elements of domestic farm income support
policies, with cuts in import protection and export subsidisation being larger than those in
internal support. However, a major element of both the USA's and EC's domestic farm
income support policy was excluded from any reduction; namely deficiency payments
(compensatory payments in the EC). The conditions placed on such payments were
designed to ensure that excess production was not encouraged even though the payments
are not strictly 'de-coupled'. That said, the agreement I'rovides a starting point for the
review negotiations in 1999, which should mean that the years of ideological battling by the
EC and United States seen in the UR can be avoided.
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Chapter 4
The Use of Aggregate Measures of Support in
the Uruguay Round
4.1 Introduction
From chapter 3 it is clear that the main participants in the UR accepted that an AMS would
be needed to quantify the existing level of internal support and then monitor reductions in it
relatively early on in the Round. Differences of opinion as to the role of such an AMS
within a programme to reform agricultural policies continued to exist in the proposals tabled
by the US, Cairns Group (CG) and the EC1, but in the papers submitted before the
abortive 'final' meeting in December 1990 there appeared to be a remarkable degree of
agreement on the form that the AMS should take. It was proposed that it be based on the
principles of the OECD Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE). Thus it would contain
elements to capture market price support, direct payments to producers plus other input,
investment and marketing cost reduction measures only available to agriculture, but with
adjustments to the policy coverage and the method of measuring market price support.
This chapter examines the PSE and the problems associated with it as a measure of trade
distortion, the changes to the PSE suggested by the major participants in the UR as
solutions to the problems, and an illustration of the use of the 'new' AMSs in the reform
process proposed in autumn 1990. Finally, a comparison is made between the proposed
AMSs and the PSE.
4.2 The Producer Subsidy Equivalent2
The use ofPSEs to measure assistance to agriculture was developed by Josling in the early
1970s (although the theoretical basis of the PSE may be found in the work of Corden).
The method was adopted by the OECD in 1982 and PSEs are now calculated annually for
certain key agricultural products for the OECO countries.
The PSE calculation is based on the principle that policies to assist farmers do so by
Only in the Blair House Accord of 1992 did the EC accept separate reductions in each of the three Areas
(internal support. import protection & export subsidisation) as a principle.
2 This section is based largely on Cahill & Legg (1989).
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transferring income from consumers and taxpayers. It is an aggregate measure of the total
monetary value of assistance to agricultural inputs and outputs, on a commodity basis,
associated with a set of policies given the policies of other countries, and represents the
value of consumer and taxpayer transfers+
The PSE framework rests on 'a downward-sloping demand curve and an upward-sloping
supply curve which determine equilibrium prices that reflect the private and social benefits
and costs' (Cahill & Legg p 20), within a partial equilibrium framework (so that, by
assumption, prices and quantities in the rest of the economy are not affected by changes in
agricultural markets), using observed levels of commodity production and domestic and
'world' prices+, In addition, the partial equilibrium assumption means that zero
substitutability is also assumed so that 'no cross-commodity effects are incorporated in the
calculations based on observed prices and quantities' (Cahill & Legg p 21) and
homogeneity is assumed for a commodity produced and consumed within a country
(whether or not the latter is domestically produced or imported). Finally, the PSE
calculation assumes the small country case. In other words, the potential effects of any
country's policies on the levels of trading prices are ignored. The problems associated with
this assumption are well recognised by the OECD and are discussed in section 4.2.1.
PSEs can be expressed in three ways: (1) the total PSE which measures the total value of
transfers to the commodity; (2) the per unit PSE which measures the total value of transfers
to each unit of the commodity; and (3) the percentage PSE which measures the total value
of transfers as a percentage of the total value of production (including transfers). Figure
4.1 gives an illustration of the PSE concepts in the case of (a) a perpetual net importer and
(b) a perpetual net exporter, where the government policies are aimed at market price
support.
In each case the supported domestic price is pd and the world market price is pw. The
perpetual importer produces at QSm while consumers within that country demand QDm,
imports are thus QDm-QSm. The total PSE in this case is the rectangular area pdabpw5.
3 These should not be confused with the transfers measured in the Consumer Subsidy Equivalent (CSE) which
captures only the effects on consumers of agricultural support policies rather than capturing all policies that
affect consumption. See Cahill & Legg (l989p 17).
4 The 'world' price being an approximation of an 'unassisted' price against which to measure the effects of the
policies employed on internal prices.
5 The area acdb represents the total (negative) CSE resulting from the higher prices paid by consumers for the
imported good.
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In the case of the perpetual exporter production is at QSx, domestic demand is QDx and
exports are equal to QSx-QDx. The total PSE is the area pdefPw. The unit PSE in both
cases is pd.pw, Now assume that both countries employ a deficiency payments scheme.
The levels of production would not change in either country, however, new levels of
consumption would arise - QDm' in (a) and QDx' in (b). The unit PSE would be
unchanged at Pd-Pw as would the total PSE in both (a) and (b)6.
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Figure 4.1
Algebraically the three PSE measures can be expressed, in general, as follows
PSE = Q(pd - PW) +D + B - L
Unit PSE = PSE I Q
% PSE = PSEI [Q(pd) +D - L]
(4-1)
(4-2)
(4-3)
where Q is the domestic production level, pd is the domestic producer price, pw is the
'world' price, D are direct payments, B are all other budgetary financed support and L are
producer levies. Note that the PSE could also be expressed as a percentage of domestic
production valued at world prices. The resulting percentage PSE would then be
comparable with an ad valorem tariff as such a tariff is also expressed as a percentage of
world prices (Tangennann et al., 1987).
The OEeD PSE calculations aim to incorporate all agricultural policy measures which
directly or indirectly influence production, consumption and trade and which would not be
6 In the case of deficiency payments there are no CSEs.
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captured if only trade barriers were measured. More specifically, five categories of
agriculturalpolicies are included:
(i) market price support policies;
(ii) direct payments to producers which do not necessarily raise consumer prices;
(iii) policies to reduce input costs, with no distinction being made between subsidies to
capital and those to other inputs;
(iv) the provision of general services which reduce long-term costs but are not directly
received by producers;
(v) other indirect support policies including regionally funded subsidies and taxation
concessions.
Included under (i) are government storage costs and export subsidies - 'The unit price gap
multiplied by the relevant level of production results in the total PSE due to market price
support and this includes both quantities exported and taken into government stocks.'
(Cahill & Legg p22). This of course becomes significant when considering the EC's
position in the UR (see chapter 3). In each of the other categories only those policies
specific to agriculture are included - policies which are also applied to other sectors are
excluded. For example, a global transport subsidy, such as that operated in the US, would
not be included while a targeted subsidy, such as that to grain producers in western
Canada, would (ibid).
The PSEs are calculated for the DECD countries (the EC counting as one country) for
commodities which account 'for at least one per cent of the value of agricultural production
as measured at the farm gate' (ibid). Adjustments are made in the livestock sectors to
.compensate for the effects of market support policies applied to products that are used in
animal feed; support of cereals, soybeans and skimmed milk powder, for example, raises
the cost of animal feed above what it would otherwise have been. These are calculated
using fixed input-output coefficients for feed.
4.2.1 Drawbacks of the PSE Measure
The prominence of the PSE in the UR negotiations has prompted a number of papers
pointing out the limitations of it in assessing the effects (distorting or otherwise) of
domestic support policies on world markets (for example Harvey (1990), McClatchy
(1987), Peters (1988), Tangermann et al (1987) and others). In defence of the PSE, the
DECD has stated that it was not developed to measure anything other than 'the gross costs
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to consumers and taxpayers which are transferred as benefits to the agricultural sector.'
(Cahill & Legg p38). Nevertheless the criticisms of the use of the PSE in the UR to
measure the distorting effects of domestic policies are still valid. These are discussed
below and the solutions proposed in the UR are presented in section 4.3.
The PSE has the advantage of encompassing the wide range of agricultural support policies
which the measures of support used previously' did not; however, despite their use in
assessing the costs of transfers to the agricultural sectors within the OECD countries, the
OECD has freely acknowledged that PSEs have some drawbacks. The first of these is the
'small country' assumption. The world markets for agricultural products are in reality
dominated by the large OECD countries (mainly the US and EC) 'which subsidise exports
using the world market as a residual recipient of surplus production' (ibid p24) so that
their domestic support policies have an effects on the level of world market prices; the
observed price levels are lower than they would otherwise have been. Thus for small,
relatively unprotected, price-taking countries the price gap (and hence the PSE) would be
larger than would otherwise have been the case. The OECO, however, defends the small
country assumption by stating that 'in so far as changes in world prices for a commodity
affect all countries for which calculations are made, this maintains the correct relative level
of assistance' and 'the PSEs and CSEs measure the transfers to the agricultural sector from
the rest of the economy arising from agricultural policies with a given set of prices and
making adjustments for a "'policy-free" world price would lead to incorrect transfer
calculations.' (ibid p21).
In addition to the theoretical considerations, technical problems of measurement also exist.
The world price level is a very important element of the PSE calculation and the choice of
the appropriate price is' a contentious issue. Some argue that the appropriate price is some
estimate of a 'free market' equilibrium price, while others argue that the estimation of this
latter price is in itself contentious so that observed prices should be used despite the 'small
country' problems. In so far as is possible, own-country border prices are used in an
attempt to net out some of the distorting effects of other countries' support policies, using
c.i.f. prices for net importers and f.o.b. prices for net exportersf. However, even after
following these guidelines, technical problems (such as accounting for quality differences)
are still to be resolved for some products.
'l Nominal and effective rates of protection for example.
8 Within the UR the issue of the external reference price has been raised several times in the search for an AMS.
This will be discussed further in later sections.
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Another of the drawbacks of the PSE is the partial equilibrium framework. Black and
Bowers (1984) state that on balance the use of such a framework results in an under-
estimation of the overall level of assistance afforded to agricultural producers. This results
from the fact that 'neither macro-economic polices affecting the agricultural sector (in
particular the effect of changes in exchange rates) nor the effects of assistance to agriculture
on the rest of the economy are measured' (ibid p20). In addition, as has been mentioned
previously, no cross-commodity effects are considered other than the somewhat ad hoc
animal feed adjustment. McClatchy & Cahill (1988) point out that the cross-commodity
effects 'may have considerable impacts on the volumes of that product produced,
consumed and traded' (p3). The areas most affected are the cereals sector, for example
where production of one crop is suppressed by support for a substitute, and the livestock
sector with support for animal products tending to increase the demand for feedgrains, thus
offsetting the price reducing effects of feed subsidies. They conclude that in the UR the
cross-commodity effects could be taken into account by a 'balanced' reduction of an AMS
between commodities which they suggest could take the form of varying rates of policy
reform in different commodity areas. The problems caused by the partial equilibrium
framework are again recognised by the OECO.
4.2.2 The PSE as a Measure of Trade Distortion
The major criticism of the PSE has been its usefulness as a measure of trade distortion,
which stems from its inability to distinguish between the diverse distortionary effects of the
differing policies employed by the industrial countries. For example, Hathaway (1987,
p26) argues that while the US deficiency payments programme provides a significant
degree of income support to producers and hence an incentive to produce, consumption of
the commodities concerned is not reduced, either in the domestic market or on the world
market. On the other hand, a set of policies which raise the domestic market price as well
as the price received by producers provides an output incentive (as with deficiency
payments) and changes the pattern of consumption on both the domestic and world
markets (given that the world market is the residual market for disposing of any surplus
product on the domestic market). To clarify this, consider figure 4.2.
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In both cases, the total PSE is equal to the area pdabPw and the unit PSE is pd_pw. D and
S represent the quantities which would be demanded and supplied on the domestic market
if the market price were equal to the world market price pw while D 1 and S 1 represent the
quantities demanded and supplied at the supported price pd. It is clear from the figure that
the distortion caused by the export refund policy is greater than that caused by the
deficiency payment; the latter results in a smaller change in the traded volume - [(S I-Dl)-
(S-D)] - than the former because the deficiency payment does not distort the demand side of
the market.
Harvey (1990) suggests that given that the UR had as its primary objective the reduction of
trade distortions and of the domestic pressures for continued support in the agricultural
sector, there was a need to 'separate agricultural support from agricultural trade distortion
and, in so doing, clarify the meaning of protection' (pI7). The PSE cannot do this as
'there is no unique relationship between levels of protection and distortion' (p4). A better
method, he suggested, would be to use a 'real' rate of distortion, based on the change in
the quantities traded, signed by the differences in the observed levels of domestic and
world prices and a post-reform market price. However, Harvey's measure relies upon an a
priori estimate of what the levels of trade and world prices would be following a
multilateral reform of agricultural policy to determine the real rate of distortion before the
reforms occur. Clearly this would be subject to all the usual problems associated with
forecasting and one of the main advantages of using a PSE-based measure in the UR
negotiations was that the required data were readily accessible (for the OECD countries the
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data are already collected}. Tangermann et al. (1987) suggested that rather than
abandoning the PSE altogether, the GATT negotiators could agree to classify all support
measures such that policies which were not trade distorting would not be included in any
reform programme while other measures would be included in the new 'PSE'.
If the PSE is adjusted to account for the differing distortionary effects of the support
polices, one problem remains, that of the choice of world (external reference) price. The
main concern of the policy makers was that changes in world market prices may be due to
factors outside of the agricultural sphere, for example exchange rate movements. It was
suggested by the EC that the external reference price should not be allowed to fluctuate but
should be fixed. The logic behind this can be seen with reference to figure 4.3.
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If the world market price, expressed in domestic currency, in the base year t were pw the
total PSE be equal to the area pdabPw, where pd is the domestic support price. If the
world price fell in year t+ 1 to pw' due either to a change in the market price or the
exchange rate or a combination of the two, with the level of pd unchanged, the total PSE
would be increased to pdacpw'. On the other hand, the use of the fixed reference price,
pref (=PW), would leave the measure unchanged. If the world price fluctuates for reasons
beyond the control of governments, for example a drought or exchange rate movements
caused by changing circumstances in other economies, reductions in the level of support
cannot be measured consistently. One only need examine the PSEs for the Ee cereals
sector in 1989 compared to earlier years and 1990 (table 4.7) to see how unexpected
shocks (a US drought) can drastically affect this measure'', If the aim of the proposed
9 The OECD in it annual publication 'Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade' pursues a decomposition
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reductions in support is to narrow the gap between domestic and 'world' prices, and the
success of the reduction policy is to be measured by an AMS, then it would seem essential
to have a stable benchmark against which to measure progress. The best solution to this
stable benchmark question would be to compare real domestic prices with a real external
price. However, given the political difficulties likely to be involved in choosing the
appropriate deflators, the comparison of current domestic prices with a fixed reference
price could offer a second best solution. Tangermann et al (1987) suggest that it is
desirable for domestic market prices to have some degree of responsiveness to changes in
world market prices and some account would have to be taken of inflation over a UR
reform period, thus adjustments would need to be made to the fixed reference price.
Itmust be noted, however, that the use of a fixed external reference price based on recent
levels of world market prices does not resolve the problem of the effects of large country
distortions to market prices on small countries. Even if prices are fixed, the smaller,
price-taking countries (mainly the developin.g countries) still face a base level price gap
which is larger than would be the case if estimated free market world prices were used.
4.3 Adjustments to the PSE Proposed in the Urul:uay Round
Discussions about the form of the AMS in any UR agreement centred on adjustments to the
PSE in the areas of policy coverage and the choice of external reference price. Suggestions
were first tabled by Canada (the Trade Distortion Equivalent) and the EC (the Support
Measurement Unit) and eventually by the US and CG.
4.3.1 The Trade Distortion Equivalent
The Canadian government proposed this alternative to the PSElCSE framework on the
grounds that in the context of the UR negotiations only trade-distorting agricultural support
polices needed to be addressed. As has been noted before, one of the problems with the
PSE is that it does not distinguish between policies for their trade-distorting effects. The
Trade Distortion Equivalent (TOE) weights the various policy elements of the PSE or CSE
according to the extent to which they have distorting effects on world markets.
Algebraically, the TDE which measures transfers from consumers and government to
analysis of PSEs and CSEs, by country and by product to assess the relative importance of the various
components of these measures. In 1989 the OECD found that had there been no changes in the other
components of the PSE for wheat, the changes in the world price would have induced a 46 per cent fall in the
total PSE from the base year as opposed to the 40 per cent fall that actually occurred.
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fanners (i.e. analogous to the PSE) can be expressed as
(4-4)
COj, i= l ,..4 are the weights to be attached to the individual policy elements in PSE measure
as defined in equation 4-1. The weights would be set such that the policies which greatly
affected world trade would be emphasised while those that had essentially internal effects
would not be counted. According to McCorriston (1993) 'no explicit guidance on the value
of the weights has been given', though Cahill and Legg (1990) suggest that they will vary
between 1 (for the most trade-distorting policies) and 0 (for the least trade-distorting
policies)' (p419); this, of course, gives a rather wide range of possibilities!. In addition, it
is worth noting that the TDE (like the PSE) suffers from the use of the small country
assumption, and the partial equilibrium framework.
4.3.2 The Support Measurement Unit
The EC's preferred AMS, the SMU, is again similar to the PSE but differs from it in three
significant ways. Firstly, in defining the SMU, the EC suggested that market price support
should be calculated as the difference between internal prices (in most cases the intervention
price), and afixed external reference price, pref (rather than the current world price in the
PSE calculation), expressed in national currency, multiplied by production. The aim of the
fixed external price was to introduce stability into the SMU over time by eliminating the
effects of short-term exchange rate and world price movements, thereby allowing 'a party
to enter into commitments knowing precisely to what it is committing itself (EC
Commission (1989a». However, it makes the SMU sensitive to the chosen reference
price; if a high level of external prices is chosen then the price gap (and hence the SMU)
would be smaller than if a lower level were chosen. In the latter case, an agreed percentage
reduction in the SMU would leave producers with a higher level of protection at the end of
the reform period than in the former. It is therefore in the interests of fanners to press for a
lower base external reference price. The EC suggested an average of the world market
prices in 1986-1988 as a base for pref.
Secondly, the SMU gives credit for government-imposed supply control programmes
(e.g. quotas) by estimating a shadow price associated with the limited production level; the
shadow price is the minimum price necessary to induce the controlled volume of production
and is necessarily less than or equal to the domestic price. The SMU takes account of the
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difference between the shadow price and the reference price rather than the difference
between the domestic price and the reference price. The credit for supply control is
illustrated in figure 4.4. pd is the internal support price, at which farmers wish to produce
Q. If pref is the external reference price, then at Q the unit SMU is pdpref. If a production
control (e.g. a quota such as in the EC dairy sector) is imposed and limits production to Qs,
then the unit SMU is as ps.pref where ps is the estimated shadow price associated with
Qs. The total SMU is Qs(ps-pref), whereas the total PSE is Q(p<Lpref) and the unit PSE
is pd.pref (if pref is also the actual world market price). Rayner et al. (1990) note that if
pd is adjusted upwards whilst the supply control is maintained at Qs, then both the unit and
total SMU are unchanged but the unit and total PSE are affected. In addition they state that
'if production is limited by an area reduction programme as in the USA, then (PS) becomes
an adjusted producer price being approximately equal to (Pp + d(l-x)) where Pp is the
internal market price, d is the unit deficiency payment and x is the percentage of area set
aside. Similar considerations apply, adjusting producer prices downwards, for the set-
aside and extensification programmes in the EC.' (p 10).
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It is also clear from figure 4.4 that the shadow price is dependent on the point elasticity of
supply (given that in reality only Qs is known). The determination of the appropriate
supply elasticities for countries and products with production controls is likely to be
politically difficult.
Finally, the SMU differs from the PSE in its policy content. It purports to take account of
only those policies which have a significant impact on the farmer's decision to produce and
hence on trade. To this end, the SMU embraces market-price-support policies, input-cost-
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reduction schemes, general services and certain direct payments, but not 'disaster
payments' which do not, according to the EC, affect the farmer's decision to produce, and
'diversion payments' (e.g. set-aside and retirement programmes) which represent 'a direct
and immediate compensation for the reduction of production factors' (EC Commission
(l989a) p3).
In the absence of supply controls the SMU can be represented algebraically as
SMU = Q(pd - pref)+(D -DN -DIS) + B - L (4-5)
while the presence of supply control policies would alter the SMU to
SMU = Qs(PS - pref)+(D - DN -DIS) + B - L (4-6)
where DIY are diversion payments and DIS are disaster payments.
4.3.3 US and CG Proposed AMSs - Autumn 199010
While the EC continued to forward the SMU as the AMS to be used in the reform process,
both the US and the CG offered more detailed descriptions of the form that an AMS would
take under their respective reform proposals in the autumn of 1990. They proposed
changes to the PSE in three areas which were similar to those proposed by the EC and are
presented below.
External Reference Price
In their papers of October 1990 the CG and US appear to concur with the EC on the
reference price question. All three suggest the use of a fixed reference price based on
1986-1988 data, in the calculation of market price support. The CO and US also
proposed periodic reviews of the reference price (the first being in 1995/96 under the CG
proposal) to take account of inflation, world price trends and exchange rate adjustments.
Under the CG proposal, the reform process would be halted once the percentage AMS
reached less than 5 per cent of the value of production. If,however, this was the case but
pd was still significantly above the world price (even though the gap between pd and pref
had narrowed) a downward revision of the reference price would be necessary to complete
10 This section is taken largely from O'Connor et al (l99Ib) and has not been updated since then, hence it
should be read bearing in mind that only data available at that time are used in any examples.
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the reform process 11. In addition, the CG proposed that the fixed reference price would
apply only in the 'early years of the implementation period'. If any country's agricultural
sector became market-oriented to the extent that movements in world market prices directly
influence producer prices, the current world price would become the reference price. The
papers do not make it clear whether the gap between the fixed reference price and the
domestic support price would be measured in real or nominal terms, so the illustration of
the proposals in section 4.4.2 is in terms of nominal prices to conform with the PSE
procedure.
Credit for Supply Controls
An important feature of the Community SMU is that it gives credit for government
imposed production controls. The AMSs proposed by the US and CG do not explicitly
give credit for supply control. However, the US proposed that only the quantity of the
production eligible to receive the support price be used to calculate the AMS, which could
potentially give some credit for some forms of supply controls. The effects of taking
account of supply controls rather than a limited eligibility for price support can be seen by
considering figure 4.5. Firstly, assume production is at Q but only Qe is eligible to
receive support. The total US 'PSE' in this case is pddcpref as opposed to the larger
pdabpref without the restriction. If we now assume that Qe represents a production quota
it can clearly be seen that some credit is given for the supply restriction in the total'PSE'
calculation, (pd - pref)Qe, the area pddcpref, but not in measuring the unit 'PSE' (pd -
pref). The unit SMU, on the other hand, is calculated as ps - pref while the total SMU is
limited to (PS - pref)Qe, the area PSecpref. The CG proposed no such adjustment of
production, neither did it propose the use of shadow prices to give credit for supply
control.
11 Consider again figure 4.3. If the reform process occurs such that pd equals pref at some stage, any further
reduction of pd towards pw' would require a lowering of pref.
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It is possible that the US incorporated the Qe principle into their GATT proposals to make
them consistent with the so-called 'triple base' feature of the 1990 Farm Bill, under which
commodity programme participants suffered a 15 per cent cut in the area eligible for direct
payments as a means of limiting the budget, but it would also take account of the fact that
participation in the US deficiency payments scheme is voluntary, with the production of
non-participants being excluded from Qe. The Qe feature of the US proposal could have
resulted in an inconsistent treatment of the EC's supply control policies. For example, in
the dairy sector all of the Ee's production is eligible for intervention support, even if the
quota is exceeded. The penalties are in the form of producer levies rather than any
commitment not to support the excess productiont-, In this case, the US AMS calculation
would not explicitly take account of the supply control (Qe would be Q and the 'PSE'
would be pdabpref as opposed to a SMU of PSecpref). In the sugar sector, on the other
hand, the EC operates a three-tier quota system, within which there is a proportion of EC
sugar production which does not qualify for any internal support and cannot be sold on the
domestic market. This production would be excluded from the US AMS calculation, thus
giving some credit for the supply control.
Policy Coverage
There was general agreement among the participants that the AMS should only take into
account policies which distort trade. .As with the EC's SMU, the US and CG also
excluded 'disaster' payments such as food aid or 'decoupled' income safety-net policies
12 It is recognised that as producer levies are excluded from the US AMS calculation, some 'credit' would be given
to the Ee for milk quotas.
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from the AMS calculation, along with 'resource retirement' policies (e.g. set-aside) and
general services 'of a beneficial nature to the rural community' (US 1990). The US also
proposed that for the base period, the AMS should be augmented to take account of
resource set-aside policies, although no comment was made on how this would be
achieved.
Essentially then, in the initial reform period the CG proposed a measure similar to the SMU
(but excluding the possibility of credit being given for supply controls), while the US
proposed an 'adjusted PSE' (APSE), which can be written algebraically as
APSE =Qecrd- pref) + (D - DIY - DIS) +B - L (4-7)
where Qe is the quantity of production eligible for support.
Comparison of the SMU in equation 4-5 with the APSE indicates that, ceteris paribus,
there is little to chose between them unless there is a large difference between Q and Qe (of
course if supply controls exist then the difference is more fundamental).
4.4 A Numerical Illustration of the AMS Proposals
4.4.1 Supply Control and the EC Dairy Sector
The effects of the differing treatment of supply control policies by the EC, US and CG can
be seen if the APSEs and SMUs for the EC dairy sector are compared. As stated in section
4.3, an APSE for the EC dairy sector would not give the EC any explicit credit for the
introduction of milk quotas and as such can be calculated from OECD data, adjusting the
PSEs to include a fixed external reference price (1986-88 average), and exclude the costs of
resource retirement programmes (in this case the ECs milk 'outgoers' scheme). Calculation
of the SMU, on the other hand, requires the determination of a shadow price for milk
quotas. In order to calculate this, a medium-term supply elasticity of 0.75 was used. The
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food suggested a supply elasticity of around 0.7-0.8
had been used by the Commission in their SMU calculationslJ but the true value is
unknown. It is worth noting at this point that the OECD in its Ministerial Trade Mandate
model employed a supply elasticity of 1.0, which was attributed to a Commission source in
1979, but this could be a longer-run estimate. The importance of choosing the most
appropriate supply elasticity can be seen by referring to table 4.1. In each case the elasticity
13 Private correspondence October 1991.
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was used to calculate the shadow price associated with the Guaranteed Quantity for each
calendar year (including the Deliveries Quota and national reserves, net of adjustments for
quantities suspended). Using these shadow prices and guaranteed quantities while taking
other data from the OECD, an elasticity of 1.0 results in a 1986 SMU some 0.4 per cent
above the level calculated with an elasticity of 0.75, and 0.9 per cent below that calculated
using an elasticity of 0.7; by 1990 the figures are 0.6 per cent below and 6.5 per cent above
respectively. This analysis shows that the precise elasticity used in the calculation of the
dairy SMU has only a slight effect on its measured value.
Table 4,1
SMUs in the EC Dairy Sector: The Effect of the Elasticity of Supply
. (Million ECD)
SU12121~EI~ti~i~
~
Q..1 azs M .L.Q
1986 14,362 14,750 14,566 14,586 14,622
1987 11,552 12,467 12,232 12,334 12,800
1988 10,051 11,295 11,692 11,826 11,930
1989 10,160 11,354 12,507 12,172 11,245
1990 11,848 11,983 12,886 12,978 12,813
Table 4.2 shows a comparison between the PSE, APSE and SMU, calculated as described
above, for the EC dairy sector, 1986-1990. Two things are evident from this. Firstly, the
use of shadow prices in calculating the SMU results in a considerably lower level of
aggregate support than when it is measured in terms of either the PSE or APSE. Secondly,
the fixed reference price used to calculate the APSE means that in 1989, and to some extent
1990, when international prices of dairy products were at historically high levels, the PSE
measure was considerably lower than the APSE.
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Table 4.2
Comparison of the PSE, APSE and SMU Measures for the EC
Dairy Sector, 1986·1990
(millionECU)
PSE AfSE SM!l
(Es-Q,15l
1986 25,213 22,758 14,566
1987 22,333 21,527 12,232
1988 20,375 22,995 11,692
1989 20,691 25,186 12,507
1990 24,960 27,266 12,886
4.4.2 Proposed Reforms in the EC Cereals Sector l+
Calculations made by the EC in the autumn of 1990 to illustrate their offer to reduce cereals
support provide a total SMU for the base year of 1986 and for 1995 (the 1986 level
reduced by 30 per cent). For the CG and the US who did not provide numerical
illustrations of their offers, an AMS can be calculated using data collected by the DECO for
their PSE calculations.
For the SMU calculation, the quantity of EC cereals production eligible for support for
1986 was taken as the actual level of production, as the intervention mechanism was not
restricted by quantitative ceilings or limited buying-in periods. Thus Q was the same as Qe
(note that as supply controls were not operated the SMU is calculated as in equation (4-5».
The difference between the APSE and the SMU in 1986concerned the reference price. All
three participants proposed that the reference price be based on 1986-1988 levels and it
therefore seemed reasonable for the purposes of this analysis to assume that pref is the
same under both measures. However, although the EC stated that DECO data could be
used in the SMU calculation (EC Commission (1989a», the pref used by them was not the
same as the pref calculated as a production weighted average of the cereals reference prices
quoted by the DECO for 1986, 1987 and 1988 (DECO 1991); the latter was used to
calculate the APSEs for the CG and US while for the EC an APSE equivalent of the
14 This section is again taken from O'Connor et al (l991b), the same advice applies.
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SMUlS was calculated to take account of the differing reference prices!v. For 1995 the
APSE equivalent of the SMU was calculated under the assumption that all of the EC's
cereal production for that year became eligible for market price support. Production is
assumed under a 'best' scenario to be such that the all-cereals Maximum Guaranteed
Quantity (MGQ) of 160 million tonnes is not exceeded in 1995. This would be achieved
through an increase in the area 'set-aside' and stabiliser-induced price reductions in
previous years. In addition, it was assumed that there would be no disaster payments or
food aid payments in 1995, then the durum wheat subsidy would be reduced by 4 per cent
per annum (the yearly reduction in the SMU suggested by the EC, over the reform period,
for all cereals) and that the coresponsibility levy would be 2.39 ecu per tonne (derived from
the 1987 levy when the MGQ was not operational so that the supplementary levy did not
apply)l7. Under a 'pessimistic' scenario, EC production is assumed to over-shoot the
MGQ by 5 million tonnes.
The reader is reminded of the offers on the long-term reduction of 'internal' agricultural
support tabled by the EC, US and CG up to December 1990:
EC - 30 per cent reduction in the SMU between 1986 and 1995;
US - 75 per cent reduction in support between 1991 and 2000, using the average level of
support in 1986-1988 as the reference;
CG - 75 per cent reduction in an AMS between 1991 and 2000, using the 1988 level as the
reference.
Note that the policies singled out for the lesser (30 per cent) reduction under the US
proposal are assumed not to be included in the commodity-specific APSEs (this simplifies
the analysis somewhat).
The results of this exercise are shown in table 4.3. The expected conclusion can be drawn
from this table, namely that the EC's offer would have resulted in a significantly higher
level of support to cereal producers in 1995 than the US or CG offers when measured in
APSE terms. Even under the extremely optimistic assumption that EC cereal production
could have been restrained to 160 million tonnes by 1995, the costs of supporting that
production under the EC's plan would have been around 4.5 billion ECU more than if the
15 Essentially substituting the pref proposed by the EC with that calculated for the APSE.
16 The reference prices were, for the SMU 90.33 ECU ,and for the APSE 84.94 ECU.
17 The coresponsibility levy is paid annually regardless of whether production is above or below the MGQ. The
supplementary levy is paid only if production is above the MGQ.
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CG or US plans had been implemented. Not surprisingly, the CG proposal emerged as the
most reforming in terms of reducing aggregate support.
The total costs of support in table 4.3 can be translated into levels of support to individual
producers over and above pref by defining a percentage APSE as that part of the
producer's revenue (or the value of output) accounted for by governmental assistance.
Note that a percentage APSE would also have the advantage of being comparable between
sectors and across countries. Relying on the definitions given by the OECD for the
percentage PSE in equation 4-3, the percentage APSE would become
%APSE= [Total APSE/(Qe(pd)+D-DIS-L)]ol 00 (4-8)
Table 4.3
Comparing the 1990 Uruguay Round Proposals: EC Cereals Sector
(million ECU; APSE measure)
Proposed reduction
Base period over reform period
Level in
.l2.22 2000
US proposal 15,968 (a)
CG proposal 15,504 (c)
EC proposal (SMU) 15,621 (d)
APSE equivalent of
theSMU -
11,976
11,623
4,686
7,986 (b) 3,992
7,754 (b) 3,876
10,935
Best
Worst
16,910
16,910
4,531
4,488
12,379
12,422
(a) Average 1986-1988 APSE
(b) 75 per cent reduction by 2000 implies an approximate annual, compound decrease of 12.94 per cent;
this has been applied to the US and CO proposals to gain a 1995 value.
(c) 1988 APSE
(d) 1986 SMU. Source: EC Commission (1990)
Table 4.4 shows the 1990 Uruguay Round proposals in terms of percentage APSEs.
Again under the best scenario cereal production is assumed to be 160 million tonnes while
under the worst scenario production is 165 million tonnes. The percentage APSEs
illustrate a number of points; firstly, although the US and EC identified roughly the same
level of support in the base period, by 1995 the EC proposal would result in a significantly
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higher level of support to producers (percentage APSE): this follows logically from the
total support costs presented in table 4.3 Secondly, producers receive a lower level of
income support when production is higher although the total monetary cost of this support
is larger - in percentage APSE terms the extent of support received by EC cereals farmers
would be 48.55 per cent of the value of production under the EC proposal 'worst' scenario
by 1995 and 49.28 per cent under the 'best' scenario, whereas the costs of this support
(table 4.3) would be 43 million ECU higher under the 'worst 'scenario.
Table 4.4
Comparing the 1990 Uruguay Round Proposals
(% APSE)(a)
1225.
Base period Best Worst
US proposal 57.19 38.53 37.76
CG proposal 55.27 37.83 37.07
EC proposal 57.63 49.28 48.55
(a) Derived from the information used to calculate table 4.3, using equation (4.8)
The levels of pd derived for 1995 as part of the percentage APSE calculationlf can be
taken as an indication of what might loosely be called the cereals 'producer price' implied
by the three proposed reform programmes (given the assumptions about production and
coresponsibility levies stated above). Table 4.5 shows a comparison of the 1995 'producer
price' with a production-weighted average of the cereals producer prices published by the
OECD for 1986 to 1990. Under the EC proposal, cereals farmers within the Community
are unlikely to suffer as large a cut in 'producer prices' as under either the CG or US
proposal. Under the former, cuts of around 5 to 6 per cent would be likely to occur while
under the latter two the cuts would probably be around 20-23 per cent.
18 Given the assumptions about production, coresponsibility levies etc. and the fact that pref is known, the
only unknown in the APSE calculation is pd, hence it can be easily derived by simple mathematics.
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Table 4 5
Producer Prices for EC Cereals Farmers
(ECU per tonne)
1986 1987 1988 1989 l22Q
184.64 179.82 172.66 174.03 176.12
US
Opt. 139.64
Pess. 138.00
1995
.CG
138.06
136.47
ill:
167.24
164.95
4.4.3 Comparison of the SMU and APSE with the PSE.
In order to compare the projected levels of support with those experienced recently,
percentage PSE equivalents of the proposed SMU and the APSEs for 1995 are computed.
The main difficulty in the calculations is the determination of an appropriate, current,
'world' market price to replace the fixed reference price in equations (4-5) and (4-6) in
1995. As a backcloth to the calculations, it is noteworthy that there is a long-run
downward trend in the real cereals price (a declining trend is the dominant feature of the
time series data of real food commodity prices presented by Tyers (1990» and that
agricultural support policies in most OECD countries have served to retard the rate of
transmission of this decline to domestic prices. The 'world' price was estimated by
combining a forecast of real international wheat prices19with an assumed inflation rate of
3 per cent and a view of the nominal $IECUexchange rate (mean rate for rnid-1987 to mid-
1991). The levels of pw thus obtained are baseline figures for comparison. They are
generated from a model dominated by a downward trend and based on data from a period
when the agricultural support policies of the industrial nations affected the world market. If
a serious reform process is initiated, real wheat prices may fall less quickly over the reform
period2o• Consequently, the PSEs calculated below for 1995 may overestimate support
levels relative to the probable level in 1995. However, the possible importance of policy
intervention should not be exaggerated in respect of calculations for 1995, given the short
time scale involved and the presence of offsetting supply and demand policy interventions
in the cereals markets.
19 US Hard Winter no.2, ordinary protein, f.o.h. Gulf; deflated using the index of US wholesale prices (all
products), 1980 = 100.
20 A structural simulation model would be required in order to assess the effects of reform on the trend in world
prices; such a model isdeveloped chapter 5
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4.4.3.1 The Model: Simply a Long Run Time Trend ?
A visual examination of the real international wheat price series in figure 4.6 suggests that
although it is extremely volatile, there exists a slight downward trend over time. A time
trend is often included as an independent variable in many time series analyses to capture
the effects of technological progress or quality changes which, if not accounted for, could
cause the residual errors to be 'badly behaved' and invalidate the usual test statistics. In
order to establish whether a simple time trend could be used to forecast world wheat prices
(or indeed to establish whether a deterministic time trend should be included in a more
general model), the international wheat price series was tested to see if it had a 'unit root'.
If a unit root can be established then the series follows a 'random walk' and does not in
general return to any long term trend (although it may drift towards its long term mean) - in
this case the series is said to be difference stationary. More formally, a stochastic process
Y t is said to be (covariance) stationary if its mean, variance, and autocovariances are
independent of time
(i) E[Ytl = Jl
(ii) E[(Yt _ Jl)2] = X(O)
(iii) E[(Yt-Jl)(Yt-T - Jl)] = x(T) T = 1,2,...
The last condition ensures that the covariance between any two values depends only on
their distance apart, not on time t.
The importance of the stationarity concept in time series analysis cannot be understated. If
variables within a regression relationship are non-stationary, the conventional test statistics
do not hold. In particular, R2 tends towards 1; the t-statistics do not obey the usual
distribution-I: and the Durbin-Watson statistic is low. (These are the characteristics of
spurious regressions, resulting from time series data which are trended, identified by
Granger and Newbold (1974). Thus even intrinsically unrelated variables can appear to be
highly correlated, albeit in a relationship with serially correlated errors. If a deterministic
regression model is to have any validity then the dependent and independent variables must
be stationary before any inferences can be made about the relationship.
21 The Phillips-Durlauf result shows that t and F statistics diverge asymptoticalJy hence the regression
coefficients do not converge on their 'true' values.
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Real International Wheat Prices 1890-1990
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Figure 4.6
Testing for Stationarity
A growing literature has emerged about the concept of stationarity and testing for it. The
formal tests rely on the existence of a non-time dependent variance; therefore a constant
variance should be established before any formal stationarity (or unit root) tests are carried
out.
a) Constant Variance - A range - median plot can be used to establish whether a series
has a constant variance. The data is sliced into sections containing 3 to 12 observations and
their median values are plotted against their ranges. If a non-constant variance is found
data transformations may be used to induce stationarity. The type of transformation
necessary can also be inferred from the range - median plot.
Figure 4.7 shows range - median plots for the real international wheat price data series
(1890 - 1990)22. For a series to have a constant variance a line fitted through the points
should be horizontal; from the range - median plots of the international wheat price series it
22 This model was developed in 1991 and later data were not available.
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is evident that its variance is not constant. The upward slope of the fitted line suggests that
a log transformation would be appropriate (Mills (1990) p41). Figure 4.8 shows the range
- median plots for the logged series. When 7 year groupings are used the log
transformation appears to satisfy the constant variance condition of stationarity. However,
the 5 year grouping presents a slight problem. It is possible that the results are being
distorted by suspected outlying values in 1898, 1921, 1945 and 1973, although it is more
likely that the presence of two world wars during the period and the change in agricultural
support policies in the aftermath of the 1930s depression lead to a series of 'structural
breaks',
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Chow tests were carried out to test whether the series exhibited structural stability23 in the
following time trend model
InWP = Co+ ~ot + Ut (4-9)
where InWP is the logged international wheat price series. After correcting for
autocorrelation in the error term, the results indicated that the changing policies in the 1930s
did not lead to a change in the trend. However, two breaks were indicated; both after the
wars - one in 1920 and the other in 1945. Bleaney and Greenaway (1990) found that there
was no evidence to suggest that general commodity prices suffered from a structural break
in 1920 and that the significant Chow statistic was more likely to have been caused by 'the
influence of one or two extreme observations in the period of considerable prices
instability' (p21). Indeed, incorporating a dummy variable into the model to remove the
23 Bleaney (1990) suggested that when testing for structural breaks in any model only one of the possible test
procedures should be followed and showed the Chow test to be reasonably robust when the time of such a
change is unknown.
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effects of the extreme values resulted in an insignificant test statistic and the conclusion that
no structural break occurred. If a similar dummy is incorporated to remove the effects of
extreme values in the 1945 test, the test statistic is still significant (at the 1% level) - a
further indication of a break in the series at this time.
b) Unit Root Tests - As has already been stated, the presence of a unit root can be
taken as an indication that a series is 'difference stationary'. In order to understand the
concept of a unit root consider the following autoregressive model
t = 1,2 ....
P is a real number
Et - NID(O, cr2)
(4-10)
Yt is stationary only when the autoregressive coefficient Ipl < 1. The series will thus be
non-stationary for all other values of p. If P = 1 then Yt follows a random walk, and is
said to have a unit root; AYt will be stationary in Yt - Yt-l = Et. In this case the series is
known as a 'difference stationary process' and is integrated of order 1 (written as 1(1)).
Note that if [p] > 1 then an explosive series is implied with the variance growing
exponentially over time. In general the explosive case is not plausible in terms of economic
theory so that the hypothesis testing procedures concentrate on whether a series is a
'difference' stationary process. The hypothesis p = 1 can be tested by estimating the
above model or, more usually the reparameterized model, !1Yt = PYt-I+Et (in this case we
test the equivalent hypothesis p = 0).
Fuller and Dickey and Fuller (DF)24 have demonstrated that the usual t and F tests are
inappropriate for testing the hypotheses and have produced corrected tables for the
asymptotic distributions of the t and F statistics. The DF test is based on a regression of
the form
(4-11)
Three hypotheses can be tested using this maintained model; (i) that Yt has a unit root
(p=O); (ii) that the series follows a random walk with a drift towards a mean value
(c2=P=0); and (iii) that the series follows a random walk without drift (CI=C2=P=0)25.
24 Fuller W.A. (1976) Introduction to Statistical Time Series Wiley, New York.
Dickey D.A. & Fuller W.A. (1979) 'Distortions of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit
Root' Journal of the American Statistical Association vol. 74 pp427-431.
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Note that if c2 cannot be restricted to zero then the series contains a deterministic time trend
which must be isolated prior to any modeling.
The DF maintained model only allows for the testing of the simple AR(1) case; a more
general form of the equation, known as the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), is usually
used to allow a more rigorous testing of the nature of the integration of a series
m
AYt = cl + c2t+ pYt-1 + L~iAYt-i + Et
i=l
(4-12)
where m is chosen so as to eliminate any autocorrelations, leaving the error term Et as white
noise and permitting efficient OLS estimation. Testing of the augmented model is carried
using the same null hypotheses as for the DF model above.
Applying the ADF method to the InWP series for the 1945 to 1990 period26 yields the
following results. (All autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems were eliminated with
m=3)
InWPt = 2.005 - 0.005t - 0.366InWPt_1 +O.249.6.lnWPt_1 + O.193.6.1nWPt_2 -O.226.6.1nwPt_3 (4-13)
The hypotheses tested were as follows
(i) HO: p=O The DF 't~ statistic (DF(1979», given by the t-ratio on the estimated
coefficient on Yt-1 (p), is used to test the hypothesis. In this case the t-ratio of -
2.3606 is larger than the critical 't'f value (at the 5% significance level) and the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected. LnWP thus has a unit root over the 1945-1989 period.
Even accepting that the series has a unit root does not guarantee a difference stationary
process if c2 is non-zero (the first difference will depend upon time and the series will not
be 1(1»; in addition, the test statistic -rt is dependent on c2 being zero. Thus the second
ADF hypothesis was tested.
(ii) HO: c2=P=0 An F statistic is calculated using the residual sum of squares from the
original ADF and a regression with the joint restriction of c2 =0 and p=O. It is then
2S Perman R. (1989).
26 In the presence of structural breaks a different unit root test is needed for the full period. See section c).
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compared to the critical values of the DF <1>3 statistics". In this case F(4,34) is 1.3945
which is not significant at the 5% level, and HOcannot be rejected.
For the period after the Second World War, therefore, it would appear that there was a
trend in world wheat prices which can be eliminated (and a stationary process established)
by taking logs and then first differencing. But what of the full sample period?
c) Testing for Unit Roots in the Presence of Structural Breaks - Perron (1989)
showed that when a time series contains a structural change (characterized by a change in
the mean level at a known date) the standard unit root tests are biased towards the non-
rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root; the problem being caused by misspecification
of the tested equation. He suggested alternative processes to distinguish a series with a unit
root from a stationary series with a single, permanent (exogenous) change in the mean
value, all of which were 'asymptotically equivalent'. He noted, however, that the method
could not explain the exogenous change. nor could it provide a descriptive stochastic
structure; it simply removed the effects of it from the error term. The simplest procedure
suggested by Perron effectively subtracted the mean from the original series by allowing a
change in it at the time of the break. If Y t is the original series, then the unit root test can be
carried out as follows
Rt = aRt-1 + £t (t=I,2 ...... T)
Et-NID(0,cr2)
(4-14)
where Rt are the residuals from an OLS regression of Yt on a constant arid a dummy
variable DUt which is equal to 0 up to and including the year of the mean change (TB) and
1 thereafter. Testing for a unit root under the null hypothesis that a=1 is done using the t-
statistic on the estimated value of a. ~. ta. As with the DF tests the usual t distribution
cannot be used, nor indeed can the DF 't~ distribution; Perron thus derived an asymptotic
distribution of tao The values are however only valid when the error term in the first
regression is not autocorrelated.
Carrying out this Perron process using the InWP series for the full sample period, 1890-
1990. revealed autocorrelation of the error term in Yt = '\jI+ l1DUt + Et thus further testing
was required. In formulating the further tests, Perron distinguished between 'additive
27 Dickey D.A. & Fuller W.A.(l981) 'Likelihood Ratio Statistics for Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit
Root' Econometrica vol SS pp2S1-276.
4-31
outliers' and 'innovative outliers'. The former refers to a once and for all change in the
mean, while the latter refers to changes in the mean which do not occur instantaneously
with the effect on Yt depending on a dynamic process. The 'additive outlier' test is based
on the ADF equation and as with the simple test requires an OLS estimation of Rt
k
Rt = aRt-1 + ~Ci~t-i + Ut
i=l
(t=k+l,· · ·T) (4-15)
where k is chosen to eliminate any autocorrelations in the error term. The null hypothesis
of a= 1 is again tested using the t statistic on ~ with the critical value being ~.
Testing the null hypothesis of a unit root in the case of an 'innovative outlier' is achieved
by OLS estimation of equation 4-16 and with the t-statistic associated with '&. being used to
test a=1 against critical values of ttl.
k
Yt = yOUt + aD(TB)t + aYt-l + ~i~ Yt-i + Vt (t = k+ 1, ... T)
i=l
(4-16)
where D(TB)t is equal to 1 if t=TB+ 1 and 0 otherwise.
Although it is known that there is a structural break in 1945, it is not known whether the
form is 'additive' or 'innovative'; therefore both tests were carried out on the InWP series.
The results were as follows.
1&
Additive outlier method -3.27
Innovative outlier method -3.28
In each case the critical value of tU was -3.38 so that the null hypothesis of a unit root
could not be rejected.
From the DF and Perron tests it would appear that the international wheat prices cannot be
accurately forecast using a simple time trend. This is hardly surprising given the volatility
of the original series (figure 4.6) and the change in the parameters after 1945. The data
did, however, display a downward trend (which can be eliminated by differencing),
suggesting that while a simple time trend may not be appropriate, a more sophisticated
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approach to time series analysis, the Box - Jenkins approach, could be used.
4.4.3.2 The Box-Jenkins Approach
In essence the Box-Jenkins (BI) approach to forecasting involves building an
'Autoregressive, Integrated, Moving Average' (ARIMA) model to represent the data.
Suppose Y is the variable to be forecast. The BJ analysis begins by transforming Y to
ensure that it is stationary (usually by differencing), thereby creating a new variable y*
which becomes the variable used in the ARIMA model. The general model for Y" can be
written as
(4-17)
I
where ai and bj (i= 1,2, "'p, j= 1,2,...q) are unknown parameters and the E are independent
and identically distributed normal errors. The model is denoted ARIMA(p,d,q) where p is
the number of lagged values of y* representing the autoregressive part of the model, d is
the degree of differencing required to produce the stationary series Y*, and q is the number
of lags of the error term representing the moving average part of the model. Obtaining the
specific ARIMA model for a particular series involves three steps
(a) identification - the choice of p, d and q which seem appropriate for further
consideration;
(b) estimation - the estimation of the unknown parameters ai and bj from the data;
(c) diagnostic checking - the resulting model is tested to see if it adequately fits the data, or
if any further models should be tested.
The BI approach was applied to the InWP series as follows:
(a) Identfflcation > the unit root tests performed above showed that the InWP series is
first-difference stationary hence the magnitude of d was already known to be 1. The data
period used for model estimation was taken as 1946-1990 because of the presence of the
change in mean in 1945. An ARIMA model estimated over the full period was of the same
form as the 1946-1990 model, but the parameters differed. A visual examination of the
differenced series, however, revealed potential outlying values which may have biased any
attempts to estimate an ARIMA model. International wheat prices in the early 1970s were
subject to several abnormal shocks, the most important of these being the emergence of the
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USSR as a significant buyer on the world market, and it was therefore decided to remove
the effects of these shocks from the data points concerned. Estimates of what the InWP
values would have been in 1974 and 1975 in the absence of any shock were made as
follows. Using data from 1946 to 1973 the model
(4-18)
was estimated, by OLS, and then used to forecast a 1974 value. The model was then re-
estimated using the newly created data 1946 to 1974. This second model was used to
forecast a 1975 value. The resulting series, InWP2, was found to be difference stationary
under the ADF criterion and could therefore be used in the ARIMA procedure.
With d for the new series known to be 1, the identification stage simply entailed
determining p and q. Although this is the most crucial step in ARIMA model building, it is
subject to personal judgement as it requires a visual inspection of the autocorrelation
function (ACF), or the correlogram, and the partial autocorrelation function (PACF), and
an 'educated guess' at the appropriate orders of p and q. In practice the actual
autocorrelations are not known and must be estimated from the data. From the ACF and
the PACF it was deduced that the appropriate model was a mixed ARIMA(p,q) process
rather than a simple MA(q) or AR(p); however the orders of p or q were not obvious. The
BJ approach in this case would be to choose a few likely forms for the ARIMA model,
estimate them ,and use diagnostic tests to select the one which best fits the data.
(b) Estimation - Under the BJ 'parsimonious parametrization' principle, it is generally
thought preferable to have a simple model rather than a more complicated one. This does
not imply a belief that the world is necessarily simple, but that if a model with fewer
parameters can be shown to represent the variables under consideration, then this is better
to use this rather than a more complicated one. The forms chosen for comparison were
ARIMA(1,I,l), ARIMA(2,1,1), ARIMA(1,1,2).and ARIMA(2,1,2); note that in this case
the possibility of p=O or q=O has already been discounted by the identification stage.
Estimation showed that the ARIMA(2,1 ,2) model was non-stationary in the AR term and
therefore an unacceptable form. In order to choose between the remaining models, it was
necessary to examine some model selection criteria. The Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC)
criteria (Akaike (1974) and Schwarz (1978), as reported in Mills (1990») are perhaps the
most well known of these, and are presented for the InWP2 series in table 1 below. For
both criteria, it is assumed that the degree of differencing is known so that the objective of
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the procedures is to determine the most appropriate values of p and q. The calculated AIC
and SC criteria are examined in the following way. Upper bounds, P and Q, are chosen so
as to be sufficiently large to encompass the true model, with pbar = {O,l,· · · ·P} and qbar =
{O,I,· · · ·Q}; p* and q*, the most appropriate value ofp and q, are selected such that
AIC(p* ,q*) = min AIC(p,q) where. p is an element of{pbar}, and q is an
element off qbar}
and similarly for the SC criterion.
Table 4.6
Akaike and Schwarz criteria for Ln WP2
Akaike
p
1 2
1 -3.6185 -3.5730
q
2 -3.5696 NS
Schwarz
p
1 2
1 -3.4956 -3.4092
q
2 -3.4058 NS
(NS = non-stationary)
The ARIMA( 1,1,2) model performed best under both the AIC and the SC criteria and was
thus selected as the most appropriate model.
InWP2t = -0.0847 + 0.6046InWP2t_1 + 0.7753Et_1 + 0.1550Et_2
Figure 4.9 shows the actual and estimated values of the InWP2 series using this model.
(c) Diagnostic checking - the best way to investigate whether a model satisfactorily fits
the data is to see how well it performs outside of the sample period. However, frequently,
and indeed in this case, the amount of data available is insufficient for this approach to be
used, so that models are identified, estimated and checked over the same data set; the
diagnostic tests thus performed are less powerful than if they had been carried out on data
outside the sample period, but nevertheless are an important stage of model building. The
usual test is to check whether the calculated residuals of a model mimic to a reasonable
degree a white noise process. If this is the case then the residuals would have a mean close
4-35
to zero, an approximately constant variance and negligible autocorrelations. The validity of
the latter point can be checked by comparing the calculated autocorrelations with the
standard errors. The autocorrelations of the residuals of the ARIMA( 1,1,2) model
calculated from the InWP2 series are within the standard error bands for all values of k
except k=14 and k=23. It was suspected that the volatility of the later data points as
compared to the 1946-1970 period may have accounted for this and so it was decided not to
reject the model at this stage, but perform further diagnostic tests.
Actual and Fitted Values of LNWP2
6.0
5.5
~
a:j 5.0
4.5
Actual
4.04-----~----r---~-----r----,_----r_--_,----_r----~----~--_.
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
Figure 4.9
More formal diagnostic checks are the 'portmanteau' tests of Box and Pierce and Ljung and
Box (Q* and Q respectively). Box and Pierce (1970)28 showed that if the stationary
process was correctly generated by the ARMA(p,q) process then Q* would be
asymptotically distributed as X2 with (rn-p-q) degrees of freedom, where m=T1/2 and T is
the length of the time series-". Ljung and Box (1978)30 modified the Q* statistic (and
called it Q) and showed that it also would have a X2 (m-p-q) distribution if the model is
correctly specified. If the calculated value of Q exceeds the tabulated X2 (rn-p-q) value then
28 As reported in Mills (1990) p145.
29 Note that if a constant term is includedin the model,as with 1nWP2,the degreesof freedomare reducedby
one.
30 As reported in Mills (1990)p145.
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the adequacy of the model would be questioned. The ARIMA(I,I,2) model estimated from
the InWP2 series did not fail the Box-Pierce-Ljung portmanteau tests and can thus be
regarded as adequately fitting the data.
4.4.3.3 The Comparison
After applying an annual inflation rate of 3 per cent to the forecast values of LnWP2 for
1991-1995 and converting from US dollars to ECU at the exchange rate of
1ECU=$ 1.1934, a 'world price' of 120.82 ECU per tonne was estimated. Table 4.5 gives
the DECO PSEs for 1986-1990 and estimates of the percentage PSEs in 1995 (PSE
equivalents of the APSE and SMU) which would occur under each proposal, based on two
scenarios concerning EC cereals production. Also presented are 'wheat PSEs' for those
years calculated by replacing the DECO wheat reference prices with those used in the
forecasting procedure.
Production is assumed to be 160 and 165million tonnes in scenarios A and B respectively,
but in addition production of oats, rye and sorghum is assumed to be 10million tonnes so
that 'wheat' production (effectively wheat and barley production) is 150 and 155 million
tonnes respectively. The assumptions made about co-responsibility levies and other
expenditure in section 4.4.2 are assumed to hold in this case, but in addition set-aside
payments are assumed to be increased by 4 per cent per annum between 1990and 1995.
Table 4.7 indicates that there would have been a very considerable reduction in the
proportion of farmers' receipts made up of governmental support if any of the reform
processes had been initiated, since internal farm support in 1995 would have been
considerably lower than 1990 levels in percentage PSE terms. However, it should be re-
. emphasised that these projections are based on trend dollar prices for wheat and a view of
the mean $IECU exchange rate. Actual world prices in ECUs, and hence' PSEs, in 1995
could be quite different from those used in the projections as a result of factors causing
short-run instability in the world cereals market and/or. exchange rate variability. For
example, if the value of the ECU against the $ were 10 per cent higher (lower) than that
used in the projections then the 1995 PSEs would be considerably higher at 20 per cent
under the US proposal and 34 per cent under the EC proposal (considerably lower at 2 per
cent under the US proposal and 20 per cent under the EC proposal).
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Table 4.7
Percentage PSEs for the EC Cereal Sector 1986.1990
and Percentage PSE Equivalents 1995
1225Projections (a)
illQ .l.2.81 rsss l.2a.2 l22Q Scenario US Ql EC
Cereals 54.02· 55.86 44.55 24.61 45.15 A. 12.0 11.6 27.9
B. 11.5 10.5 26.8
Wheat 45.75 43.24 39.51 39.86 41.82
(a) PSE equivalents of the SMU, in the case of the EC, and of the APSE in the case of the US and CG.
4.5 Conclusions
The Autumn 1990proposals of the major participants in the UR showed some convergence
on the definition of the AMS which was to be used in the reform of internal agricultural
support. Based on the PSE, the AMS incorporated the notion of a fixed reference price and
made some allowance for supply control, although the US and the EC methods for
achieving this were still very different. However, evaluating the offers tabled for the EC
cereals sector, on a comparable basis, indicates that there was still a considerable gap
between the EC and the US and CG proposals. Under the EC proposal, the costs of
supporting the EC cereal sector, as measured by the APSE, would have been around 4.5
billion ECU higher in 1995 than under either the US or CG proposals; EC cereal farmers
could thus have been receiving a 1995 'producer price' some 20 per cent higher if the EC's
1990 Uruguay Round proposals, rather than those of the USA or CG, had been
implemented. In addition, a comparison of the APSE with the PSEs calculated by the
DECD indicated that while there would have been a very considerable reduction in the
proportion of farmers' receipts made up of governmental support if any of the reform
processes had been initiated (since internal farm support in 1995 would have been
considerably lower than 1990 levels in percentage PSE terms), the EC's reform proposal
would have resulted in a 1995 value some 15 percentage points above that if either the
USA's or eG's had been implemented. Given these divergent positions. it is perhaps
understandable that the USA and CG left the negotiating table in December 1990.
A4.1
Appendix A4.11
Other Measures of Government Intervention
1. Nominal Rate of Protection
2. Effective Rate of Protection
3. Nominal Rate of Assistance
4. Effective Rate of Assistance
The first two are traditional measures of government intervention while the latter two were
developed in Australia to increase the policy coverage of the former without using aPSE
format.
The nominal rate of protection measures how domestic prices for traded goods change in
response to changes in government policy. It is defined as the percentage difference
between the producer price- and the border price of a commodity. In algebraic terms
NRPi = [(pdi - PWi) I PWi]·lOO
= [(pdi 1PWi) - 1].100 A4-1
where NRP is the nominal rate of protection for the ith good, pd is the producer price and
pw is the world price.
The NRP measure covers mainly border policies which cause the domestic and world
market prices to differ.
The effective rate of protection incorporates the effects of government intervention on the
prices of both the final output and intermediate input prices. It is defined as the percentage
difference in the value-added of a good with and without border distortions. Algebraically
it can be written as
A4-2
where ERPi is the effective rate of protection in good i, vd is the value added measured at
domestic prices and VW is value added at world prices. Also
The information in this appendix is drawn largely from ABARE (1990).
2 Consumer rates of protection can also be calculated using consumer prices rather than producer prices.
A4.2
A4-3
and
A44
where j are an intermediate input, aji is an input-output coefficient, PWj is the price of the
input measured at world prices and pdj the price of the input in domestic currency.
The nominal rate of assistance for any commodity is defined by the Australian Industries
Assistance Commission as the percentage difference between the unit gross returns to
domestic producers (Rd) and the world price. It therefore covers the effects of both border
measures and all other forms of assistance which directly affect the producers' unit gross
returns. Itmay be defined algebraically as;
A4.S
Finally the Australian effective rate of assistance is defined as the percentage difference
between the value-added per unit of output with and without government interventions. It
can be written as;
ERAi = [(AVi - UVi> I UVi]·l00 A4-6
where ERAi is the effective rate of assistance to commodity i, AV is the assisted value-
added and VA is the unassisted value added, both of which are measured at world prices.
The ERA takes into account policies which are aimed at intermediate factors (e.g.
fertilisers), value-adding factors (e.g. land and capital) and those which directly affect the
domestic price of the final commodity.
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Chapter 5
The Links Between AMS, Export Subsidy and
Import Protection Commitments
5.1 Introduction
For the first five years of the UR, the EC's reform proposals were presented in terms of an
AMS on the grounds that cuts in the AMS (i.e, internal support) would automatically lead
to commensurate cuts in export subsidisation and import protection. The USA and CG, on
the other hand, consistently proposed separate reform programmes in each of the three
areas, export subsidisation, import protection and internal support. The aims of the
following two chapters are threefold: firstly, to assess whether AMS reductions do indeed
lead to commensurate cuts in border protection and export subsidies; secondly, to establish
whether the commitments made in the UR in each of the three areas are compatible (in the
sense that they can be achieved simultaneously); and, thirdly, to examine the policy options
open to the USA and EC if they wish to support farm incomes and remain within the letter
of the UR agreement. The effects of reform on the world wheat market are thus examined
to provide an illustration of the three points above, using a simulation model covering
seven countries or regions. The analysis centres on the developed countries (especially the
EC and USA) as these countries support agriculture more heavily than other areas+,
Chapter 5 provides a brief review of the modelling procedures used in previous
liberalisation studies and a detailed description of the model which is used later in this
chapter and in chapter 6 to answer the questions posed here.
5.2 Modellin2 International Commodity Markets; A Reyiew of Previous
Procedures
In recent years interest in the role of international agricultural trade in agricultural policy
analysis has grown as policy makers and politicians have realised its import. The result has
been a rise in empirical work on trade prospects, especially the effects of liberalising the
restrictive trade policies of the industrialised countries, and a re-examination of the
An extension of the analysis to consider the effects on developing countries and Eastern Europe for example
is a possible area for future research.
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analytical procedures appropriate for such studies. The following section is a brief review
of some of the modelling procedures used, and the improvements to these procedures made
over the last decade.
Agricultural markets have, in general, been analysed using a partial equilibrium approach,
usually concentrating on one commodity at a time while implicitly disregarding any cross-
commodity effects that may be present. Neither are interactions with other sectors
considered. While this allows detailed modelling of the commodity in question, any
analyses carried out using the model must be viewed as incomplete (indeed Hertel (1990)
argues that partial equilibrium models, especially those in reduced form, lack economic
structure and therefore the results can be difficult to interpret and theoretical inconsistencies
could arise). The development of multi-commodity partial equilibrium models (for example
that of Tyers and Anderson reviewed later in this section) has allowed cross-commodity
effects within the agricultural sector to be considered, but any possible cross-sectoral
effects (changes in factor requirements for example) are not included, nor do such models
allow for endogenous exchange rate changes. The exchange rate can be an important factor
when analysing international commodity markets where prices are usually quoted in US
dollars. Movements in exchange rates can have effects on the balance of trade valued in
domestic currency, and hence on domestic production, consumption and policy decisions.
However, one should not overestimate the advantages of general equilibrium modelling
(which allows for cross-sectoral effects and endogenous exchange rates) over the partial
equilibrium approach. Gardner (1988) describes the advantages and pitfalls of general
equilibrium modelling as follows
'It seems obvious at first glance that general equilibrium is preferable to partial equilibrium
modelling. General equilibrium modelling is more rigorous in that it satisfies more neoclassical
restrictions: for example, the adding-up properties of a system of demand equation(s). It also
satisfies the constraint that income equals expenditure, so that if protection changes farmers'
incomes, this is fed back through the demand side of the model to obtain price effects that a partial
equilibrium model would omit' (P362). However, 'in order to make general equilibrium models
tractable, their preferences, technology, and endowments have typically been so simplified, and so
much has been abstracted, that it is often difficult to take their predictions in some directions
seriously. The internal logic of general equilibrium modeling then creates a difficulty in taking
any of the model's predictions seriously.' (P363)2 .
Also the advantages of partial equilibrium modelling, namely the inclusion of specific
market details, especially with respect to policy, should not be underestimated. To give a
2 This latter quotation taken in tum from SargentT.J. (1987) 'Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory' Harvard
University Press. p7.
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general equilibrium model the kind of focus found in partial equilibrium models would
require the construction of 'the ultimate model' with every sector modelled in detail. While
this would be desirable, the cost of such a model would be great. In practice, general
equilibrium models include considerable detail in the sectors of interest, while the other
sectors are collapsed into one or two sections.
Of the models reviewed (the majority of which were developed to analyse the effects of a
complete liberalisation of agricultural trade) only two were in a general equilibrium format,
the OECO WALRAS model and the World Bank (Burniaux) Rural-Urban, North-South
(RUNS) modeP.
General Equilibrium Models
The OECO model is a multi-sector, multi-commodity applied general equilibrium model
developed 'with the aim of quantifying the long-run effects of agricultural policies on
resource allocation between the farm and non-farm sectors, on economic welfare, on factor
returns, and on world trade volumes and prices' (Martin et al. (1990) p 132). It covers the
major agricultural trading countries/regions of the OECD in six sub-models which are
linked with a residual 'rest of the world' aggregate via a bilateral world trade sub-model.
Each country/region sub-models covers thirteen industries, five of which are agricultural.
The world trade sub-model treats imports originating in different countries/regions as
imperfect substitutes (i.e. the Armington speciflcation+), and hence each country is
assumed to face a downward-sloping demand curve for all products, and intra-industry
trade can occur. The model is completed with an investment equation within which net
saving is entirely allocated to investment goods (there are no financial assets in the
model)5. The model is closed by assuming that the initial government deficit and base-
year foreign trade imbalance do not change. This, the OECD argues, 'approximates
revenue-neutrality which is considered the appropriate closure to apply to the government
sector in long-term simulations' (ibid p76). The agricultural policies of the OECD
countries/regions are measured using PSEs and CSEs, and, where appropriate for the
analysis, the price gap (between internal producer and world market prices) caused by
3 Other general equilibrium models have been developed to study this area, such as the Horridge and Pearce
extension of the Tyers and Anderson model (Horridge M and Pearce 0 (1988) 'Modeling the effects on
Australia of Interventions in World Agricultural Trade', IMPACT Preliminary Working paper no. OP-65,
University of Melbourne), but are not included here. A review can be found in Hertel (1990).
4 See section 5.2.1 for a discussion of the Armington specification.
5 The OECO freely admits that this is • very simplistic representation.
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specific policies. The use of PSEs and CSEs allows the OECD to measure the effects of all
agricultural policies (support given to market prices, as measured by the difference between
internal and external prices, and transfers from policy measures such as direct payments)
simultaneously where other models have only incorporated those effects which influenced
the price gap (the OEeD's Ministerial Trade Mandate model, reviewed in the next section
also uses PSEs and CSEs to measure agricultural policies).
The agricultural section of the 'RUNS' model was developed by Burniaux to assess the
overall impact of agricultural protectionism in industrial countries. The model involves ten
regions, each of which have a sub-model for the agricultural (rural) sector and one for the
non-agricultural (urban) sector; both sub-models are then disaggregated (13 agricultural
commodities and 5 industrial). Foreign trade equations imply an imperfectly competitive
market for manufactured goods and services but a unique world price for each agricultural
product (i.e, perfect competition is assumed for agriculture). While the assumption of
perfectly competitive world markets is one which is common to many general and partial
equilibrium models, international markets for most agricultural products are dominated by a
few powerful exporters (notably the USA and EC) so that some argue that it may be more
appropriate to model agricultural trade as imperfectly competitive, or at the very least
recognise that a perfectly competitive model is not appropriates, The sectors are linked
through price transmissions with domestic agricultural prices responding to world prices of
agricultural goods and changes in prices in the urban sector; the effects of agricultural
policies are then measured as the price gap between domestic and world prices.
Partial Equilibrium Models
The partial equilibrium models reviewed were, in general, constructed as a system of
demand and supply equations for a set of countries which are linked through trade. In its
simplest form, the partial equilibrium model becomes a reduced form model of the
international market for a limited set of commodities (for example Valdes and Zietz (1988».
Modifications to this basic model have included treating world markets as imperfectly
competitive (e.g. Mitchell (1988), McCalla (1966), Schmitz & McCalla (1981), treating
imports from different sources as imperfect substitutes (e.g. de Gorter & Meilke (1987)
and producing multi-commodity models (Tyers & Anderson (op. cit.), OECD (1990),
Roningen & Dixit (1989».
The Mitchell and McCalla models view the world market for grains (wheat specifically in
6 See section S.2.1 for more detail on this point.
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the case of McCalla) as a dominant-finn oligopoly. Mitchell asserts that the USA acts as
the price leader in the markets for grains, soyabeans, meal and oil, while McCalla assumes
Canada to be the 'price leader' in the wheat market. It should be noted that the latter model
was developed when the EC was a net importer rather than a significant net exporter.
McCalla acknowledged that his dominant firm duopoly model no longer applied post-1970
as the EC would have to then be included as part of the 'dominant firm' group.
The de Gorter & Meilke model of the world wheat market was developed to evaluate the
impact of EC wheat policies on domestic wheat consumption (excluding animal feed) and
international trade. The analysis distinguishes between the impacts of a change in the
intervention price and a change in the threshold (consumer) price. In addition, the model
treats imported wheat as a product differentiated from domestic wheat production and
exports. The approach taken is to approximate the substitution possibilities between
domestic and imported wheat by a two-stage demand system under which total wheat
consumption is determined first and then distributed between domestic and imported
supplies on the basis of the elasticities of substitution within an almost ideal demand system
(AIDS)7.
The Tyers and Anderson model is perhaps the most well known of the multi-commodity
partial equilibrium models used to analyse agricultural trade liberalisation. Their 'Grain,
Livestock Products and Sugar' (GLS) model is a dynamic, stochastic, multi-commodity
simulation model of world markets in staple products - wheat, course grains, rice, meat,
dairy products and sugar. It covers 30 countries or country groups 'so that the
international as well as the domestic effects of policy or structural changes in one or more
countries or commodities can be determined endogenously' (Tyers & Anderson (1988)
p199). Policy and stock-holding behaviour are endogen?us and are based on empirical
analyses of price transmissions between domestic and world prices and between prices and
domestic supply, and of stock level responses to price and quantity changes in each country
or country-group respectively. Structurally, the model is a set of expressions for quantities
produced, consumed and stored, each of which is a function of known past prices and
endogenous current prices. Production is represented by Nerlovian equations and is
subject to random disturbances (making the model stochastic); allowance is made for the
effects of land set-aside policies on production. Consumption is split into direct human
consumption, characterised by price and income elasticities of demand, and livestock feed
use which is based on input-output coefficients for each livestock product. The model is
7 This is discussed further in section S.2.1.
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solved for the levels of international and domestic prices, production, consumption and
closing stocks which simultaneously clear all markets (markets are assumed to be
competitive ).
Another multi-commodity, partial equilibrium model was developed by the OECD to
analyse the economic effects of domestic agricultural support policies and, subsequently,
the impact on domestic and international markets of a reduction in agricultural assistance
(described in OECO (1990) pp45-68). The Ministerial Trade Mandate (MTM) model is a
medium-term, comparative static model of world agriculture comprising of 11 country or
regional models. linked through trade. Each country model contains endogenous
relationships explaining the economic factors determining demand, supply and prices for
18 categories of agricultural commodities. The world market is assumed to be competitive
and equilibrium occurs when world supply and demand are in balance. Assistance to
agriculture is measured by estimates of PSEs and CSEs.
The USDA's 'Static World Policy Simulation Modeling (SWOPSIM) framework'
(Roningen & Dixit) is a multi-commodity, multi-region, static, non-spatial price
equilibrium model which is calibrated to represent world agricultural markets for a given
year. Within the model. it is assumed that (i) world agricultural markets are competitive in
that countries act as if they had no market power; (ii) a geographical region is considered as
a single marketplace even if it contains more that one country; and (iii) domestic and
imported products are perfect substitutes and importers do not distinguish between country
of origin. The economic structure of the SWOPSIM model is characterised by constant
elasticity domestic supply and demand equations and summary policy measures (price
wedges derived from PSEs and CSEs). Stocks are not explicitly modelled because markets
are assumed to be in intermediate-run static equilibrium; 'implicitly, though, stocks are
presumed to be proportional to consumption flows' (ibid p8). Trade is the difference
between domestic supply and total demand and is given as a net figure (i.e. it cannot
identify imports and exports in the case where a country is an exporter and importer of the
same good).
S.2.1 Dealing With Differentiated Products and Imperfect Markets
One of the assumptions made in models of world agricultural markets in the past has been
homogeneity of the product under consideration. It has been argued that this assumption is
unrealistic given the varieties of agricultural products and different qualities within these
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varieties, and the fact that countries can import and export the same generic good
simultaneously (for example the EC exports soft wheat and imports hard wheat). A
popular way of dealing with the simultaneous import and export of the 'same' good is by
using an Armington specification.
The Armington Specification8
The original model developed by Armington in 1969 was of trade in products differentiated
by country of origin. It was based on a 2-stage budgeting process in which total
expenditures on the product are determined first using a weakly separable utility function,
and then allocated to imports from each source on the basis of a CES function (other types
of functional form have been used in some applications of the Armington specification).
Using this approach the following import demand function can be specified for a particular
product:
for cr>O (5-1)
where Mj is the quantity of the commodity imported from country j, ~j is a constant, M is
the total quantity of the good consumed, Pj is the price of the good imported from country
j, P is the price index of the good and CJ is the elasticity of substitution between imports
from the various sources.
The main advantages of the Armington model are ease of use, flexibility in terms of the
functional form of the import demand equation and the fact that the 'model often gives
results which are judged to be successful because of both plausible parameter estimates and
statistical significance' (Alston et al. p445). The main disadvantages are the restrictions
placed on import demand. The Armington model assumes that import demands are
homothetic and separable by import source. This implies that within a market, trade
patterns only change when relative prices change and are not affected by changes in
income. Moreover, the elasticities of substitution between imports from any pair of
sources are identical and constant, and the income elasticities of demand for all imports of
the good from all sources are forced to unity. These are strict restrictions on demand.
Alston et al. (1990), Goddard (1987) and Winters (1984) find that the Armington
specification is not appropriate in the case of wheat and cotton trade, beef trade and UK
manufactures respectively. This is because the data do not support the restrictions of
homotheticity and separability. Alston et al. conclude that if the Armington specification is
8 This section draws on MacLaren (1991).
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to be used the data should be tested for consistency with the restrictions, although 'in
general, it will be desirable and appropriate to use a less severely restrictive set of
assumptions about demand relationships than those of the Armington model' (p466). They
suggest using an AIDS specification to give a less restrictive model of import demand'',
but in doing this there is still a risk of specification bias (although a lower risk than with the
Armington specification). Used in a model of import demand, the AIDS specification
developed by Deaton &Muellbauer (1980) relates the share of expenditure on imports of
good j from source i to total expenditure on imports and prices. Deaton & Muellbauer
concede that although the AIDS specification usually leads to a high R2, the homogeneity
assumption is often not supported by the data. They suggest that this is likely to be the
result of the exclusion of important explanatory variables other than price or total outlay
(for example, time trends, lagged dependent variables or short-run price expectations).
They further suggest that the price coefficients are likely to be biased by the omissions
(pp77-79).
Imperfect Markets
The ability of a small number of countries to influence world markets for many agricultural
products indicates clearly that agricultural markets are not perfectly competitive. However,
there has been little consensus among agricultural economists on the appropriate model
structure for the world market. Models incorporate a variety of assumptions about the
extent and nature of market power. The McCalla and Mitchell models mentioned above are
fairly typical of the oligopoly models, as is the Coumot structure for the wheat market used
by Sarris & Freebaim (1983). The Coumot model, which assumes that the strategic
variable is quantity, can be justified if the large developed countries are assumed to pursue
policies with an inward-looking nature. This would imply that although these countries
recognise that their actions can affect world market prices, their prime concern is with
domestic issues such as farm incomes, the level of stocks and budgetary pressures.
Perhaps a more applicable model of world agricultural markets is the less naive, conjectural
variations model, which assumes that firms (countries) realise that their output and pricing
decisions affect those of other firms and therefore make assumptions (,conjectures') about
the output and pricing actions of competing firms. For those large countries which have
considerable power on world markets, it is not unreasonable to assume that they have
access to the information required to make plausible conjectures about the responses of
other countries to changes in their exports (and hence world prices).
9 Winters (1984) also suggests using an AIDS structure to model international trade (p261).
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Vasavada (1990) contends that it is not only the supply side that is imperfectly competitive,
but that the demand side displays extensive importer power (consider, for example, the
ability of the former USSR (and now the CIS) to negotiate favourable terms for their
imports of grains and dairy products). He models imports within an Armington framework
such that importers do not necessarily display price taking behaviour. Carter & Schmitz
(1979) used an 'optimal tariff framework to examine whether importing countries exerted
monopsony power in the world market by comparing actual prices with empirical estimates
of the optimal tariff solution. Using data from 1966 to 1977 they concluded that the EC
and Japan could have been tacitly colluding with one acting as a price setter by setting
prices close to the theoretical optimum. Most modelers, however, view importing
countries as price-takers.'
5.3 The Model
.
The model is a partial equilibrium, stochastic, simulation model for wheat. The partial
equilibrium format was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, because the analysis centres on
the industrialised economies, where agriculture accounts for a small proportion of GNP
(less than 5%), and where the impact of changes in the agricultural sector on other sectors
is small (exceptions to this are fertilizers and agricultural machinery but these again form a
small proportion of the GNP of the industrialised countries). Moreover, as one of the aims
of the UR was to reduce the trade-distorting agricultural policies of these industrialised
countries, a model used to analyse these negotiations should contain a high level of policy
detail; the partial equilibrium format facilitates this type of focus. In addition, a partial
equilibrium model can give a fairly full picture of the market under consideration if
international and cross-commodity interactions are taken into account.
Initially the model was split into six areas, the USA, the EC, Canada, the CG (without
Canada), Eastern Europe and a Rest of the World (ROW) grouping, however, China was
separated out from the ROW grouping during the model building process to give a seven
are model. The areas are linked through trade with the market clearing price determined
when excess supply is equal to excess demand. Note that although the USA, EC and
Canada exhibit the ability to influence the world market price, the world market is not
explicitly modelled as an oligopolyl'', Rather, the stocking policies of these countries are
assumed to be such as to allow them to react to changes in market conditions and influence
10 The USA in particular has a number of sellers in addition to the government (CCC).
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the world price. Thus if the market price falls below a notional trigger level (which is not
necessarily the same for all countries), government stocks are accumulated and vice-versa.
Also the Export Enhancement Programme of the USA is included specifically as this is
another mechanism by which the USA can use its government stocks to influence the world
price (it has the effect of dampening it).
The first 4 areas have quite different specifications and are described below. The aim in
each of these areas is the same, however; that is to determine net exports (essentially an
excess supply function). Available supply is given by the identity
ASt = PRODt +M, + STOCKSt_l
where M, are imports and stocks are given by an end of year figure, while usage is given
by
USEt = Ct +Xt + STOCKSt
Equating supply and demand and re-arranging gives exports as
Xt = PRODt + M, - Ct - (STOCKSt - STOCKSt_l) (5-7)
5.3.1 The USA
Production
As with the other three areas modelled in some detail, production in the USA is calculated
as the product of the area planted and yield. Yield is calculated on trend, from the base
period t=O, but with a random element introduced to allow for unpredictable events,
weather induced shocks for example. This formulation is the same for each of the four
areas modelled in detail.
YIELDt =YIELDo + cpTREND+ Et (5-8)
In order to account for the voluntary nature of the support programmes in the USA, the
area planted is the sum of the areas planted by participants and by non-participants.
(5-9)
The area equations are based on the methodology used by Haley (1991) to model the
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provisions of the 1990 Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act (FACT). The area
planted by non-participants is given as
(5-10)
where E(RETNt) is the expected return, per hectare, when not participating in the farm
programmes; E(RETNJ is calculated as the expected price (E(P)) in time t multiplied by the
expected yield (E(Y)) - the trended value for year t. Price expectations are formed
according to the formulation used by Haley in his model of US cereals sector: that is, they
are equal to the minimum of either last year's price or the average of the 3 previous years'
prices. Haley argues that farmer pessimism regarding market returns can be reflected by
this specification, but it also allows farmers to apply a discount factor to 'abnormal' prices.
Thus if prices in year t are high due to some abnormal event, a drought for example,
rational farmers do not expect those prices to carry through to t+1.
The area planted by participants in the programmes is calculated as follows
AREAPt = (PTt * BAS&) - SETt (5-11)
where BASEt is the base area set under the farm program (calculated as the average of the
acres planted and considered planted during the previous five years); PTt is the participation
rate in year t, which can vary between 0% and 100% and is dependent on the relative
returns from participation and non-participation; and SETt is the area set-aside in year t
such that
SETt = t(ARPt * BASEt * PTJ ·(5-12)
where ARPt is the percentage of the base area required to be set aside under the Acreage
Reduction Program. The ARP variable, like all other policy variables, is assumed to be
exogenous but is restricted by the provisions of the 1990 FACT, namely that the range of
ARP levels available to decision-makers is determined by the ratio of ending stocks to total
use. The constant t is expected to be larger than I as the total area set aside includes area
registered in other programmes (for example paid land diversion and the 50/92 and 0192
programmes).
The assumption of exogenous policy decisions is made while recognising that events on the
world market will influence policy makers so that policy could be made endogenous (using
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game theory or a 'satisficing' model, for example). However, it is useful for this analysis
to investigate whether governments can adjust certain policies, leaving others unchanged
(or even increased) while still meeting any UR agreement. By making this assumption
various policy options can be easily tested.
The participation rate (registered acres as a percentage of the base area) is given by
(5-13)
where E(RETPt) is the minimum expected return per hectare from participation.
Note that given the formulation above and the fact that all farmers face the same expected
returns in anyone year, the existence of a participation 'rate of between 0% and 100%,
rather than exactly 0% or 100% reflects the differing perceptions of risk by individual
farmers. The difference between the known minimum expected return from participation
and the unknown expected return from the market can be thought of as a measure of risk.
E(RETPt) is calculated as the sum of the expected deficiency payment and the expected
price support from the non-recourse loan program.
(5-14)
The expected deficiency payment, E(DPt), is defined as the minimum target price (as fixed
in the FACT) minus the average market price in the previous 12 months, or the previous 3
years, whichever is the lower. YDPt is the programme yield, fixed in the FACT as 'the
average of farm program payment yields for the 1980-85 crop years excluding the highest
and lowest years' (USDA (1990» - i.e. a constant. The loan rate, LRh although an
exogenous policy variable, is constrained by the provisions of the 1990 FACT. Thus it is
set at 85% of a 5-year moving average of market prices, excluding the high and low years,
providing it is not less than 95% of the year earlier loan rate. Discretionary reductions of
up to 10% are allowed if the ending stocks-to-use ratio is over 15%.
As the participation rate can only take values from 0 to 1 (values outside this range do not
make sense), predicted values from the linear formulation in equation (5-13) need to be
restricted such that negative values are made equal to 0 and values which exceed 1 are made
equal to 1. It is acknowledged that this is somewhat arbitrary and could lead to some
misleading results, for example predicted values of 1.01 and +00 would both be set to 1.
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However, it was found that values only slightly outside of the specified range (less than
0.1 in either direction) did not occur until the difference in expected return from
participation and non-participation was over $90 per tonne (the difference would have to be
over $597 per tonne to gain a negative number). This has not occurred during the time
period under consideration, indeed the average difference between E(RETP} and E(RETN}
was $54.60.
Note that an alternative formulation was considered, that of a logit transformation of the
linear function which ensures that the predicted values fall within the specified ranget l.
However, this formulation could be used to estimate the probability of one farmer
participating in the commodity programs but not to estimate the actual participation rate for
the whole of the USA.
Results
The results of an estimation of equation (5-8), using crop year data from 1968 to 1990 are
shown below.
YIELOUS = 1.7124 + 0.04621TREND + 0.24444 083 - 0.22419 086 - 0.34662 D88 - 0.48283 D89
(25.97)* (9.733)* (3.125)* (-2.840)* (-4.216)* (-5.734)*
R2 0.9218
Rbar20.8827
OW 1.7700
(t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 95% level)
The dummy variables are included to account for the variable weather conditions during the
late 1980s. As the DW statistic was in the inconclusive region an LM test was carried out
to test for first-order autocorrelation. The calculated X2 was less than the critical value so
that the null hypothesis of p=O (i.e. no autocorrelation) could not be rejected.
The area planted by non-participants was calculated using data derived from equations (5-9)
and (5-11) as below
AREANt =AREAUSt - [(PTt * BASEr) - SETt]
This data, and the calculated expected return, were then used to calculate the parameters of
equation (5-10) using the Cochrane-Orcutt (C-O) method for second-order autocorrelation
11 A detailed exposition on the logit function can be found in Cramer (1991).
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LnAREAN = -3.122 + 2.2902LnE(RETN)
(-1.038) (4.053)*
R2 0.7325 DW 1.738
Rbar20.6879
Data availability meant that the participation rate and the area set aside were estimated over
the 1983/84 - 1990/91 crop years; the following results were obtained. The dummy
variable was included in the participation rate equation to explain an outlying value,
possibly caused by the change in the base area in that year (when calculated on the basis of
the old base area, the participation rate is 70% as opposed to 60% calculated using the
actual base area). It is postulated that farmers needed time to adjust to the new permitted
area before changing their decision to participate.
PTt = 108.49 - O.156E(RETN) + 0.022E(RETP) - 15.25D84
(9.284)* (-2.389)t (0.463) (-2.97)*
R2 0.8858 DW 2.8215
Rbar2Q.8001
(t significant at 90% level)
Again the DW statistic was in the inconclusive region but the Lagrange Multiplier test
showed that the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation could not be rejected.
The coefficient on the E(RETP) variable in equation (5-13) is insignificant which suggests
that the decision made by farmers is really whether not to participate rather than a positive
decision to participate. It could be argued that this is a result of the derivation of the
E(RETP) variable, but substituting the expected market price for the loan rate in equation
(5-14) does not give a significant coefficient on E(RETP) either.
't in the set-aside equation is taken as the average value for the period.
SET = 1.257(ARP * BASE * PT)
Estimation of the coefficient, using the C-O method for second-order autocorrelation, gave
a 't value of 1.256.
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SET = 1.256(ARP * BASE * PT)
(29.338)*
R2 0.9548
Rbar20.9548
pi 0.882
p2 -0.759
The dynamic nature of the overall model would have been affected ~ith the inclusion of
such second-order lagged terms (see section 5.4); also as the coefficient is not significantly
different from the average value (Ho: 't = 1.257, t = -0.023358), and in the interests of
parsimony, the average value is used in the overall model.
Note that a systems approach to estimating the last three equations was tried, but no
significant correlations were found between the residuals, and the results were not
improved.
Consumption
Wheat consumption is modelled in two sections, one section covers feed consumption,
CFit.(good i being wheat) while the other covers non-feed, direct consumption, CDit.
(5-15)
In previous studies, such as that of Tyers and Anderson (op. cit.), direct human
consumption has been modelled as a function of population, national income and prices.
The first two of these are both highly trended, therefore for this model it was postulated
that direct consumption is a function of a trend and price such that
(5-16)
The model for feed consumption, like that of Tyers and Anderson, is based on the premise
that feed consumption of wheat is determined by livestock numbers and the price of
wheatl-, However in this model feed use is constructed in a two-stage process, such that
12 An attempt was made to apply the exact Tyers & Anderson formulation to each country's data up to 1990,
using the coefficients published in Tyers & Anderson (1993). However. this resulted in consistent
underestimation of feed use of wheat. One explanation may be that in the Tyers and Anderson model. the
outputs of livestock are endogenous and the reported data may not include all of the elements in the model. A
simpler explanation may be that by 1986-88. the 1982 feed use coefficients. on which the Tyers nad
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the consumption of wheat for feed (CFt) is determined as a proportion of the feed use of all
grains (CFfOTt); this in tum is a function of livestock numbers
CFfOTt = Uo + UtLIVt (5-17)
cr, = 'Pit CFTOTt (5-18)
(5-19)
where 'Pit is the proportion of total feed use accounted for by wheat and pWitlPWjt is the
market price of wheat relative to that of other cereals. The price of a representative cereal is
taken as a proxy for an 'other cereals' price; for the US the representative price is for
maize.
Results
Equation (5-16) was estimated using crop year data from 1961 to 1989. The real world
market price (1986 prices) was used under the assumption that the agricultural policies of
the USA only affect the receipts of farmers not the price paid by consumers.
InCnUS = 9.4785 + 0.0136 TREND - 0.OO531nP
(92.432)* (7.491)* (-0.219)
R2 0.9713
Rbar2Q.9691
P 0.7918
The price variable in the USA case is not significant - this is to be expected given the
strength of the trend in non-feed consumption (figure 5.1) - so the equation was re-
estimated excluding the prices, and in linear form, with the following result.
enus = 14008 + 262.79 TREND
(33.54)* (11.48)*
R2 0.9634
Rbar2Q.9621
P 0.63103
Anderson estimates were based, were no longer applicable (due to changes in feeding patterns or technology
for example)
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For feed use of wheat the following coefficients were estimated.
CFfOTt = 0.72994CFfOTt_l + 0.22226LIVt - 43764 075 + 16100087 - 25376 089
(5.755)* (2.327)* (-5.221)* (1.8332)t (-2.940)*
R2 0.7508 DW 2.2886
Rbar2Q.7092
'Pit = 0.065133 + 0.41974'Pit_l - 0.033681Pwit1PWjt + 0.036414084 + 0.046529086
(3.697)* (3.419)* (-2.928)* (2.692)* (3.426)*
R2 0.7078 DW 1.9250
Rbar2Q.6569
Stocks
Levels of private and government stocks are modelled separately such that
STOCKSt = CCCt + PRIV A1'Et + FORt (5-20)
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where FOR is the Farmer Owned Reserve. Sharples & Holland (1981) argued that wheat
stocks accumulated in the FOR partially substitute for wheat that would otherwise have
been stored privately by farmers, and therefore should be included separately in any
modelling of total wheat stocks. Here it is modelled as a function of the market price
relative to the FOR loan rate, FORLRh
( Ilt )FORt = 11 FORL~ (5-21)
Private stocks are modelled as a function of the change in the current market price relative
to the expected market price in the next year.
( Ilt )PRIVATEt = 7to - 7t1'1 E(P. )
I(t + I)
(5-22)
The level of CCC (Commodity Credit Corporation) stocks is hypothesised to be a function
of the loan rate, such that stocks are accumulated if the price received by farmers is below
the loan rate and released if not (the CCC minimum release price was effectively
circumvented by the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) after 1985 and does not apply
from the 1990 FACT in any case). The change in CCC stocks due to redemption of EEP
certificates is modelled separately. Note that it was initially thought that production
changes would be an important determinant of these stocks. but these proved to be
insignificant. Thus
CCCt = ~LRt - EEPt (5-23)
The EEP, initiated in 1985, is aimed at increasing exports of agricultural products above
what would have occurred in the absence of the programme, in specifically targeted areas,
under the condition of budget neutrality. The programme is operated using a bidding
process whereby the CCC requests offers for exports to a target country up to a specified
maximum; after negotiations with the importing country, qualified exporting firms submit
bids for EEP bonuses. A bid takes the form of a per-unit bonus (in dollars) that the firm
requires to make the US product competitive with those of other exporting countries. A
firm with a successful bid is then given a bonus certificate by the CCC which can be
exchanged for commodities from government stocks (valued at market prices). The use of
payment in kind (PIK) certificates will increase the market supply of wheat by reducing
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CCC stocks. However, because the certificates are generic those issued to wheat sales
need not necessarily be redeemed for wheat (the same is true for any EEP commodity).
Brooks et al. (1990) state that for 1986/87 18.2% of the total certificates issued were
redeemed for wheat and the 1987/88 the figure was 21.2% (p266). In modelling the
impact of the EEP they assume that PIK certificates are redeemed at the historical rate
(approximately 20%). Anania et al. (1992) add to this that only around 40% of the
certificates awarded for wheat EEP sales are exchanged for wheat (p539). In this model,
the effects of the EEP for wheat on wheat CCC stocks'> are given by
EEP = co(EEPTOT/(max(LR,p») (5-24)
where EEPTOT is the total value of the bonus section of the EEP sales for all commodities
and is a policy variable (hence it is exogenous), and cois the proportion of the certificates
redeemed as wheat (assumed to be 20%; see above). The CCC stocks available to the
policy makers are assumed to be sufficient to meet the PIK redemption demands. This
does not seem an unreasonable assumption to make given that it is the CCC that initiates the
EEP bidding process and sets the maximum quantity to be exported. The available stocks
are given by the closing stocks in the last period less the 4 million tonnes of emergency
reserve which the CCC is required to hold.
Anania et al. (1992) point out that all EEP studies prior to theirs assume that the volume of
subsidised exports is unconstrained. In this formulation, the quantity of EEP exports is
constrained only to the extent of CCC stocks and the size of the EEP budget. It is accepted
that this is a shortcoming of the model, but its effects are expected to be mitigated in the full
simulation model where exports from other regions, especially the EC, will limit sales from
theEEP.
Results
As the farmer owned reserve has only been operating since the 1977n8 marketing year
13 The overall effect of the EEP will be to reduce world market prices through two mechanisms; (i) an increase in
US market supply as modelled here and (ii) a price depressing effect on other exporters (assuming a quasi-
competitive market). The direct price effect is captured in the overall model by adjusting the transmission
mechanism of world market prices (Gulf US $ prices) into national, domestic currency prices. For the EC
where the transmission is virtually zero the price effect is assumed to manifest itself as increased export
refunds.
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equation (5-21) was estimated using data from this date. An outlying value was found in
1982, so that a dummy variable was included for this year. Roberts et al. (1989) argue
that the cause of the sudden large accumulation of FOR stocks in 1982 was the FOR policy
itself, with farmers producing specifically for this reserve (p58).
FORt = 29771 - 9225.6( flt ) + 11525D82 + 4453.4D86
FORL~
(6.267)* (-4.068)* (6.117)* (2.413)*
R2 0.9191
Rbar2 0.8921
P 0.58276
The private stocks equation was estimated using closing stocks data from 1961 to 1990 and
real market prices (1986=100). Expectations are again formed according to the Haley
specification.
PRIVt = 8486.6 + 0.3546PRNt_1 - 3391.4~( E(R ) ) + 13878D76 + 11397D85 - 7158.1D88
I(t + I)
(4.617)* (2.530)* (-1.462)¥ (4.532)* (3.239)* (-2.021)*
R2 0.7090 DW 2.1332
Rbar20.6362
Note: ¥ significant at the 80% level
~ was estimated using the dependent variable DEPV AR = CCC+EEP, calculated from data
for 1960 to 1990, where EEP has been calculated for the relevant years according to
equation (5-24) with coas 20%.
DEPV AR = 81.875 LRt + 11997 D86
(3.233)* (3.233)*
R2 0.7728
Rbar2 0.7539
P 0.62885
It was originally thought that in the short-run CCC stocks would respond to annual
changes in production; however, the variable did not prove to be significant. Given that the
loan rate changes annually, it is possible that the short-run effects are already encapsulated
within this formulation.
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5.3.2 The European Community
Production
As with the USA, production is postulated to be equal to yield, estimated by equation (5-
8), multiplied by the area planted. In the EC the area planted is modelled using the relative
returns from wheat and a substitute crop, barley.
AREAECt=eO+el-E-~--~---
EeRETBA) (5-23)
The expected returns are calculated as the price that the farmer expects to receive for the
particular crop times the expected yield. The expected yield is simply calculated on the
trend for each crop using equation (5-7). For the expected prices, market prices are used in
preference to intervention prices for the following reason. It should be the case that the
intervention prices for both wheat and barley-are announced prior to the planting decision
so that farmers are certain of the minimum price they will receive. However, in practice,
Commission delays mean that farmers have been uncertain about the levels of prices at the
time of ordering seed, and in later years have also been uncertain about the level of co-
responsibility levy to be paid and any price adjustments due to the stabiliser mechanism.
On the other hand the Cunha reforms mean that from 1992/93 farmers will know the
intervention price level before planting. Thus in the simulation for years after 1992193, the
intervention price was incorporated into equation (5-28) as the expected price but in order
to model the situation up to 1992/93 it was decided to apply the Haley rules for price
expectations to the market prices of wheat and barley in the EC.
Using crop year data from 1973n4 to 1990/91, adjusted so that they were for the EC 12
for the entire period (see appendix A5.2 for the methodology of the data transformation).
Equation (5-8) was estimated for wheat and for barley with the following results:
YIELOEC = 2.8933 + 0.12784TREND + 0.79897084 - 0.16933 087
(32.01)* (14.0)* (4.338)* (-0.894)
R2 0.9485
Rbar20.9366
DW1.6029
The dummy variable for 1987 was included as part of the calibration process for the overall
model; although is is not statistically significant in the individual equation above, it was
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necessary to prevent a misleading change in Ee production in the fully assembled trade
model. This should not be viewed as a manipulation of the data but rather as a recognised
practice when calibrating a dynamic simulation model (see below and Pindyck & Rubinfeld
(1981)). The same logic applies for the inclusion of the dummy variable in 1988 in the
barley yield estimation.
YIELOBAREC = 3.138 + 0.05129TREND + 0.65674 084 + 0.26359 088
(31.36)* (5.020)* (3.237)* (1.243)
R2 0.7868
Rbar20.7376
DW2.0901
The market prices of wheat and barley used in formulating the expected prices were
calculated as a production weighted average of the market prices in major producing
countries - France, Germany and the UK - in ECD, converted at market rates.
Using the calculated expected returns, equation (5-28) was evaluated using OLS as below.
Note that RELRET is used to denote the relative expected returns to wheat and barley.
AREAEC = 10439 + 4329.1 RELRET - 1101.6 077 + 453.28 084 - 582.08 088
(5.185)* (2.603)* (-2.653)* (1.305) (-1.512)¥
R2 0.7918 DW 1.5076
Rbar2 0.6993
It is interesting to note that it is the expected yield which dominates the expected price in
planting decisions; using simply relative expected prices in the formulation does not yield
satisfactory results. Given the divergent yield trends for wheat and barley this was not
unexpected. The result is consistent with the findings of Burton (1992) for the UK.
Consumption
As with the USA, wheat consumption is modelled using separate functions for direct (non-
feed) and feed use (as in equations (5-15) to (5-17». Crop year data from 1974 to 1990
were used in the estimation but had to be adjusted to take account of the two enlargements
of the Community during the period. For direct consumption, the total non-feed usage
figure was divided by the population of the EC'9', EC'10' or EC'12' as applicable. This
per caput figure was then multiplied by the population of the total twelve to give an EC
figure. A dummy was included for an outlying value in 1984/85.
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CDECt = 126.6POPt - 28.693Pt + 1533.7D84
(30.324)* (-3.411)* (2.615)*
R2 0.6031
Rbar20.5464
P 0.21518
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Figure S.2
The statistical fit of the feed-use section of the EC model was improved by estimating the
level of wheat feed consumption directly as a function of total livestock numbers and the
real market price of wheat. Again a dummy variable was included for an outlying value in
1984/85.
CFECt = 0.03684 LIVt - 34.785 Pt + 2211.1 D84
(15.29)* (-5.621)* (2.350)*
R2 0.9177
Rbar20.9050
PI 0.91397
P2 -0.5666
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Stocks
Stock levels in the EC are modelled as the sum of the change in private stocks and the
change in intervention stocks (Private Storage Aid stocks are included in the private
stocks). Private closing stocks are estimated as a function the market price in time t, the
expected market price in time t+l, and some proportion of the change in production in year
t.
(5-24)
Following work by Ackrill (1993), closing intervention stocks were postulated to be a
function of the opening stock level (if this is high, closing stocks could also be expected to
be high) and the variation of production around a trend. .The latter is included to account
for the short term stabilisation function of intervention
INTERVt = c;o + C;tRESIDPROt + <;20PSTKt (5-25)
where RESIDPROt are the residuals from
PRODt = 4>0 + 4>1TRENDt (5-26)
Results
1984/85 was identified as an outlying year so that a dummy variable was included in the
estimation of equation (5-24) for that year. Intervention stocks were affected by this
outlying value in 1985/86 so a dummy was included for this year in the estimation of
equation (5-25).
PRIVATE =0.16162 APROD - 57.86Pt+ 102.75 E(Pt+l)
(3.647)* (-5.369)* (3.165)*
R2 0.7321
Rbar20.6786
OW 2.148
INTERV = 1346.6 + O.15348RESIDPRO + 0.62304 OPSTK + 5154.6D85 + 5002.6D90
(2.469)* (2.141)t (5.283)* (4.424)* (3.411)*
R2 0.8647
Rbar20.8196
OW 'h' ·1.0154
(The OW 'h' statistic is used because OPSTK is essentially a lagged dependent variable)
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where RESIDPRO is given by the residuals from the equation below. Note that the
formulation does not contain a dummy variable for the outlying year 1984 because it is
aimed at finding the deviations from the trend forecast.
PRODt = 43187 + 2265.0 TREND
(16.95)* (9.108)*
R2 0.8469
Rbar20.8366
DW 1.9338
5.3.3 Canada
Canadian wheat farmers receive support from two main sources - the Canadian Wheat
Board (CWB) and the government (indirectly through the railway system). The CWB and
the Canadian government set an initial price at the start of each marketing year based on the
expectations of US and world market prices. The producer price for the whole marketing
year is then a 'pooled' price of average export and domestic prices, weighted by quantities
sold (as exports are large relative to domestic sales, the CWB pooled price is primarily
determined by export returns). If the pooled price is less than the initial price, the federal
government makes up the difference; thus the initial price is in effect a guaranteed minimum
price. Producers in the Western prairies benefit from reduced freight charges on the rail
network if the wheat is bound for the Eastern ports and export (currently under the Western
Grain Transportation Act (1983)14); grain producers in general benefit from transport
subsidies if the grain is to be sold for animal feed (under the Feed Freight Assistance Act
(1943». The main effect of the transport subsidies has been to encourage production in the
prairies to the detriment of other areas (the FFAA was aimed at equalising the feed grain
prices in deficit areas, but also encouraged production in the surplus areas by effectively
raising producer receipts), but they also increase the pooled price received by farmers.
This being the case the transport subsidies per se have not been included in the estimations
which follow, rather they are assumed to be implicit in the CWB pooled price.
Production
Production in Canada was initially hypothesised to fit the same model as for the EC (using
CWB prices instead of intervention prices). A model by Bailey and Goodloe (1987)
14 Rail freight subsidisation for grains has been in force since 1897 (the so called 'Crow Rates'); the WGTA is
simply the latest form of this.
5-26
proposes a similar formulation, but uses the difference between returns to wheat and barley
rather than the relative returns. However, examination of the data from 1960 to 1990 (crop
year) revealed an upward trend in the area planted both prior to and after a suspected
structural break in 1970 (figure 5.3), and a yield which appeared to vary around a constant
(albeit with a suspected structural break in 1974) rather than a trend. The break in the area
series was assumed to be the result of Canadian participation in the USA's Operation LIFT
(Lower Inventories For Tomorrow) which advocated a reduction in the area planted to
reduce cereal stocks.
The yield equation, post 1974, was therefore estimated as a constant with a random
element; the constant being the average for the period.
YIELD CAN = 1.86 + Et
The area planted was modelled, for the period 1971 to 1990, as a function of the expected,
nominal market price (the CWB pooled price) and the area planted in the previous year.
Expected prices were used in preference to expected returns as the expected yield, taken
from the equation above, is a constant.
AREACANt = 2746.5 + 0.74514AREAt_l + 4.6239E(Pt)
(2.937)* (8.746)* (0.7049)
R2 0.8610
Rbar20.8437
DW'h' -0.625
Although the expected price variable is not significant, it was decided to include it in the
overall model at the calibration stage because without it estimated Canadian production was
consistently too low.
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Figure 5.3
Consumption
Consumption was again modelled by separating feed and non-feed (direct) use. Direct
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consumption was estimated using a trend and the market price. Note that the Bailey and
Goodloe model used income per caput instead of the trend, but as has been mentioned
before the two essentially do the same job. In estimation, however, the market price
variable was not significant. Thus Canadian non-feed use is given by the following (OLS
estimation in natural logs gave the best fit).
LnCDCAN = 7.8171 + 0.01576 TREND + 0.28143 D75
(365.8)* (10.24)* (5.622)*
R2 0.8635
Rbar20.8499
DW2.2796
Feed use of wheat in Canada did not display any significant movement from a constant
value, and certainly did not show any relationship with livestock numbers or its own price.
The constant value base level value was thus used as the estimate for feed use.
Stocks
The CWB does not operate a 'buyer of last resort' policy like those of the CCC or the EC's
intervention agencies, and is therefore assumed to act as if it were a private firm. Thus
stocks are modelled as a function of nominal market prices. Border prices are used in the
estimation in recognition of the large proportion of Canadian wheat production that is
exported-f. These prices were in nominal terms as an interest rate was included to
account for the costs of storage. Also included in the stocks equation is the change in
production in t.
STOCKS = 4575.9 + 0.28869 &ROD - 26.317 (P, - E(Pt+l»
(3.301)* (3.490)* (-1.789)t
R2 .0.6767
Rbar20:6120
DW'h' -0.0774
5.3.4 The Cairns Group
The CG as a whole (minus Canada which is dealt with above) is a net exporter but within
the group several countries are non-producers and consume only imported wheat.
IS Western Red, Spring no.l 13.5%, in store, Thunder Bay.
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Therefore Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand are excluded when
estimating the production equations, but are included in the consumption and stocks
sections. The model is a relatively simple one but, given the aggregated nature of the CG
data, representation of a single country's policies is meaningless. Also, apart from
Argentina where direct producer subsidies are still in operation, the CG countries included
in this analysis give little or no governmental support to agriculturels. The CG section of
the model is described by the following equations.
Production
PROOCGt = YIELOCGt * AREACGt (5-27)
(5-28)
(5-29)
where good i is wheat, good j is maize and pw is the world market price.
Results
The yield data for the CG were derived by summing production and area planted across
countries and then dividing one by the other. The resulting series was quite volatile, hence
a trend estimation does not give a particularly good statistical fit.
YIELOCG = 1.1787 + 0.02097 TREND
(19.692)* (6.423)*
R2 0.5872
Rbar20.5730
DW 1.8015
AREACGt = 6821.4 + 0.641 AREACGt_l + 22.537 [E(PWit)- E(pwjt)] - 4108.7 070
(3.024)* (5.426)* (1.825)t (-3.182)*
R2 0.8008
Rbar2.7676
DWb' -0.4288
16 Wheat exports from Australia must be made though the state trading organisation, the 'Australian Wheat
Board' (AWB). Although it has been suggested that the AWB is a policy instrument and distorts trade in
favour of Australian farmers, its actions could also be seen as the rational response of a private firm operating
in as part of a non-co-operative oligopoly. In this analysis, the ABW is assumed to be a 'free trader' in the
sense that it does not provide subsidies to farmers.
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Consumption
Consumption in the CG is modelled using the same equations as for the USA (equations
(5-15) to (5-17», with the price in equation (5-16) being the world market price.
Results
As with the other countries, direct consumption of wheat in the CG countries is dominated
by a trend; the world market price did not prove to be a significant explanatory variable.
CDCG = 11328 + 431.73 TREND
(48.135)*(32.567)*
R2 0.9743
Rbar20.9734
DW 1.9668
Feed was postulated to be determined according to equations (5-17) to (5-19). During
estimation it was found that while equations (5-17) and (5-18) did apply, 'Pit could be
better represented by a constant given by the average for the period (7.9934%).
CFTOTCGt = 0.22319 CFTOTCGt_l + 0.038782 LIV + 802.0 TREND + 3198.1 D86
(1.295)¥ (4.909)* (4.132)* (1.987)t
R2 0.9854
Rbar20.9836
DW'h' -1.0476
The TREND variable was included to remove the effects of a distinct upward trend in
both the total feed use and head of livestock data series.
Stocks
(5-30)
where RESCG are the residuals from the estimation of equation (5-30).
Results
As in the case of human consumption, the price variable was not significant in explaining
stocking behaviour in the CG. Hence stocks are given by
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STOCKSt = 2124.1 + 0.5441 STOCKSt_1 + 0.4068 RESCG + 3854.7 D68
(4.415)* (6.158)* (6.639)* (3.095)*
R2 0.7893
Rbar20.7650
DW 1.8780
where RESCG are the residuals from an estimate of production on trend.
PRODt = 15335 + 831.23 TREND
(11.19)* (11.12)*
R2 0.8100
Rbar20.8035
DW 1.8018
5.3.5 Eastern Europe
For the purposes of this analysis Eastern Europe (EE) was defined as Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Yugoslavia. It is
acknowledged that this group of countries can no longer be regarded as a coherent unit, but
the import demand estimations presented below owe more to normative judgements about
the prospects for agricultural production in the countries, and the willingness of the main
exporters to provide credit, than to formal econometric analyses based on past data.
However, that said, the data are used as a basis for the normative judgments.
EE as a whole is a net importer of wheat, but most of the import demand is from the former
USSR (until recently the group of remaining countries were net exporters); thus conditions
in the former USSR are likely to dominate the demand for imports in the whole EE group at
least for the foreseeable future. It is contended that the quantities imported by the Soviet
Union from 1971 were intended to make up any shortfall in domestic production (thereby
smoothing consumption from year to year), and were not governed by the general level of
world market prices; rather they were constrained by the extent to which the exporting
countries were prepared to offer special concessions - subsidised prices, credit
arrangements and, more recently, 'barter' deals (Agra Europe no.1532 pM11). Therefore
world market prices are not included in the EE import demand equation. Note that another
reason for the exclusion of world market prices is the unclear direction of the relationship
between world prices and EE imports. Some commentators argue that as the quantities
imported by the USSR especially are so large, they have an impact on the amount the
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exporting countries can sell to other importers, and hence have an impact on the world
price; inclusion of a world price in an import demand function would imply price taking
behaviour!".
On comparing wheat consumption and production in EE for the period 1960 to 1990
(figure 5.4), it is evident that although both move more or less in the same direction,
production has been considerably more volatile than consumption. However, if production
is compared to net domestic consumption (defined as total consumption less net imports),
both are extremely volatile albeit in the same direction (with the exception of 1971). A rank
correlation coefficient of 0.938 (Spearman's) was calculated for the two series indicating
that the inclusion of both production and net domestic consumption in an import demand
function for EE would have led to autocorrelation problems. On average the former was
approximately double the latter although the range of the scaler was quite large (0.66 to
5.21).
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Figure 5.4
17 Note that when all 7 areas are brought together in the final model. the world market price will be determined
when excess supply is equal to demand. Thus the quantities imported by the EE will influence the overall
levelofPw.
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It was decided to included production changes in the estimation of an import demand
function, whilst remembering that the corresponding change in net domestic consumption
was likely to be around twice any change in consumption (the result of this is that imports
would have to be double any deficit in production in order to maintain consumption at
previous levels and vice versa following a rise in production).
The function was estimated using data for the shortened time period 1980-1990 due to a
structural break in production (and by implication imports) in the Soviet Union. Desai
(1991) argues that Soviet policy changes from 1980/81 changed production patterns,
especially in terms of yields. The adoption of intensive agrotechnology - high-yielding
seeds, better fertilisers and pesticides - and an increase in land set aside as fallow led to a
large increase in yields (after adjustment for the unpredictable weather element). Desai also
argues that from 1987, the 'Glasnost' reforms supplemented the yield increase and further
encouraged production as procurement by the state was reduced.
A distinct downward trend in net imports (NETM) was accounted for by including a trend
as an independent variable and a dummy was included for 1984.
NETM = 24722 -762.35 TREND - 0.1937 MROD + 6920.6 D84
(16.727)* (-3.384)* (-2.885)* (2.956)*
R2 0.8703
Rbar20.8147
DW 1.6662
To test the hypothesis that the world market price should not be part of an import demand
equation for EE, it was included in the above formulation (in real terms). This resulted in
an increase in the explanatory power but caused autocorrelation problems. Also, the real
world price variable was only significant when the dummy for 1984 was excluded and in
this case it had a positive sign. This would suggest that it was only picking up the effects
of the outlying year and not explaining much in other yearsl8•
In order to make predictions of future import demand by EE using the above equation, it is
necessary to make some inferences about the prospects for production. Post-1980
production has been considerably less volatile than in previous years but still exhibits some
variability. Ifwe decompose production into the area and yield elements, it can be shown
18 When estimated over a longer period (1971-1990) the real price variable had a negative sign but the
relationship was again distorted by extreme values in the early 1970s.
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that the main cause of this variability is the yield element. This is done by decomposing the
multiplicative relationship using the formula for decomposition of the variance of a
productl? as approximated by Burt & Finley20. Specifically, taking the production of
wheat as the identity
PRODEEt =AEEt * YEEt (5-31)
where AEE is the area planted in year t and YEE is the yield in year t. Each independent
variable can be thought of as being composed of a deterministic or trend value and a
random variation around that trend
AEE =AEEm +Ut (5-32)
YEE = YEEm +Vt (5-33)
where AEEm and YEEm are the mean or trend values and Ut and Vt are random
disturbances. The variance of PRODt can be written as21
Var(PRODEE) =YEEm2cr2u+AEEm2cr2v+ 2AEEmYEEfficov(uv) + var(z) (5-34)
where z = u=v. The terms of equation (5-34) can be interpreted as follows. The first term
represents the direct area effect, the second the direct yield effect, the third a linear
interaction effect and the final term a quadratic effect. The result of applying this analysis
to the EE data are given in table 5.1. The analysis was carried out for two time periods,
1960 to 1990 and 1980 to 1990 and using two values as the 'mean' area and yield; the first
in the mean of the individual time series and the second the value predicted from the time
trend for 1990 .
.It is evident from the table that yield variations are the most important element in production
changes; therefore, we need to be able to forecast yield changes before we can make any
inferences about the future import demand of EE for wheat.
19 BohmstedtG.W.& GoldbergerA.S. (1969)'On theExactCovarianceof Productsof RandomVariables'
Journal of the American Statistical Association vol.64ppI439-42.
20 BurtO.& FinleyR.M.(1970)'StatisticalIdentitiesinRandomVariables'American Journal of Agricultural
Economics voI.50pp734-44.
21 A prooffromfirstprinciplescanbe foundin Jennings(1981)pp3.10-3.12.
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Table 5.1
Variation inArea and Yield as a Percentage of Total Variation in
Production
1960-1990 1980-1990
Thrm Mean Trend Mean Trend
1 11.02 23.65 13.28 1.5E-7
2 82.84 68.2 82.71 99.99
3 6.04 8.02 3.97 3.8E-8
4 0.11 0.13 0.04 3.5E-I0
Following the format of the areas modelled in detail, yield for EE is given by a trend and a
random element. For the 1980 to 1990 period yields were estimated as
Y = 1.5008 + 0.07933 TREND
(17.027)* (6.104)*
R2 0.8055 OW 1.523
Rbar2Q.7838
5.3.6 The Rest of the World
Changes in imports from the ROW throughout the 1980s are dominated by changes in
imports by China; these have sometimes been dramatic and distort any estimation of
imports by the ROW. Indeed, when China is removed from the ROW grouping, the
remaining countries imports can be estimated by using a simple trend (recall that the trend is
used to represent growth in population and income).
NETM = 16852 + 1289.2 TREND
(16.529)* (22.448)*
R2 0.9474
Rbar20.9455
OW 1.636
The problem then becomes one of how to explain Chinese import behaviour. Figure 5.5
shows Chinese net imports of wheat from 1960 to 1990. Net imports were fairly stable
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and insignificant until the mid 1970s. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Chinese
authorities allowed more wheat to be imported for urban use as part of a set of programmes
to incorporate some market forces into the economy. The resultant increase in production
in the 1981-84 period prompted the government to order a drastic cut in all grain imports
(and vigorously promote corn exports to Asian markets). In the late 1980s, production
began to stagnate (yields were already relatively high and further expansion of irrigated
land was limited) while demand continued to increase, thus imports rose again. "After four
years of fluctuating grain harvests, China's government leaders re-emphasized the
importance of grain production and decided at the end of 1988 to raise 1989 grain
procurement prices and increase both central and local government investment in crop
cultivation" (Tuan & Ru (1992) pI93); net imports of wheat have again begun to fall.
What of China's future import demand? Continued population growth and economic
development would require an increase in imports unless agriculture is reformed and
allowed to grow further, but the increase would be constrained to the extent of foreign
exchange earnings, and the ability of China's infrastructure to absorb the imports. Tuan &
Ru suggest that wheat imports could approach 20 million tonnes by 2000 if the foreign
exchange situation does not deteriorate (pI94). Tyers & Anderson, on the other hand,
estimate that under certain optimistic assumptions import demand could reach as much as
46.2 million tonnes «1992) p289).
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5.4 The Calibration Process
The simulation model was calibrated such that the levels of excess supply, excess demand,
and world market prices corresponded closely to those seen in the base period suggested in
the the Dunkel Final draft, confirmed in the November 1992 Blair House Agreement, and
specified in the final UR agreement, in other words the average 1986-88 value (in order to
simplify the calibration process the 1986-1990 base for the volume of subsidised exports
agreed in December 1993 is ignored at this stage). In order to do this the estimated,
strucutral model was solved for the equilibrium value of the nominal world market price
(PWt) in each year by equating net excess supply for that year (given by the equations
detailed above for the USA, EC, Canada and CO) and net excess demand (given by the
import demand functions of Eastern Europe, China and the Rest of the World grouping).
4 3
LESit - LEDjt = 0
i=l j=l
(5-35)
When the estimated equations are substituted into (5-35) the overall model collapses to a
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quadratic in the current, nominal, world market price (see appendix A5-1 for details).
(5-36)
The 'constant' term (y) represents the change in CCC stocks which is due to the EEP.
Recall that to convert the EEP term from dollars to tonnes the expenditure figure is divided
by the higher of the loan rate or the market price. In the period considered, the market price
is always above the loan rate, hence solving the model for the market price results in a
quadratic. Note that as EEP expenditure is a policy variable it is determined exogenously
and can change from year to year; as such it is only a constant in the sense that it is fixed
for anyone year (this latter point also applies to the a and ~ parameters). The parameter a
contains those terms of the model which are dependent on the market price; domestic
market prices are converted to world market levels using the average exchange rate in each
of the years of the base period, and any necessary adjustments are made (see below). The
parameter ~ encompasses those elements which are independent of pWh but which may
contain past values of the price.
A simple average of the 1986,1987 and 1988 estimates for ESih EDit and pWt is taken as
the base period value.
Note that with this solution method, the value of pWt is very sensitive to both the
parameters of the excess supply equations and the dynamic behaviour of the model. The
former can be seen in a simple diagrammatic way by referring to figures 5.6 and 5.7. As
the net import demand functions of the model are independent of pWh the excess demand
schedule is vertical in each year. If we assume for the purposes of this simple example that
total excess supply is represented in a linear form, ESt = A + ~pwh figure 5.5 illustrates the
effect of a change in A, given ~, on the equilibrium market price, and figure 5.6 the effect
of a change in ~, given A. In addition, although only the positive quadrant is shown, it is
possible for negative equilibrium prices to occur for certain values of A and ~.
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The dynamic behaviour of the model is not straight-forward. Lags occur in several of the
equations of the model, for example those for feed use in the USA and CG, the stock
equations in all 4 areas, and the area planted equations in Canada and the CG, but they also
occur due to the C-O technique of correcting for autocorrelation. Consider equations 5-37
and 5-38, which represent a linear regression model with errors that are autocorrelated to
the first order.
(5-37)
(5-38)
Estimation of model using the C-O technique gives an estimated value of p, in the
transformed model 5-3922•
(5-39)
Hence it can be seen that the C-O technique has introduced lags into the model. For the
wheat market model the additional lags due to the C-O technique will affect the overall
dynamic structure. Note that for higher orders of autocorrelation further lags are
introduced.
Because of the two sources of dynamic elements in the model and the fact that the overall
model structure is quite complex (although it is essentially linear), there is no way of
22 A more detailed description can be found in Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1981) pIS7.
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knowing, a priori, whether the model will converge smoothly, converge with oscillations,
or diverge (oscillatorilly or non-oscillatorilly). The calibration process will force the model
to converge on the average 1986-88 values, but the final model will then need to be tested
to see if it adequately fits the historical data and produces reasonable forecasts (section
5.5).
Computer hardware limitations meant that the full simulation model, with the dynamic and
stochastic elements included, had to be run on a mainframe computer. Thus a FORTRAN
programme was used to run the completed model (see appendix A5-4). For the calibration
process the stochastic elements were suppressed (these are discussed later in section 5.7),
but because values in each of the years 1986 to 1988 were estimated individually, the
dynamic elements were retained. The calibration method was a two-stage process. Firstly
programmes were written to test the fit of the individual models, for the 4 exporting areas,
to actual values. This was done because although the parameter estimates given above
were the 'BLUEs' for the individual equations, simply having a good fit in the individual
equations does not guarantee an overall simulation model that reproduces the historical data
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1981) p355). The base values and the policy were input into the
separate programmes as required (see appendix table AS-3.1). The programmes were then
run for the three year period without any further exogenous data except for the actual value
of the nominal world market price in each year (with the areas being tested separately, the
equilibrium market price cannot be determined within the programme).
At this stage it was necessary to examine the extent of the transmission of world market
price signals to the domestic market, and from the domestic market to farmers. In this
model the world market price, in US$ terms, was used as the domestic, market price in the
USA and the CG; for the former a relationship between pWt and pdt of close to 1:1 was
found; and for the latter the world price was used for two reasons: (i) the CG is assumed to
represent the 'free' trading group which takes pWt as the domestic market price; and (ii) a
CO exchange rate, although not impossible to calculate, would not be very meaningful.
For Canada it was found that the domestic price was equal to the world price adjusted by
the exchange rate. In the EC section of the model the direct transmission of world prices to
domestic wholesale prices is assumed to be close to zero when pw is below the threshold
price (for ease of exposition this is defined as 110% of the domestic price). In this case the
effective domestic market price is assumed to be the 'buying-in' intervention price (i.e,
94% of the intervention price), less the co-responsibility levy. Note that while it is
recognised that it is more usual to account for the co-responsibility levy in the farm gate
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price rather than the market price, in this case the two are almost identical (see below). The
structure of this model makes it possible for pw to be above the threshold price (the UR
agreement is expected to produce a modest price rise, and when this is combined with the
possible effects of the stochastic elements of the model, such a situation could occur), and
in this case the domestic wholesale price is taken as pw adjusted by the $IECU exchange
rate and factors to account for 'Community Preference' (which is still held in place even
with the UR agreement (see section 3.9, p3-20», and the switchover mechanism.
The farm gate prices in the USA were found to be in general around 60-61 % below the
nominal world market price (unfortunately 1986 was an outlying year at 51%; this figure
was used for 1986 and 60.5% for the other two years). For the EC a small adjustment had
to be made to get from market prices to farm prices during the calibration process (a 0.8%
increase), while for Canada and the CG no adjustments were made.
Table 5.2 shows the actual and estimated values of the elements pertinent to excess supply,
for the 4 areas, for the 1986-88 base period. The estimated values gave a fairly close
approximation to the actual values for the base period; hence the econometrically estimated,
structural models for the 4 areas were included, without adjustment, in the next stage of the
calibration process.
Table 5,2
Actual and Estimated Excess Supply: Average 1986·88
(using actual world market prices)
A~nllllYilll.l~:i
llSA EC.l2 CANAQA QJ
Production 54526.00 72941.00 24454.33 37381.33
Area 22913.00 15697.33 13570,67 20329,67
Consumption 29561.00 59310.33 6730,00 26827.33
Feed Use 7605.00 22109.33 3310,00 4202.33
Non-Feed Use 21956,00 37201.00 3420,00 22625.00
Stocks 35856.17 14700.00 8368,33 5582.67
Gov't 11826.26 6017.00
Private 11459.75 8683.00
FOR 12570,16
Excess Supply 37361.89 15464.00 18896.33 11536.33
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Estimated Values
!lSA Kl.2 CANADA CQ
Production 56584.23 72919.98 22312.55 38385.78
Area 25907.43 15674.75 13225.15 21717.73
Consumption 29294.84 57165.20 6813.14 26944.31
Feed Use 7997.90 21130.13 3420.00 4109.58
Non-Feed Use 21697.01 36035.07 3393.14 22834.73
Stocks 37088.57 14238.08 8372.21 4819.32
Gov't 11150.02 6352.87
Private 12809.80 7885.21
FOR 13128.75
Excess Supply 39264.62 17953.23 16316.23 12658.64
This second stage entailed checking whether the model structures used to determine the
values above, when combined with those for Eastern Europe, China and the ROW (Table
5.3), gave a close approximation to the actual world market price. The individual
FORTRAN programmes were combined, the determination of excess demand
incorporated, and equation 5-36 solved using a subroutine from the NAG library. This
NAG routine uses the 'standard' closed formula for solving quadratic equations, via a
variant of Laguerre's method due to B.T. Smith (1967). The routine allows the roots of
the quadratic to be either real or complex. Since an imaginary value of pWt would make no
sense, a safeguard was written into the programme to prevent imaginary numbers feeding
through the model. In the event, this safeguard proved to be unnecessary as no complex
roots were found. Also, as a quadratic equation has two roots, a procedure was needed to
decide on the correct root. It was decided to firstly exclude one root, and use the other
root, if the former was outside a given range; 4 standard deviations from the mean of the
nominal world price series was chosen as this allowed results that were obviously not
credible to be dismissed, but at the same time left enough of the distribution intact so as not
to bias the stochastic simulation results. Secondly, if both roots were within this range,
repeated tests showed that the larger of the two should be selected (the smaller root was
usually around 70-100 US cents per tonne, i.e. too small to be regarded as a credible world
market price).
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Table 5,3
Actual and Estimated Excess Demand: Average 1986-88
(using actual world market prices)
Actual Values Estimated Values
E,E,
ROW
20897,00
56371.67
13000,00
22301.54
54481.20
13000,00China
When solved, the model appeared to be oscillating towards a stable value; however, due to
the short base period, the convergence was not achieved. The average world market price
given as a solution to the model was $170 (nominal terms) while the actual base period
price was $126,83. In the process of 'tuning' the model-! to reduce this discrepancy the
model structure was changed slightly; specifically the Eastern Europe section was split such
that it became a CIS (former USSR) section with the other Eastern European countries
being incorporated into the ROW group, This was done to correct for the intra-Eastern
Europe trade in wheat which could not be isolated from the data. The following equations,
therefore, became part of the model. Note that the new net import functions for the CIS
and ROW were accepted as improvements to the original equations on the basis of an
improved statistical fit; had R2 or R~ar2 been lower than in the previous formulations, the
new equations would not have been incorporated into the model.
QS.
NETMCISt = 2968,6-0,90464NETMCISt_l-O,18038MROO+4933.2084-11 023085-6761.7088
(2.012)t (8.349)* (-5.254)* (2.117)t (-4.068)* (-2,895)*
R2 0.9400
Rbar2 0.9066
OW 1.6586
YCIS = 1.4575 + 0.01362 TREND + 0.4225078 + 0.5870 086 + 0.4499 089plus
(15.170)* (1.122) (2,593)* (1.761)¥ (3,076)*
R2 0.7514
Rbar2 0,6519
OW 1.7519
where NETMCIS are the net imports by the CIS and YCIS is the wheat yield per hectare in
23 See Pindyck & Rubinfeld p403-40S for a discussion on tuning simulation models.
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the CIS. The dummy variables were largely introduced to facilitate calibration of the
model, but were only accepted if they were statistically significant.
R.O.W.
LnNETMt = 10.117 - 0.029752 TREND - 3.5548 M>RODt
(238.2)* (12.78)* (-1.729)t
R2 0.9281
Rbar2 0.9228
P 0.3358
As expected the overall model proved to be quite sensitive to changes in the parameters and
the calibrated values are presented in table 5.4. Recall that the actual value for the nominal
world market price is $126.83 (real price is $123.07), and note that these values are
obtained without referring to the actual values of pw or adjusting any of the parameters
during the 3-year running period.
Table 5.4
Calibrated Values: Average 1986-88
lISA Ern ~ANAQA ca
Production 58161.85 72920.02 22326.43 38452.75
Area 26096.52 15674.76 13231.43 21755.88
Consumption 28156.58 57165.20 6813.25 26944.31
Feed Use 6859.64 21130.13 3420.00 4109.58
Non-Feed Use 21697.01 36035.07 3393.25 22834.73
Stocks 36869.07 14238.09 8359.53 4870.36
Gov't 11150.02 6352.88
Private 12763.84 7885.21
FOR 12955.21
Excess Supply 42274.58 17953.27 16377.09 12718.30
Ex~~ssDemand
CIS 15447.83
China 13000.00
R.O.W. 53507.26
~Qrld Mark~t Pri!:!: - Nominal 128.11
Real 124.34
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5.5 Evaluation of the Model
As has already been stated, a good statistical fit of individual equations in a simulation
model does not guarantee that the overall model will be able to simulate well. In order to
evaluate the ability of the model to produce results which are credible, the individual
variables need to be tested in a 'simulation context' (Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1987) p362).
We would expect a model to produce results which closely reflect the actual data if a
historical simulation is carried out (i.e. a simulation over the estimation period); we would
therefore expect the errors for each endogenous variable over the historical simulation
period to be small. The most common measure of how well an endogenous variable tracks
the corresponding historical data is the Root-Mean-Squared Simulation Error (RMS). The
RMS for variable Y is defined as
(5-40)
where YSt is the simulated value of Y in time !,yat is the actual value of Y in time t and T is
the number of simulation periods.
Other measures do exist24 but are essentially similar to the RMS. The RMS is a measure
of the deviation of the simulated variable from its historical time path, however its size can
only be evaluated by comparing it to the average size of the variable in question. In general
then, for a model to give a good overall fit the RMS should be very small in relation to the
variance of the variable in question.
A low RMS is only one desirable property of a simulation model however; the model
should also be able to distinguish turning points in the historical data. Consider figure 5.8,
where Y represents the original data series and X and B the results from two different,
hypothetical simulation models. The RMS for model X is likely to be lower than that for B
because it tracks the overall data well. However, model X fails to predict the sudden
change in the data which means that model B is in fact the better model. A simple time
trend could have given the same results as simulation model X without really explaining the
underlying processes. Hence the ability of a model to predict turning points or rapid
changes in the historical data is important.
24 These are (i) the RMS% error; (ii) the mean simulation error and (iii) the mean % error.
(i) RMS% =VOrr (L«ySt - yat)l yat )2»
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Figure 5.8
The historical tests on the overall wheat market model were carried out for 1989 and 1990.
Additional years could not be used because the model requires past values of certain
variables (due to the dynamic structure), therefore it could not be run backwards from
1986-88 to say 1980; to run the model forwards from 1980 to 1990 would have implied a
1980 calibration date. The results of the historical tests are shown below. The variables
chosen for the tests reflect the analysis to be carried out with the model later in this chapter
and in chapter 6; the important variables when examining the possible policy choices for
the USA and Ee after the UR agreement are the world market price level, the quantity of
wheat available for export and the stock levels (particularly government stocks) in the two
areas. Note that the level of import demand is also a central variable, and this is included in
the table of RMS values (Table 5.5), but in this model its estimated form is dominated by
trends. It is accepted that this is a limitation of the model, and the implications of this are
discussed in chapter 7.
Table 5.5 shows that the RMS values for all of the variables in question are indeed small in
comparison to their variances while graphs 5.9 to 5.11 show that significant turning points
are picked up in the pw series and in the stocks. However, the continued fall of excess
supply in 1989 is not reflected by the model, and neither is the full extent of the rise in pW;
it is worth remembering here that 1988 and 1989 were severe drought years in the USA
and that world trade in all agricultural products was affected. The individual model
equations account for the drought effect to some extent but cannot reflect the overall effect
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on world markets. As the model had shown movements in the right direction for stocks
and pw, it was decided not to reject the model at this stage.
Table 5.5
Root Mean Squared Simulation Error Test Results
Vuian~~ RMS Relatiye
pw 478.50242 17.47287 0.03652
Excess Supply
USA 68201391 6322.03 9.3E-05
EC 13560250 6168.731 0.00045
Canada 12362121 4302.013 0.00035
CG 9595460.3 1267.08 0.00013
Import Demand
CIS 20216556 1953.101 9.7E-05
ROW 9234860.5 5587.104 0.00061
Stocks
US Total 210069466 4470.558 2.1E-05
CCC 42637789 1770.304 4.2E-05
EC Total 9354783 3285.775 0.00035
Intervention 7314952.8 4199.417 0.00057
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5.6 Forecastin2 the Exo2enous Variables
Prior to running the model over the full period (1986-88 to 2000) the exogenous, non-
policy variables have to be estimated for the period 1990 to 2000. The exogenous variables
in this category are the prices of substitute products in the EC, USA and CG; population in
the EC; livestock numbers in the EC. USA. Canada and CG; imports by China, and the
yearly change in production for the ROW grouping. The exogenous policy variables for
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the EC and USA are assumed to be those set out in the 1992 Cunha reforms and the 1990
FACT respectively, until the review dates (1996 & 1995). For the initial run it was
assumed that these policies would remain unchanged at the relevant review and continue
until 2000. The effects of changes to the policies at the review are considered in chapter 6.
5.6.1 Substitute Prices
Following the methodology in chapter 4, the prices of substitute goods in the USA and CG
are estimated by ARIMA models; such a model could not be identified for the EC and a
simple lagged dependent variable equation was used instead. Unit root tests showed that
the prices should be estimated in log form with the degree of differencing for the ARIMA
models being 1.
The US data series (1960-90) contained outlying values in 1973, 1974 and 1986 which
were more than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean value. As in chapter 4, these were
replaced by estimated values to remove any possible bias in the ARIMA model. The values
were estimated using a lagged dependent variable model from 1960 to 1972 to give an 1973
value; from 1960 to 1973 (the estimated value) to give a' 1974 value; and similarly for
1986. This adjusted series was then used to estimate the ARIMA model in table 5.6.
For the CG, the correlogram and partial autocorrelation charts seemed to indicate that an
ARIMA(2,1,2) would be the most appropriate model; however, when the Akaike and
Schwarz criteria were examined, the model presented in table 5.6 performed best.
Table 5,6
ARIMA Coefficients: USA & CG
AR MA Constant
1
0.63924
2 1 2
1.4833 -0.74915 -0.009
0,68451 -0.32981 0.53418 0.020
The barley price in the EC was forecast to 2000 using the following equation.
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LnPBAt = 1.0003 - 0.80265 LnPBAt_1
(1.773)t (7.107)*
R2 0.8558
Rbar2 0.8455
P 0.26064
5.6.2 EC Population
A time trend has been used throughout the model to represent changes in income and
population, and accordingly EC population is estimated using a trend.
LnPOPt = 5.7363 - 0.003268 TREND
(3902.0)* (7.107)*
R2 0.9962
Rbar2 0.9959
PI 1.21152
P2 -0.53976
5.6.3 Livestock Numbers
The livestock data included in the feed equations of this model are calculated total numbers,
on a beef-cattle-equivalent basis. The forecasts of these data are made using a simple time
trend without any reference to the actual numbers of sheep, pigs etc. This is done in the
interests of parsimony but means that the policy conclusions drawn from the model results
in chapter 6 may not reflect the full impact of the DR agreement. Multi-product models,
such as that of T&A and the SWOPSIM model, with an endogenous livestock sector would
be able to give an indication of the effect of the UR provisions for livestock on the wheat
market. The T&A model, however, deals with livestock production (meat & milk) rather
than livestock numbers, and the SWOPSIM uses only demand elasticities and again does
not deal with livestock numbers per se. Hence neither of these models could provide the
information needed to gain a more detailed forecast of the total livestock data used here.
The livestock series for the EC, USA, and Canada are estimated in log-linear form, those
for the CO in linear form, using the C-O technique, and the results are presented below.
5-51
USA
LnLIVt = 12.063 - 0.0011733 TREND
(572.9)* (-0.877)
R2 0.7230
Rbar2 0.7046
P 0.77951
LnLIVt = 13.796 - 0.0097796 TREND
(1568.0)* (11.01)*
R2 0.9596
Rbar2 0.9567
P 0.4530
Canada
LnLIVt = 10.795 - 0.010602 TREND + 0.031067 D74
(543.9)* (9.824)* (1.417)¥
R2 0.9261
Rbar2 0.9208
PI 0.83553
P2 -0.38074
LIVt = 270280 - 6944.9 TREND
(45.08)* (22.88)*
R2 0.9964
Rbar2 0.9962
P 0.82556
5.6.4 Import Demand: Chinese Imports & ROW Production Changes
For the initial runs of the full model, it was assumed that the forecasts of Tuan & Ru are
correct, so that wheat imports into China approach 20 million tonnes by 2000. A smooth
move towards this figure is assumed with imports rising by 750,000 tonnes in each year
from 1991 to 2000.
Import demand by the ROW grouping requires that the change in ROW production from
year-to-year was forecast to 2000, as ROW production was not endogenous to the model.
In the 4 areas modelled in some detail, wheat yields, and hence production, are taken to be
stochastic; thus a stochastic element was also introduced into the ROW import demand
function to account for the uncertain direction and magnitude of production changes post-
1990.
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Note that the stochastic elements are calculated using a FORTRAN NAG routine for
generating pseudo-random numbers. It is not possible to generate true random numbers
without special hardware but the NAG routine generates series of numbers with statistical
properties which are very close to those of true random numbers. The pseudo-random
number generator is initialised to a repeatable state with the actual numbers being calculated
from a normal distribution with mean ~ and standard deviation cr. The values of ~ and o
for each area are taken to be the actual mean and variance of the errors from the econometric
estimations (i.e. for the USA the difference between the actual yield and the calculated yield
given by YIELOUS = 1.7124+0.04621TREND+O.24444083-0.22419086-0.34662088-0.48283089).
The random number generator is initialised to a repeatable state to allow for an analysis of
possible policy changes in chapter 6; if it were to be initialised to a non-repeatable state,
each separate run of the model would lead to a different set of random numbers and hence a
different set of world market. prices, stocks and levels of trade. While the latter may be
desirable statistically, it would make policy analysis difficult2S• In an attempt to avoid
distorting the results by extreme values the random numbers obtained were constrained to
be within 2.5 standard deviations of the mean value, such that if an individual call returned
a random number outside the specified range, it was flagged, and the call was repeated to
give another value. The process was repeated for 5.1% of the iterations in anyone run of
the programme.
In order to ease the interpretation of the results of the simulation model, it was decided to
carry through the mean values of the stochastic variables, rather than storing individual
values in each year for use in the following year. The effect of this simplifying assumption
is to give a series of probability distributions as the output (one from each year) rather than
20010 possible equilibrium values by 2000.
5.7 AMS Reductions. Import Protection and Export Subsidies
In this section, the results of the overall model are examined in order to answer one of the
questions posed at the beginning of this chapter: namely, do AMS reductions lead to
commensurate cuts in border protection and export subsidies? The reader is reminded that
for the first five years of the DR, the Ee asserted that a reduction in the AMS would lead to
a fall in import tariffs and export subsidies. In the 1990 proposals for a UR settlement the
2S The model was run with the random number generator initialised to a non-repeatable state and the results from
successive runs of this model, under the same assumptions, did not indicate that the patterns of world price
changes, trade movements or stock levels seen in the repeatable state model were unusual.
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EC offered to reduce the SMU by 30% from 1986 levels by 1995, but made no specific
offer on reductions in import tariffs and export restitutions except to say that these would
be reduced as a consequence of, and in line with, reductions in the SMU. It is this
proposal that is examined here.
Recall that for the cereals sector the SMU can be calculated as
SMU = Q(pd - pref)+(D - DIV - DIS) + B - L
where Q is the domestic production level, Pd is the domestic producer price, pref is the
fixed external reference price, D are direct payments, DIV are diversion payments, DIS are
disaster payments, B are all other budgetary financed support and L are producer levies.
Import protection is measured as the difference between the internal price and the ECU
world price (converted at commercial exchange rates but adjusted for the effects of the
switchover mechanism), adjusted for the 10% Community Preference. Unit export
subsidies are measured as the difference between the internal price and the ECU world
price. Note that a 'quality premium' was found to exist in the $ world price when
compared to EC export prices. This was reported by Ackrill et al. (1993) to be around 41
ECU per tonne for cereals as a whole; however, using data from the International Wheat
Council26, an average wheat premium of $24 per tonne was calculated. In the model,
therefore, pw is reduced by $24 before the export refund calculations take place.
As stated in section 5.6, the initial run of the full programme is carried out under the
assumption that policies by the USA and EC follow those set in 1990 and 1992
respectively. Specifically the following rules are assumed to apply.
(i) The Target Price in the USA is frozen at the 1990 level of $4 per bushel.
(ii) The CCC Loan Rate is taken as 85% of the average market price in the last 5 years,
excluding the high and low years. However, it cannot be below $2.44 per bushel;
neither can it be less than 95% of the year-earlier value.
(iii)The percentage of land required to be set aside under the Acreage Reduction Program
(%ARP) is determined according to the total stocks to total usage ratio: if the ratio is
26 World Grain Statistics (1992), tables lOa & lOb.
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less than 40% the %ARP is set at 7.5 while if the ratio is greater than 40% the %ARP
is set at 12.527.
(iv)Expenditure on the EEP is fixed at 1993 levels.
(v) The intervention prices in the EC are equal to those agreed up to 1994/95. After this
point they are held constant at 106.60 ECU per tonne. Compensatory payments and
set-aside payments which were part of the Cunha reforms follow the same pattern-s.
(vi)The percentage of required set-aside in the EC is assumed to remain at 15% for the
land under the rotational scheme and 20% for the non-rotational scheme. The
effective amount of set-aside is assumed to increase linearly from the 1993/94 figure
of around 9%29 of the base area to 15%. This rather optimistic increase is due to the
assumed effects of the introduction of the 20% non-rotational set-aside scheme in
1994/95 and of a decrease in the number of farms qualifying for exemptions.
In addition to the assumptions about policies in the USA and EC, the following also apply:
the price deflator is assumed to rise by 3 percentage points per annum from 1991 (as in
section 4.4.5.3); budgetary expenditure for items other than the compensatory payments
and set-aside payments is assumed to be constant and can therefore be ignored in
comparisons across years30; the US$IECU and US$/Canadian$ exchange rates are held
constant at their average 1993 levels (1.1724 and 1.3240 respectively) for the period 1994
to 2000.
The dynamic structure of the model means that a single extreme value of a stochastic
variable in anyone year feeds through into the following years, via a distorted average
value. In order to counter the possibility of the distortions leading to the simulation
exploding over time (an extreme value in year t feeds through into year t+ 1, which causes a
further distortion that feeds through into t+2 etc.), the calculated values of pw were
27 The 1990 FACf states that if the stocks to usage ratio is less than 40% the %ARP can be set between 0 and 15
while if the stocks to usage ratio is greater than 40% the % ARP can be set between 10 and 15. The values
chosen represent the mid points of these possible ranges.
28 Note that in the model the compensatory payments are not included in the area calculations because they are
the same for all cereals and therefore do not affect the relative returns from wheat and barley.
29 See Rayner et aL (1993)
30 In this case the SMU is calculated as
SMU =Qwt - pref)+D.
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constrained to fall within certain limits; these are based on the mean and standard deviation
of the nominal price series for the period 1974-1990. So as not to bias the results by
excluding extreme, but possible, values, the lower bound is set as the mean value less 4
standard deviations and the upper bound as the mean plus 5 standard deviations. This
wider band is set for the upper limit for two reasons; firstly, over time we would expect
there to be a rise in nominal prices due to the effects of inflation and secondly, the 1992
reform of the CAP, and the probable effects of the UR settlement, are expected to lead to an
increase in the mean value of the real world price (and hence the nominal price). If a
calculated price is outside of the specified range (56.03947 to 262.2068 US dollars) that
particular iteration is ignored when calculating the moments for all variables, for the year in
which it occurs. The total number of times a set of values was ignored formed less then
1.37% of the number of iterations performed in anyone run of the programme.
Further constraints are placed on the model to ensure that, for example, negative stocks do
not occur. For all areas, if calculated stock levels do become negative, they are set to zero.
In the USA, deficiency payments are set to zero if the market price is above the target price
and the participation rate is constrained to be between 0 and 100 (as detailed in section
5.3.1). In the EC, if the world price is above the internal price, import protection and
export refunds are also set. to zero.
The tables below give the mean values, and 95% confidence intervals, for the variables
relevant to this analysis, which are obtained from a run of the model over the full 15 year
period, with 200 iterations of the model in each year to gain the probability distributions.
Note that 1989 and 1990 are not included in the tables as these years have already been
discussed.
5-56
Ial:!l~ ~,'1
World Market Price
(US$ per tonne, nominal terms)
95% confidence interval (a)
Year Mean From To
1991 146.58 141.430 151.730
1992 162.93 160.183 165.677
1993 197.08 193.751 200.409
1994 221.41 218.020 224.800
1995 185.53 181.799 189.261
1996 159.60 155.825 163.375
1997 175.00 171.273 178.727
1998 201.39 197.622 205.158
1999 215.18 211.293 219.067
2000 208.70 204.618 212.782
(a) Calculated using the sample standard deviation, and the Central Limit Theorem
Table 5.7 shows the mean world price level. The price rises after 1993 in this case reflect
the change in policy by the EC in the 1992 reforms rather than the effects of a UR
agreement. pw rises initially, falls around the time of the 1995/6 review date set for CAP
reform, but then begins to rise again. This is plausible for two reasons: the first of these is
the predictable effect of the price increases in the early 1990s, namely that production is
encouraged in all areas and stocks are run down as the current price is above the expected
price in the next year, leading to a situation of oversupply in 1995. The second reason is
that world price levels for commodities are often observed to follow fluctuating patterns!'.
Table 5.8 shows the mean level of the SMU in each year and the corresponding mean level
for total export restitutions. The SMU is calculated as detailed above with the external
reference price for wheat set at 93.0254 ECU per tonne (the world price, less the
adjustment for quality differences (section 5.7), converted at commercial rates and then
adjusted for the switchover coefficient). Measured in this way, the 1986 value of the SMU
for wheat is 6276.13 million ECU32; for the EC to meet the target it proposed in 1990, it
3 1 The magnitude of the calculated values is discussed in chapter 6.
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would have had to reduce the SMU to 4393.29 (a 30% reduction). From the table it is
clear that under these assumptions the EC would not have been able to meet this by 1995,
(or indeed by 2000. the final date set in the actual UR agreement, although the 1999 figure
is below the target). Recall that in this measure of the AMS, the compensatory payments
introduced in the Cunha reforms are included, in the final agreement they are not. The
compensatory payments are assumed to remain constant at 45 ECU until 2000, however,
given the market prices in table 5.7. it is unlikely that this will be the case (this is discussed
further in chapter 6) and the calculated SMU would be reduced.
The actual reduction in the SMU is 29.33%. We can now examine the EC's contention that
export restitutions WOUld.be reduced by a commensurate amount. Total export restitutions
in 1986 are calculated as 631.98 million ECU. The export refund bill is below this value in
all years except 1999 and 2000. A 29.33% reduction in the export subsidy bill would take
it to 446.62 million ECU; only in 1992 and 1994 is the total bill below this. It is worth
noting that by 2000. the agreed final date, the average unit export refunds is 24.56 ECU,
representing most the adjustment for quality differences (21.15 ECU at the assumed
exchange rate). Were the quality of wheat exported by the EC experiences price to rise in
the same proportion as the American price shown in table 5.7, unit export restitutions
would be much smaller at 3.41 ECU, giving a 2000 export subsidy bill of 96.24 million
ECU, and the export subsidy reduction could have been met by then.
The table above shows that a reduction in the SMU of almost 30% by 1995 does not
necessarily lead to a commensurate fall in export subsidies. Indeed, with the policy
conditions, inflation rates, exchange rate and quality adjustment assumed here, the export
restitution bill is 36.91 million ECU above the required level.
Import tariffs cannot be measured accurately using this model because it calculates net
excess supply. However, the mean difference between the internal and external price33
suggested by the model would imply to an average import tariff of 17.99 ECU by 1995
(after accounting for Community Preference). This compares to an average variable import
levy of 184.03 ECU in 1986. This very simple comparison would lead us to conclude that
the commitment to reduce import tariffs by an amount commensurate with the cut in internal
support could have been met after the 1992 reforms.
32 The reader should remember that the SMU calculated here does not include a measure of budgetary expenditure
on items other than the compensatory payments (set aside payments are excluded from the SMU). Moreover
it is only calculated for wheat. It is therefore not comparable to the SMU measure shown in table 4.3.
33 Unadjusted for quality differences as the Ee imports the higher quality wheat.
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Table 5.8
The Wheat SMU & Export Restitutions
(million ECU)
SMU Export Restitutions
95% confidence intervaI(a) 95% confidence interval(a)
~ ~ Emm Th ~ Emm Th
1991 6811.92 6784.294 6839.546 912.34 814.543 1010.129
1992 2150.49 2142.276 2158.704 203.52 179.018 228.025
1993 2695.30 2690.611 2699.989 457.43 451.866 462.998
1994 3471.38 3466.976 3475.784 300.27 294.553 305.991
1995 4435.33 4430.877 4439.783 483.53 474.553 492.507
1996 4439.06 4434.414 4443.706 553.35 529.882 576.828
1997 4082.30 4078.130 4086.470 621.37 609.566 633.181
1998 4240.33 4235.954 4244.706 560.38 554.701 566.066
1999 4290.39 4285.555 4295.225 655.61 649.336 661.890
2000 4508.00 4503.603 4512.397 693.21 687.407 699.017
(a) Calculated using the sample standard deviation, and the Central Limit Theorem
The 1990 offer analysed above was made before the first drafts of the 1992 reforms were
presented; in other words when the stabiliser mechanism was still in force. In this case it is
interesting to examine the results of a run of the model under the assumption that the
policies in the EC do not change in 1993 and the stabiliser mechanism continues until 2000.
The stabiliser mechanism allowed a maximum, guaranteed, total cereal production (MGQ)
of 160 million tonnes. If production exceeded this amount the intervention price would be
reduced by 3% for the next marketing year, and the co-responsibility levy would be 6% of
the intervention price rather than the basic rate of 3% (until 1991, 5% after 1991). For this
model, a wheat MGQ was derived using the average proportion of wheat to total cereal
production (47.66%) to give a wheat MGQ of 76.25 million tonnes. The effective internal
market price continued to be the buying-in price (94% of the intervention price) less the co-
responsibility levy. Note the stabiliser mechanism is invoked if the mean EC production
level in anyone year is above the wheat MGQ, rather than if anyone iteration in a year
exceeds it. This is consistent with the simplifying assumption made earlier about the
dynamic mechanism of the model; namely that the mean values of variables in year t feed
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through into t+1 to give a series of probability distributions over the estimation period,
rather than 20010 possible answers by 2000. The results are shown in tables 5.9 and 5.10.
Table 5.9
The SMU and Export Restitutions with the Stabiliser Mechanism
(million ECU)
SMU Export Restitutions
95% confidence interval(a) 95% confidence interval(a)
~ ~ fmm 1:2 ~ fmm In
1991 4258.55 4241.280 4275.820 642.70 558.493 726.909 *
1992 3865.45 3850.684 3880.216 79.90 51.187 108.611 *
1993 3202.08 3188.710 3215.450 408.60 397.273 419.918 *
1994 2116.98 2104.775 2129.185 327.39 317.549 337.231 *
1995 2963.91 2952.923 2974.897 185.56 145.121 226.004 *
1996 2316.53 2307.757 2325.303 246.60 207.157 286.039 *
1997 2043.56 2036.140 2050.980 440.03 432.366 447.686 *
1998 1825.44 1818.864 1832.016 503.57 497.267 509.873 *
1999 1607.68 1601.439 1613.921 523.26 507.733 538.779
2000 1269.16 1264.933 1273.387 612.11 588.020 636.190
(a) Calculated using the sample standard deviation, and the Central Limit Theorem
• A high level of positive skewness and kurtosis demonstrated
It can be seen from table 5.9, that with these new assumptions about policy in the EC, the
1990 proposals for reductions in the SMU are met easily (recall that in this case there are no
compensatory payments to include in the SMU and the coresponsibility levies payable are
subtracted in the calculation). However, now the export restitutions are reduced by more
than the required amount due to a low mean world market price level in 1995 (by 2000 the
export restitution bill has risen again).
If we employ the same, rather crude, method for determining a unit import tariff as before,
we get a value of zero by 1995 (rising to 10.75 ECU by 2000). Again the import tariff
commitment contained in the EC's 1990 proposals would be met.
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Table 5.10
Nominal World Market Prices and Intervention Prices Resulting
from the Stabiliser Mechanism
World Price
.
(US$ per tonne) Intervention price (a)
Thlr ~ fum 1:2 <Beu per tonne)
1991 150.94 145.962 155.918 163.49
1992 186.02 183.175 188.865 158.59
1993 219.22 216.150 222.290 153.83
1994 217.27 213.824 220.716 149.22
1995 170.28 166.611 173.949 144.74
1996 174.18 170.776 177.584 140.40
1997 210.79 207.386 214.194 136.19
1998 216.48 213.109 219.851 132.10
1999 197.71 193.670 201.750 128.14
2000 187.55 183.040 192.060 124.29
(a) In each year the coresponsibility levy was 6% of the intervention price.
In conclusion, therefore, the 1990 proposals to reduce the SMU by 30% could not have
been met using the measures introduced in the Cunha reforms. This emphasises the
importance of the concession on compensatory payments earned by the EC in the final
agreement; as we shall see in chapter 6, the commitment to reduce internal support is not an
issue in either the USA or the EC. In addition to the shortfall in the reduction of the SMU,
the fall which would have taken place would have lead to a commensurate reduction in
import protection but not in export subsidisation. If the analysis is performed using the EC
policies in place at the time of the offer (namely the stabiliser mechanism), the SMU
reduction can be met, and this does lead to a commensurate fall in import protection and
export subsidisation. The EC's argument that separate commitments in each of the three
areas would not be needed to achieve a reduction in internal support, border protection and
export subsidisation is thus proven to have been true at the time of the proposals.
However, it would not have resulted in a reduction in trade-distorting agricultural support
of the magnitude proposed by the USA and CG; thus even if it had been accepted that the
EC's contention was correct, the former would still have proved to be a major sticking
point at the abortive 'final' meeting in December 1990.
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Appendix AS.l: Solution to the Overall model
The overall model is solved for the current, nominal world market clearing price pt. Excess
supply functions for the exporting countries take the form
ESt = PRODt - CONSt - STKSt +STKSt_1
where ES = Excess supply
PROD = Production
CONS = Consumption
STKS = Total, year end stocks
Import demand (ED) functions are calculated for the remaining areas and the equilibrium price
is found when
4 3 .
LESit - "LEDjt = 0
;=1 j=1
(AS-I)
Due to the way in which FORTRAN programmes are written, those terms which are not in pt
are included in subroutines such that these would then form a 'constant' unique to anyone
year. The returned 'constants' from the subroutines are USCAL, ECCAL, CANCAL and
CGCAL. The calculation of these is shown below; note that only the equations with terms in
pt are shown in detail and dummies for years prior to 1986 are not included (as these would
effectively be zero). The full set of equations can be found in Chapter 5.
AS.1.1 USCAL
PRODUSt =AREAUSt * YUSt (A5-2)
. CONSUSt = CDUSt +CFUSt (A5-3)
CFUSt = PROPUSt +TOTGRUSt
TOTGRUS, =0.72994TOTGRUSt_l +0.22226UVUSt
+ 16100D87 - 25376D89
(A5-4)
PUS
PROPUSt = 0.065133 +0.4 I974PROPUSt_l -0.033681 PlU;t
+0.046529D86
(A5-5)
A5.2
(note: PUS = a( p;V *l00);a = 0.51 in 1986, 0.6049 otherwise]t DEFpwt
STKUSt = CCCt + FORr + PRIVUSt (A5-6)
FORr = 12423.652-9225.6 PWt +5376.3107 Pt~l
LRFORt LRFORt_1 (A5-7)
+ 0.58276FORt_1
(note: taking account of the C-O technique, p = 0.58276)
PRIVUSt = 8486.6 + 0.35466PRIVUSt_1 - 3391.4
( PWt _ Pt~l )-7158.1D88E(Pt~I) E(P;V)
(A5-8)
0.2EEPTOTCCCt+ pW =8.875(LRr-LRr_t)+0.62885CCCt_t +11997086
t
(A5-9)
(note: Due to the deficiency payments programme operated in the USA, the internal price PUSt
is assumed to be equal to the world price p,w).
= USCAL, + p,w( 9225.6 + 3391.4 + 0.033681 TOTGRUSt)_
LRFORt E(PtH) PJUSt (A5-1O)
0.2EEPTOT,
p;V
AS.1.2 EC '12'
The policies pursued by the EC Member States drive a wedge between the world market price
and the internal EC market price. For this reason it is assumed that the EC price is the internal
(intervention buying-in) price unless the world price is above the threshold price (TP).
Therefore all of the elements of excess supply in the EC are initially calculated in a subroutine
to give ECCALt = ESECt ; if the level of P,w subsequently calculated is above TP, P,w is
recalculated to take account of elements in the EC affected by the current market price. These
are
A5.3
CDECt = 125.6(POPt -0.21518POPt_I)-28.693(Pt -0.21518Pt_.)
+ 0.21518CDECt_1
(A5-11)
(note: taking account of the C-O technique, P = 0.21518)
CFECt = 0.91377CFECt_1 -0.56663CFECt_2 +0.036836UVECt-
0.33654UVECt_1 +0.020869UVECt_2 -3487.5 Pt + (A5-12)DEFECt
3178.5 Pt-I -1971.0225 Pt-2
DEFECt_1 DEFECt_2
(note: C-O method; PI = 0.91377; P2 = 0.56663)
PRIVEC = 0.16162M'RODECt + 102.75E(Pt+ .} - 57.86Pt (A5-13) .
AS.l.3 Canada
PRODCANt = AREA CANt *YCANt (A5-14)
CONSCANt = CDCANt + CFCANt (A5-15)
STKCANt = 4575.9+0.5047STKCANt_1 +O.28869M'RODCANt
- 26. 317( PCANt - E( PCANt+I))
(A5-16)
where PCANt = P;VExchange rate
ESCANt = PRODCANt - CONSCANt -(4575.9 + 0.5047STKCANt_1 +
0.28869M'RODCANt + 26.317E(PCANt+.))+ 26.317PCANt
= CANCAL+(26.317)p;V
ERt (A5';17)
A5.1.4 Cairns Group
The CG formulation does not contain any references to the current market price (although past
values are incorporated) and hence all of the excess supply calculation takes place in the
subroutine and CGCALt = ESCGt.
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A5.1.5 Solution
The import demand functions of the former USSR (IMP EE) and the rest of the world group
(lMPROW) are determined without reference to Pr' and the imports of China are taken to be
exogenous in this model. Thus we can calculate the market clearing value of Pt, using
equation A5-1, as
[
USCALr +pw( 9225.6 + 3391.4 + 0.033681)+ 0.2EEPTOT,] + ECCAL
t LRFOR, E(Pt) PIUS, Pr'
+[CANCAL+( 2~~7 )Pl" ] +CCGAL- IMPEE - IMPROW - IMPCHIN = 0
~ [USCAL + ECCAL + CGCAL+ CANCAL - IMPEE - IMPROW - IMPCHIN]
(
9225.6 3391.14· 0.033681TOTGRUSt 26.317)pw
+ + + +, +
LFORt E(P~l) PIUSt ER,
0.2EEPTOT, = 0
pW
t
w f3 w2
~ aP, + Pt + r = 0 (A5-18)
Equation (A5-18) is solved for Pr' using the familiar formula for solving quadratics.
Variable definitions
The postscript ** indicates either US, EC or CAN in the following
PROD **
AREA**
y**
CD**
CF**
CONS**
LIV**
TOTGR**
PROP**
ES**
production of wheat
area planted to wheat
yield of wheat
direct/non-feed consumption of wheat
feed use of wheat
total usage
livestock numbers, beef cattle equivalent
feed use of all grains
proportion of feed grains which is wheat
excess supply (net)
A5.5
STK**
PRIV**
Pl**
total year end stocks
private stocks (year end)
price of a substitute good
other variables
FOR
CCC
EEPTOT
LRFOR
LR
ER
POP
Fanner Owned Reserve Stocks
US government stocks (Commodity Credit Corporation)
Total $ expenditure on the Export Enhancement Program
Loan rate for the FOR
CCC loan rate
exchange rate of the Canadian to US dollar
EC '12' population
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Chapter 6
The Unlguay Round Agreement and Future
Policy Options
6.1 Introduction
The Uruguay Round (UR) agreement, concluded in December 1993, states that each of the
Contracting Parties will make reductions in their support of agriculture in three separate
areas, with a different required reduction in each of the areas. In this chapter we consider
one of the questions posed at the beginning of chapter 5, namely whether the commitments
actually made in the UR are compatible in the sense that the reductions in each of the three
areas can be achieved simultaneously. In addition the model developed in chapter 5 is used
to analyse the effects of various changes in the assumptions about excess demand on the
conclusions. Further to this, it is acknowledged that although the agreed UR programme
is aimed at reducing the quantities of subsidised exports on the world market, thereby
raising the market price above what it would otherwise have been, it also has the effect of
limiting the policy options of governments wishing to provide income support to farmers.
The second part of this chapter, therefore, concentrates on an examination of the policy
options open to the USA and EC in 1995/6 when the present policies are due to be
reviewed.
6.2 The Compatibility of the Commitments in the UR Aa:reement
6.2.1 The Base Scenario
The base scenario is taken to be the one detailed in section 5.7. Briefly, agricultural
policies in the USA and EC are assumed to be those agreed in 1990 and 1992 respectively
(see section 5.7 for the details); imports by China are assumed to rise linearly from 12.5
million tonnes in 1990 to 20 million tonnes in 2000; exchange rates are fixed at average
1993 levels; inflation is assumed to be 3% per annum; and budgetary expenditure for items
other than storage costs, export subsidies, compensatory payments and set-aside payments
is assumed to be constant.
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In order to focus the discussion, only the salient variables and years are presented in the
following tables.
The mean values of the nominal market price (PW) are presented in table 5.7 but some
discussion of the magnitude of these prices is warranted here. The mean value of pw rises
to over $200.00 by the end of the forecast period which is historically a very high level. At
first sight, this might suggest that the main achievement of UR was to force the EC to
reform the CAP (recall that for this base scenario none of the UR criteria have been
imposed on the model) thereby allowing for the desired increase in world prices.
Real World Market Price: 1960·2000
(1986 prices)
500
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04-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rT~~
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Figure 6.1
Indeed, figure 6.1 shows that the fall in the real price seen in the 1980s has been halted and
that under the assumptions of the base scenario real prices do rise in the 1990s. However,
even if the extreme values in the early 1970s are discounted, a real price of $143.76
(assuming an inflation rate of 3% per annum as stated on page 5-54) in 2000 is not a
historically high value.
That said. what are the probable causes of the forecast increase in the nominal price? They
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were summed up in section 5.7 as the expected effects of the interaction between supply
and demand. Itwas also observed that world price levels often follow fluctuating patterns.
The table below gives a summary of the relevant variables in the base period (1986-88),
1995 and 2000. It shows that total excess supply has increased by 29.6% between the
base period and 2000. The share of the market accounted for by US exports has risen from
47.3% to 57.2%, that accounted for by the EC from 20.1% to 24.4%, while the share of
the Cairns Group (CG) is greatly reduced - a fall of around 10 percentage points. The main
reasons for the fall in the CG's share are t~ofold. Firstly, the area planted in the CG is
determined by the difference between the nominal wheat price and the nominal maize price;
the latter is exogenous to the model and is assumed to move according to an ARIMA model
(detailed in section 5.6.1). The ARIMA process for the maize price results in an upward
movement over the period. Therefore, with both prices rising, the area response to a
change in the wheat price is muted. Secondly, the CG stock equation (5-30) is sensitive to
changes in nominal prices, therefore with Pw rising to over $200 it was expected that CG
stocks would be quite low. In the early years this has the effect of increasing the CG's
share of the world market; however, over time, the level of available stocks for export falls.
The overall fall in the CG's market share then is the result of falling stocks coupled with a
lack of production response.
While excess supply has risen by around 30% over the forecasting period, excess demand
has increased by 58.98%. This is in part due to the assumed increase in Chinese imports
(which in tum is based on the assumption that China's is able to finance this quantity of
imports) and in part due to the trend nature of the ROW import function. It is also
dependent upon the assumption that imports by the CIS continue to follow the pattern of
the former USSR. It is likely, therefore, that the historically high prices are the result of
very high levels of excess demand rather than any policy change in the EC (the
consequences of changing some of these assumptions about import demand are examined
in section 6.2.2.).
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Table 6.1
Base Period Results: Comparison of 1995 and 2000 with 1986-88 (a)
1. An[ill:~ 1286·88 (Cillih[ilt~d Yillu~s}
!lSA OC Canada ca
Excess Supply 42274.58 17953.27 16377.09 12718.30
Stocks 36869.07 14238.09 8359.53 4870.36
Private 12763.84 7885.21
Gov't . 11150.02 6352.88
Other 12955.21
Excess Demand
CIS 15447.83
China
R.O.W.
13000.00
53507.26
2. 1295
llSA
Excess Supply 52556.35
ECl2
20242.46
Canada
15115.63
(52050.31-53062.39) (20009.55-20475.37) ( 14848.44-15382.82)
Stocks (b) 17873.81 16728.34 . 8557.48
( 17315.59-18432.03) (16621.18-16835.50) (8403.51-8711.45)
Private 13443.40 14278.91
(13378.22-13508.76) (14223.95·14333.87)
Gov't 905.07 2449.43
(2397.24·2501.62)
Other 3525.25
(3096.04·3954.46)
ExcessDemand
CIS 21246.41
(21712.02·22004.87)
China 16250.00
ROW 68356.86
(68156.86-68556.86)
ill
7882.23
(7473.85·8290.61)
269.26
( 194.39·344.13)
3. 2000
USA
Excess Supply 66223.72
EC
28223.68
Canada
15660.70
(65638.80-66808.64) (27993.76-28453.60) (15370.30-15951.1 0)
Stocks (b) 15206.70 17363.34 8514.11
(14781.00015632.40) (17257.56-17469.12) (8348.73-8679.49)
Private 13087.08 15719.05
(13016.38-13157.78) (15664.80-15773.30)
Gov't 769.19 1644.30
(1592.81-1695.79)
Other 1350.43
(1022.46-1678.40)
ExcessDemand
CIS 25029.25
(22968.14-27090.44)
China 20000.00
ROW 85263.28
(84276.89-86249.67)
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CG
5693.16
(5211. 95-617 4.37)
39.80
(16.98-62.62)
N21sa
95% confidence interval in parentheses; calculated using the Central Limit Theorem and the sample standard
deviation.
(a) '000 tonnes unless otherwise stated.
(b) Numbers may not sum because of rounding.
Internal Support, Export Subsidisation and Import Protection
Given the mean values of the nominal world market price presented in table 5.7, and the
excess supply figures presented above, the 3 areas of the UR agreement can now be
examined under the base scenario assumptions. The analysis concentrates on the USA and
EC as these were the two main protagonists in the UR, and their policies have had the
largest effect on world markets in recent years.
The commitments agreed in the UR require the Contracting Parties to reduce import tariffs
by 36% over the 6 year reform period, from a 1986-1988 base year; to include internal
support policies in a global AMS, expressed in monetary terms, using the 1986-88 base
period and then to reduce it by 20% over the 6 year period; and to reduce budgetary
expenditure on export subsidies by 36% over 6 years and the volume of subsidised
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exports by 21% over 6 years. Both of these latter commitments are based on a 1986-90
reference period, although the agreement states that where 1991192 subsidised export levels
exceed those of the base period, the former may be used as the starting point for the
reductions. However, by the end of the reform period, the resulting reduction must be the
same, namely a 21% reduction in the volume of subsidised exports from the average 1986-
90 level.
Note that as the agreed AMS does not include deficiency payments in the USA, or
compensatory payments in the EC, both areas are expected, a priori, to be able to meet the
required reductions comfortably,
Base levels, as defined above, are presented for the USA and Ee in table 6.2. The fixed
external reference price, used to calculate the AMS, is set at the average nominal world
market price for 1986-88 ($126.83 per tonne) for the USA, and for the EC at 93.0254
ECU per tonne (as in chapter 5). The supported internal price is the intervention price in
the EC, but in the USA it is the market price. This is because deficiency payments are
excluded from the calculation, making the target price a meaningless measure of the internal
price; this results in an AMS of zero in the base period (recall that budgetary expenditure
for items other than the deficiency payments and set-aside payments is assumed to be
constant therefore excluded for the AMS comparisons), and as an AMS of zero represents
less than 5% of average production, reductions in internal support are not required (see
section 3.10)1,
Expenditure on export subsidies in the USA is taken to be the total expenditure on the
Export Enhancement Program (EEP) that can be attributed to wheat (i.e. 20%, see section
5.3.1). The quantity of wheat exported using export subsidies is approximated by the
change in wheat CCC stocks because ofEEP operations (equation 5-24). Note that the EC
will be using the 1991192 starting date for reductions in subsidised wheat exports, but the
average 1986-90 level, as calculated by the model, is presented here because the required
reduction is from this level.
Strictly speaking the de minimis rule applies to the total AMS as a percentage of total agricultrual
production but as only wheat is dealt with here it is assumed to apply to the wheat market.
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Table 6.2
The UR Commitment: AMS and Export Subsidies
(CalibratedValues)
AMS
fum
0.0 n.a.
fum
7274.00
Th
5819.20
Export Subsidy
Total Expenditure
Quantity ('000 tonnes)
102.36
924.76
65.51
731.35
1050.37
20205.23
672.24
15962.13
~
n.a. not applicable
Millions of national currency unless otherwise stated.
Recall that import tariffs cannot be specificallymeasured by the model because it calculates
net excess supply and demand. However, the gap between internal and external prices can
be measured, and this will be used (as in chapter 5) to give an indication of the likely
magnitude of import tariffs. Note that for the EC the tariff equivalent for 1986-88,
calculated in December 1993, for common wheat was 149 ECU per tonne-, For the
USA it is assumed that the domestic market price is equal to the world market price and
therefore there are no import tariffs.
Ifwe examine table 6.3, we can see at the EC has no trouble meeting the AMS requirement
by 2000, indeed the actual reduction in the AMS is 66%. On the export subsidisation
commitment, expenditure on export restitutions is not reduced by the required amount
(34%), and the quantity of wheat exported with a subsidy is increased by almost 40%
(39.69%) on average 1986-88 values. The import tariff implied by the gap between
internal and external prices, adjusted for Community Preference, is 21.27 ECU by 2000,
well below the 1986-88 tariff equivalent value. Under the assumptions of the base
scenario, therefore, the EC would not be able to meet the commitment to reduce the
quantity of supported exports by 21% over the reform period. It is therefore likely that the
EC will need to make changes to its agricultural policy if it is to meet the requirement to
reduce the quantity of subsidised exports; the possible policy changes are examined in
section 6.3.
2 Agra Europe (1993), p8.
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In the USA, expenditure on, and the quantity exported under, the wheat EEP are above the
amounts required by the UR agreement. Note that the policy assumptions of the base
scenario require the total amount spent on the EEP to be constant after 1995; with the world
price levels forecast by the model it is unlikely that EEP expenditure would be as high as it
is here, and the conclusions about US export subsidisation would be altered.
Table 6.3
AMS and Export Subsidies: Base Scenario
Quantity (b)
.l22.5. 2000
2235.44 2467.88
(2227.20·2243.68) (2459.75-2476.01)
483.53 693.21
(474.55-492.51) (687.41-699.02)
20242.46 28223.68
(20009.55-20475.38) (27993.76-28453.60)
EC
AMS (a)
Export Subsidies
Total Expenditure (a)
lISA
Export Subsidies
Total Expenditure (a)
Quantity (b)
160
881.51
(862.71-900.31 )
160
782.66
(765.50-799.82)
95% confidence interval in parentheses; calculated using the Central Limit Theorem and the sample standard
deviation.
(a) millions of national currency
(b) '000 tonnes
6.2.2 Effects of Alterations to Excess Demand
The results presented above are calculated using historically high nominal world market
price levels, which were postulated to have been caused by the high levels of excess
demand following from the assumptions made about importing areas. In this section, the
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effects of changes to the assumptions about import demand are examined. Three alternative
scenarios are presented, each of which have been computed with the following changes to
the base scenario assumptions:
(A) imports by China remain constant at 1990 levels;
(B) imports by China remain constant at 1990 levels and excess demand in the CIS
falls to zero by 2000;
(C) imports by China remain constant at 1990 levels and the CIS becomes a net
exporter, having an excess supply of 8.2 million tonnes.
As has already been stated, the assertion that Chinese imports increase to 20 million tonnes
by 2000 is based on the assumption that China has the capacity to finance this quantity of
imports. China's ability to gain foreign currency depends to a large extent on the amount
of textiles it can export; given that the DR provisions for textiles do not come into effect
until 2000, thereby leaving the Multi-Fibre Arrangement intact, the Chinese may not be able
to finance such large imports. As it is impractical to present the entire range of possibilities
for Chinese imports, scenario (A) was chosen to represent a situation where increases in
domestic production meet consumption needs above those satisfied by 1990 levels of
imports, which could be financed.
The economic reform process in the former USSR makes forecasting any economic
variable for that area very difficult. As was stated in chapter 5, the method used to forecast
CIS imports is based on a normative view of past production patterns rather than any
formal econometric analysis of the expected patterns. Scenarios (B) and (C) are meant to
represent degrees of optimism about agrarian reform in the CIS; (B) is a situation where the
CIS reaches self-sufficiency levels by 2000, but does not have an exportable surplus (some
commentators suggest that there is some evidence of the CIS moving out of the world
system, with subsistence farming filling the shortfall in food supply'): and (C) represents
the results of a simulation of a complete reform of CIS agriculture (using the SWOPSIM
model) by Liefert, Koopman & Cook (1993), where they estimate that the former USSR
would then be able to export 8.219 million tonnes of wheat.
Simulations of scenarios A, Band C required a small change to the overall model as they
3 For example B.P.Pockney. Agricultual Economics Society Annual Conference. St. Luke's College, Exeter,
1994.
6-10
introduced the possibility of complex roots as a solution to the quadratic equation 5-36,
with J3 sometimes being small (recall that the standard method of solving quadratic
equations is used). If imaginary roots were found in anyone iteration, the iteration was
ignored in a similar way to the solutions outside of the limits set for pw (section 5.7).
Ta!:ll~ fi.4
Mean Nominal World Market Prices: Scenarios A, B & C
(US$ per tonne)
A B C
Confidence Interval Confidence Interval Confidence Interval
~ ~ fum lQ ~ fum lQ ~ fum Th
1991 142.41 137.146 147.674 90.19 84.933 95.447 85.03 79.698 90.362
1992 156.78 154.098 159.462 114.47 109.974 118.966 107.02 102.132 111.908
1993 188.43 185.115 191.745 142.46 139.593 145.327 133.68 130.842 136.518
1994 218.90 215.491 222.309 191.88 188.515 195.245 178.83 175.585 182.075
1995 184.32 180.633 188.007 188.94 185.489 192.391 180.12 176.645 183.595
1996 151.92 146.798 157.042 145.52 142.043 148.997 142.86 139.417 146.303
1997 161.54 157.949 165.131 118.87 114.858 122.882 110.63 106.328 114.932
1998 195.16 191.441 198.879 147.28 143.986 150.574 125.13 121.636 128.624
1999 213.98 210.179 217.781 179.65 175.546 183.754 153.32 149.530 157.110
2000 204.53 200.468 208.592 191.62 187.551 195.689 176.93 172.863 180.997
~
95% confidence interval in parentheses.
Mean Values or pw: Base Scenario
122.1 .l2ll izsa l.2ll izss ~ l221 izss .l222 2.M.Q
146.58 162.93 197.08 221.41 185.53 159.60 175.00 201.39 215.18 208.70
Table 6.4 shows the mean levels of the market clearing, nominal world market prices
generated by the 3 scenarios. From the table, we can see that the expected result occurred,
namely a fall in the mean values of pw when compared to the base scenario (included at the
foot of the table for reference). The effect of restraining Chinese imports (scenario (A» is
not particularly marked given that each run of the model can be seen as a sample from the
population of all possible scenarios; a sample mean of $204.53 is not significantly different
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from a mean of $208.70 (99% level) if the latter is thought to be the true mean. However,
the combined effect of restraining Chinese imports and agrarian reform in the CIS is
significant.
Table 6.5 gives the effects of the change in the import demand assumptions on AMS and
export subsidy calculations for the EC and USA.
The conclusions drawn from table 6.3 about AMS reductions in the EC are shown to be
robust; in each of the scenarios presented above the AMS target is surpassed. Note that the
AMS falls as the average level of world market prices decreases. This is the result of two
effects: (i) the price gap in the AMS is calculated as the difference between the intervention
price and the fixed external reference price, and hence is unaffected by changes in the
market price; (ii) the area planted to wheat in the EC is responsive to changes in the world
market price when it is above the intervention price (adjusted as necessary), therefore, with
lower world market price levels, production is lower leading to a lower total AMS. This
latter point is also an explanation of the smaller exportable surplus in scenario C when
compared to scenario B, and scenario B when compared to A. The smaller excess supply
in scenario C means that the EC is able to meet both the expenditure and the quantity
reductions required by the UR agreement (note that the average import tariff implied in
scenario C is 16.39 ECU per tonne by 2000, therefore it is likely that the import protection
requirement will also bemet).
The USA is unable to meet the export subsidisation requirements in any of the scenarios
but this is mainly due to the way in which expenditure on, and the quantity of, subsidised
exports is calculated for the USA; the former is constant because of the assumption that
total EEP expenditure is constant and the latter rises as pw falls as it is determined by
equation 5-24, in which pw is the denominator. As has already been stated, with the world
price levels forecast by the model in each of the scenarios presented, it is unlikely that EEP
expenditure would be as high as it has been assumed so far; section 6.3 will examine the
effects of changes in US and EC policies on the compatibility of the UR commitments.
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Table 6,5
AMS and Export Subsidies:Scenarios A, B & C
A B
isss
~
AMS (a) 2199.47 2008.09 1963.67
(2191.36-2207,58) (2000,69-2015.49) ( 1956.39-1970,95)
Export Subsidies
Total Expenditure (a) 457.68 328.53 298.31
(449.17-466.18) (322.49-334.58) (291.68-304.95)
Quantity (b) 19154.16 13428.44 12604.38
(18925.00-19383.33) (13195.66-13661.32) (12359.16-12849.60)
lISA
Export Subsidies
Total Expenditure (a) 160 160 160
Quantity (b) 887.12 862.32 906.33
(868.29-905.95) (845.65-878.99) (887.87-924.79)
lM.Q
K
AMS (a) 2416.97 2131.10 2012.73
(2409.00-2424.94) (2124.02-2138.18) (2005.95-2019.51)
Export Subsidies
Total Expenditure (a) 632.13 421.32 325.68
(623.86-640.39) (414.12-428.53) (314,80-336.57)
Quantity (b) 25721.41 17371.88 14095.06
(25496.24-25946.58) (17129.94-17616.83) (13860.44-14329,68)
!!SA
Export Subsidies
Total Expenditure (a) 160 160 160
Quantity (b) 798.86 854.61 928.52
(781.23-816.49) (832,03-874.19) (906.13-950.91)
~
95% confidence interval in parentheses.
(a) millions of national currency
(b) '000 tonnes
The rather counter-intuitive conclusion we must draw from the analysis of the base scenario
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and of scenarios A, B, and C, therefore, is that the EC is only able to meet the UR
requirements in each of the 3 areas simultaneously, with a continuation of the policies
agreed in the 1992 Cuhna reforms, if world prices increase slowly, such that EC
production is restrained. This may be an anomaly of the model in which world prices
above the intervention price, but below the threshold price, are discounted as the internal
market price (which is set at the intervention price) for production decisions; the internal
price is thus around 10% lower than the world price, by definition. On the other hand, if
the calculated world price is above the threshold price, production decisions are made on
the basis of this price, which is by definition at least 10% higher than the intervention price.
Ifworld prices are lower (or rise at a slower rate) than in the base scenario, EC production
is more likely to be determined by the intervention price and hence be relatively lower.
However, the results suggest that if the CIS does not become a net exporter, the EC will
have to adjust its policies in order to meet the UR commitments by 2000. For the USA,
total EEP expenditure must be reduced if it is to meet all of the UR requirements by 2000,
while keeping the other policies of the 1990 farm bill intact .
.
6.3 Policy Options for the USA and EC
The analysis above suggests that both the USA and EC will need to adjust their polices in
the 1995196 review period if they are to meet the UR commitments by 2000. However, a
closer examination of tables 6.3 and 6.5 reveals that in 1995 the EC is able to meet the final
UR requirements in scenarios A, Band C, and only fails to meet the export quantity
reduction in the base scenario. Therefore there is unlikely to be any pressure on the EC to
change agricultural policies in 1995 in order to meet the UR provisions. In the USA,
however, expenditure on export subsidisation is above what would be expected if it were to
meet the UR commitments by 20004, while the quantity of subsidised exports is around
the required target in the base scenario and scenarios A & B, but is above the target in
scenario C. Note that reducing expenditure on the EEP should have the effect of pushing
up nominal world market prices (although the effect is likely to be small) and may affect the
EC's ability to make the required reductions by 1995, thus requiring the EC to make policy
changes.
It is interesting at this stage to examine the budgetary effects of agricultural support policies
4 In order to meet a 36% reduction by 2000, a compounded fall of 7.17% per annum would be required in
expenditure on export subsidies, giving a 1995 value of 95.03. A 21% reduction in the quantity of subsidised
exprots would require a 1995 value of 889.29.
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in the USA and EC as increasing costs of agricultural support policies are often cited as
reasons for policy changes'[. Note that the figures for budgetary expenditure presented
here are only meant to give an indication of the probable magnitude of the EC's and USA's
budgets given the assumptions of the model, and are not a representation of the total
expenditure expected in these years as they exclude all budgetary contributions not related
to income support, for example the Guidance section of the EC budget, and research &
development funds in the USA. Budgetary expenditure is calculated, in this case, as
follows;
USA: Total deficiency payments + EEP expenditure on Wheat + Storage costs;
EC: Total compensatory payments + Total set-aside expenditure + Export Refunds +
Storage costs;
where the storage costs are assumed to be 20 -ECU per tonnes (converted to US dollars
using the commercial exchange rate).
Returning, as a starting point for this policy analysis, to the base scenario, table 6.6 shows
that there has been a dramatic fall in the budgetary cost of farm policies in the USA, which
has occurred as government stock levels, and hence storage costs, have fallen and because
of the increase in world prices (recall from section 5.7 that deficiency payments are set to
zero if the market price is above the target price). In the EC, on the other hand, budgetary
costs have increased over the forecast period. As intervention stocks are decreased, the
reason for the increase is the provisions of the Cuhna reforms; if the compensatory
payments remain at their 1995/6 levels until 2000, the Community budget would rise by
over 300% compared to average 1986-88 levels. Hence, even if the EC can meet the UR
requirements by 1995, the budgetary costs of the current policy are likely to force a change
in policy. _
5 There is an area of work on the political economy of agricultural policies which concludes that 'policy
inertia' exists such that policy changes only occur in times of crisis, usually of the budgetary sort (see for
example Swinnen J. & van der Zee F.A. (1992) or Josling T. (1993) 'Agricultural PolicyReform in the USA
and Ee' in Rayner A.J. & Colman D. (1993) Current Issues in Agricultural Economics pp32-6l). If this is
the case then the need to meet the UR agreement may not be the only force behind any possible policy
changes by the EC and USA.
6 Ackrill (1992) found that EC storage costs for cereals were, on average, 20 ECU per tonne.
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Table 6.6
Budgetary Costs of Supporting Agriculture: Base Scenario
(national currency, millions)
1986-88
!!SA ~
4853.40 1021.97
3141.81 3962.88
(3044.23-3239.39) (3948.60-3977 .16)
3232.93 4184.70
(3134.82-3331.04) (4172.26-4197.14)
1995
2000
95% confidence interval in parentheses; calculated using the Central Limit Theorem and the sample standard
deviation.
6.3.1 Policy Changes in the Base Scenario
The initial analysis of possible policy changes in the USA and EC is carried out using the
same assumptions as in the base scenario. except for those relating to the continuation of
US and EC policies. In other words. imports by China are assumed to rise linearly from
12.5 million tonnes in 1990 to 20 million tonnes in 2000; imports by the CIS are assumed
to follow the patterns given by the formulation in section 5.4; exchange rates are fixed at
average 1993 levels; inflation is assumed to be 3% per annum; and budgetary expenditure
for items other than storage costs. export subsidies. compensatory payments and set-aside
payments are assumed to be constant. The policy options examined give rise to the
following scenarios;
(0) total EEP expenditure is gradually reduced to a level which gives the required
reduction in expenditure on subsidised wheat exports between 19937 and 2000;
all other policies are assumed to be the same as in the base scenario;
(E) as for (0) except that for the EC the intervention price is reduced gradually to
7 The last year for which data are available.
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reach 90 ECU per tonne in 2000, the effective set-aside percentage is raised from
9% in 1993/4 to 18% in 2000, and compensatory payments are reduced by 5
ECU per annum as part of a phasing out procedure (per hectare set-aside
payments are assumed to be constant);
(F) for the EC the policies remain the same as in (E), but total EEP expenditure is
reduced to zero by 2000;
(G) as for (E) except the compensatory payments policy ceases in the 1996/97 crop
year (i.e. payments are zero for 1996 to 2000).
The reasoning behind scenario (0) is clear; however, the others need some explanation.
The assumed policy changes in scenario (E) are a reflection of the Commission's desire to
introduce a more market-oriented agricultural support system, but are also influenced by the
recognised power of the various farming pressure groups throughout the Communityf
such that compensatory payments are likely to be phased out, rather than ended abruptly,
even though the intervention price is reduced to a level below the effective EC export price.
Scenarios (F) and (G) are introduced to give an idea of the results of extreme policy
changes. That said, in the USA, the authorities argue that the EEP was only introduced to
counter the price-dampening effects of the EC's export restitutions, if the world price is
rising the EEP is unnecessary and EEP expenditures should tend to zero. In the EC it was
argued that the compensatory payments would be a temporary measure to allow a smoother
adjustment to the CAP reform; if that is the case, they could (should) be ended at the 1995
review.
The mean world market price levels, AMS and export subsidy values, calculated in each of
the scenarios above, are given in table 6.7, along with the calculated budgetary costs.
8 See. for example. Winters L.Alan (1993) 'The Political Economy of Industrial Countries' Agricultural
Policies' in Rayner A.1. & Colman D (eds.) 'Current Issues in Agricultural Economics' pp22-31.
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Table 6,7
The Effects of Possible Policy Changes in the USA and EC
D E F G
till
World Price 159.61 186.25 186.26 186.26
(155,83·163.39) (182.53·189,98) (182.54·189.99) (182.54·189.99)
EC
AMS 2235.44 2229.81 2229.81 2229.81
(2227.20·2243,68) (2221.59·2238,03) (2221.59·2238.03) (2221.59·2238.03)
Export Subs.
Expenditure 483.53 481.48 481.48 481.48
(474.55·492.51 ) (472.41·490,56) (472.41·490.56) (472.41·490,56)
Quantity 20242.46 20050.30 20050.30 20050.30
(20009.55·20475.37) (19817.97·20282.63) (19817.97·20282.63) (19817.97·20282,63)
Budgetary Costs 3962.88 3954.0 3954.03 3954.03
(3948.60·3977 .16) (3940,49·3967.57) (3940.49·3967.57) (3940.49·3967.57)
lISA
Export Subs.
Expenditure 123.97 123.97 123.97 123.97
Quantity 683.00 680.26 627.12 680.26
(668.44·697.57) (665.81·694.71) (613.80.640.44) (665.81·694.71)
Budgetary Costs 3141.76 . 3122.90 3122.89 3122.90
(3044.18·3239.34) (3025.45·3220.35) (3025.44.3220,34) (3025.45·3220.35)
WU!
World Price 208.70 212.75 212.75 212.75
(204.62-212.78) (208.89·216.77) (208,89-216.77) (208.89·216.77)
EC
AMS 2467.88 593.3 593.38 593.38
(2460.04-2475.72) (591.48·595.28) (591.48-595.28) (591.48·595.28)
Export Subs.
Expenditure 693.21 606.79 606.79 606.79
(687.41·699.02) (601.18·612.40) (601.18·612.40) (601.18·612.40)
Quantity 28223.79 24440.92 24440.92 24440.92
(27993.87-28453.71)(24223,10.24658.74)(24223.10.24658. 74) (24223.10·24658.74)
Budgetary Costs 4184.71 2234.88 2234.8 797.36
(4172.27-4197.15) (2228.26·2241.50) (2228.26·2241.50) (790.74·803.98)
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USA
Export Subs.
Expenditure 65.51 65.51 0.0 65.51
Quantity 320.4 313.83 0.0 313.83
(313.43-327.47) (307.23-320.43) n.B (307.23-320.43)
Budgetary Costs 3232.82 3128.31 3128.24 3128.31
(3134.72-3330.92) (3033.24-3223.38) (3033.17-3223.31) (3033.24-3223.38)
~
95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
Millions of national currency except 'Quantity of Export Subs.', '000 tonnes.
n.a. not applicable
The first thing to notice from table 6.7 is that the impact of the wheat EEP (20% of the total
EEP expenditure) on the world market price is minimal; a reduction in the EEP to the levels
required by the UR agreement (scenario D) has no effect on the mean level of pw in 1995
or 2000 when compared to base levels. Indeed the only effects of the change in the EEP
policy are to allow the USA to meet all of the UR criteria by 2000, and reduce the budget
slightly (by 50 thousand dollars compared to the base scenario in 1995, and by 110
thousand dollars in 2000); therefore, while this policy change is sufficient for the USA to
meet its objectives, changes to EC policies are still needed to ease the budgetary problem in
1995 (and meet the UR objectives by 2000).
The effect of the EC policy change in scenario E is to increase the mean level of the world
price, relative to the base scenario, in both 1995 and 2000. This allows the EC to meet all
but one of the UR commitments - that of reducing the quantity of subsidised exports.
Also, although the budgetary costs of the policy are almost half of those in the base
scenario by 2000, they are still at historically high levels. Ifwe compare scenario E with G
(where the only difference is that the compensatory payments are zero for 1996 to 2000
instead of decreasing gradually to 20 ECU) we can see that this policy has no effect on the
overall level of excess supply, and hence prices, but significantly reduces the budgetary
costs. This result stems from the fact that the payments are set for cereals as a whole,
therefore for an individual cereal, such as wheat, the returns to that crop relative to another
cereal are not altered by the presence of the payment. The cause of the increase in mean
levels of world price in scenario E (relative to the base) is therefore the fall in the
intervention price to levels which are below the nominal world price level (adjusted by the
exchange rate and Community Preference), and the increase in the effective set-aside rate to
18% of the fixed base area (the average 1986-91 of the Cuhna reforms).
6-19
A note of caution must be introduced about the conclusions drawn about the EC's inability
to meet all of the UR commitments in scenarios E and G; these may be affected by the
dynamic structure of the model in which adjusted world prices above the intervention price
are fully reflected in the following year's production, consumption and stocking decisions,
but are not fed through to the current year's excess supply. This is the consequence of an
assumption made to ease the programming of the model, namely that the domestic price in
the EC is the intervention price, until it is proven otherwise. If the world price (in ECU,
and after the appropriate adjustments) is above the intervention price, the adjusted world
price becomes part of the expected price calculation for the following year. Incorporating
the world price into the current year would require an iteration process to be introduced into
the model (as EC excess supply helps to determine world price, which determines EC
excess supply, and so on) in order to find the true equilibrium price. Although it is
acknowledged that this would be a desirable feature of the model, and that it is possible to
programme the process (with a considerable change to the present dynamic structure of the
model), it is an area for future work as a way has not yet been found to ensure convergence
in every year and iteration. The effect of not including this iteration process is that the
results are probably over-estimating the quantity of subsidised exports in the EC, but not
such that the EC would otherwise meet the UR criteria". Moreover, given that the
intervention price is known by EC farmers with more certainty than the market price at the
time of planting, it is likely that the intervention price will have a strong influence on
expectations of returns of wheat, at least for the medium term. Thus the model is not
expected to be significantly biased by the solution process assumed in the model.
An examination of the results in scenario F again shows that the EEP has little effect on the
equilibrium position in the wheat market, with the main effect being on the size of the
USA's budget.
The conclusion to be drawn from the analysis so far is that the EC will have to make very
large cuts in the support it gives to farmers if it is to fulfil the UR commitment by 2000,
given the assumptions made about excess demand, exchange rates and inflation. Also
within the EC there are likely to be budgetary pressures to reduce expenditure on
compensatory payments, although this will have little effect on the EC's ability to meet the
9 The iteration process is expected to be similar to a cobweb process which, if it converges. may be likely to
give excess supply figures which are not significantly different to the present values. given the magnitude of
the coefficients of the EC section of the model. More importantly. the excess supply calculations for 2000
do incorporate the effects of the historically high prices in 1998 and 1999.
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UR criteria. and would be likely to meet with strong producer resistance.
6.3.2 Policy Changes and the Excess Demand Assumptions
In section 6.2.2 we examined the effects of a change in the assumptions about excess
demand, and found that if Chinese imports are constant and the CIS exports 8.2 million
tonnes, the EC can meet all of the UR criteria by 2000 without a change in agricultural
policy. However, the budgetary costs of maintaining all of the provisions of the Cuhna
reforms are still high (a mean of 3173.65 million ECU in 2000). What follows is an
examination of effects of the policy changes in scenarios D to G, given the assumptions
about excess demand in scenarios A to C, on the EC's ability to meet its UR commitments
by 2000 and on the budgetary costs of support in the EC.
As has already been stated, if excess demand conditions are the same as in scenario C the
EC is able to meet all of the UR criteria by 2000 with the Cuhna reforms continuing to
2000, but there would be budgetary pressures to change agricultural policies. If the policy
change were the same as in scenario EI0 (the intervention price is reduced to 90 ECU per
tonne in 2000, the effective set-aside percentage is raised to 18% in 2000 and
compensatory payments are reduced by 5 ECU per annum) the EC budget would be
3314.91 million ECU in 1995 (95 % confidence interval 3304.77 - 3325.05) and 1608.21
in 2000 (1601.84 - 1614.58); this latter figure still represents an increase in budgetary
expenditure of 57% compared to the 1986-88 base period. If compensatory payments are
now reduced to zero in 1996 (as in scenario G) the picture is much improved with a budget
of 431.9 million ECU in 2000 (425.60-438.34)
In scenarios A and B, the EC was unable to make the required reductions in the quantity of
subsidised exports but met the other criteria; the policy changes detailed in scenarios E and
F make a difference to these conclusions. Table 6.8 gives the quantities of subsidised
exports and the budgetary costs resulting from a combination of scenarios A and B with E
andF.
Table 6.8 shows a repeated pattern of the impact of a change in the compensatory payments
from a gradual reduction to 20 ECU to a sudden fall to zero; the change in budgetary
expenditure in scenarios I and K when compared to H and J respectively is quite marked,
but no other changes occur. The impact of fixing Chinese imports at 1990 levels (H & I) is
to reduce the quantity of, and expenditure on, subsidised exports, and to reduce the EC
10 Recall that simply reducing the EEP has no effect on the position of the EC.
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budget relative to scenarios E & G. However, this is not sufficient to allow the EC to meet
the UR commitments by 2000.
Table 6 8
The Effects of Policy Changes on the EC: Scenarios H to K(a)
l! I K
Ull
Export Subsidies
Total Expenditure 452.85 452.85 323.28 323.28
(444.22-461.47) (444.22-461.47) (317.17-329.39) (317.17-329.39)
Quantity 18962.00 18962.00 13216.26 13216.26
(18470.66-18900.62) (18470.66-18900.62) (12981.75-13450.77) 02981.75-13450.77)
Budgetary Cost 3862.77 3862.77 3411.54 3411.54
(3849.22-3876.32) (3849.22-3876.32) (3403.68-3419.40) (3403.68-3419.40)
llM
Export Subsidies
Total Expenditure 546.02 546.02 329.08 329.08
(540.57 -551.46) (540.57 -551.46) (323.25-334.91 ) (323.25-334.91)
Quantity 21992.97 21992.97 13225.01 13225.01·
(21773.68-22212.26) (21773.68-22212.26) (13020.03-13489.99) (13020.03-13489.99)
Budgetary Cost 2124.16 718.28 1735.26 499.54
(2117.73-2130.59) (712.00-724.56) (1729.43-1741.09) (493.84-505.24)
~
95% confidence interval in parentheses.
(a) Scenario H is a combination of A and E, I a combination of A and F, J a combination of B and E~and K a
combination of B and F.
On the other hand, the policy changes are sufficient when coupled with constant Chinese
import demand and CIS self-sufficiency; in scenarios J and K the EC is now able to fulfil
all of its UR commitment (recall that the only difficulty in scenario B was with the quantity
of subsidised exports, but this target is now surpassed). In addition, if the compensatory
payments are reduced to zero (scenario K), budgetary contributions are below average
1986-88 levels. It would seem, therefore, that given the assumptions made about exchange
rates and inflation, CIS self-sufficiency would ensure that the EC is able to fulfil all the its
UR commitments with relatively modest changes to the present policies in 1995.
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6.3.3 Exchange Rate Considerations
The conclusion from the previous section would appear to suggest that the EC will find it
easier to comply with the UR agreement if conditions over which it has no control are
favourable. However, it must be remembered that these results are based on views of the
inflation rate and the US$IECU exchange rate which may be too optimistic or pessimistic.
The question then remains, is there an exchange rate which will allow the EC to meet the
UR criteria without the need to change policies or rely on the effects of excess demand
movements? The answer to this is yes. An exchange rate of 1 ECU to 0.963 US$ would
make the difference between the world price level calculated by this model and the export
price of Ee wheat exactly equal to the $24 adjustment made for the quality discrepancy (see
section 5.7). If this is the case, the unit export refund is set to zero and all wheat exported
from the EC is then 'free market' wheat, i.e. the quantity of subsidised exports from the
EC is zero. Any exchange rate below this figure would also give the same result. If the
exchange rate is 0.963, the EC can meet the UR objectives even in the base scenario with
no adjustment to policies agreed in 1992 at the 1995 review (although the budgetary
problems remain). Note that the USA would still have to reduce EEP expenditure on wheat
if it is to comply with the DR agreement
Note that an exchange rate of 0.963 is not an extreme rate; indeed in the mid-1980s the
exchange rate fell to a low of $0.675 per ECD in March 198511, and did not surpass
0.963 until mid-1986. However, the latest available figure at the time of writing was for
May 1994, a value of 1.164 (an increase after a period of relatively low exchange rates in
early 1994), which is not too different to the 1.174 assumed in this model; therefore an
analysis of the base scenario and scenarios A to K with this new exchange rate was not
performed.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter has aimed to give some insight into the two remaining questions posed in
chapter 5; namely (i) whether the commitments made in the UR in each of the three areas
specified by the agricultural agreement can be achieved simultaneously, and (ii) what policy
options do the USA and Ee have in 1995/6 when the present policies are due to be
reviewed, if they wish to remain within the terms of the agreement?
11 Eurostat (1986) 'Data for Short term Economic Analyses'. no.1.
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On the first question, the analysis showed that the Cuhna reforms have gone a long way
towards ensuring that the EC will be able to meet all of the UR criteria simultaneously, but
both the EC and the USA would have difficulty in meeting the commitment to reduce the
quantity of subsidised exports by 2000 unless they changed their policies in 199516. This
compatibility problem was solved to some extent for the EC when changes were made to
the model assumptions governing excess demand, and would be solved if the $IECU
exchange rate were to fall to 0.963.
However, the analysis did highlight that the policy choices of the USA and EC in 1995/6
are likely to be constrained by the conditions of the UR. In particular, the EC will not be
able to reduce the percentage of land required to be set-aside in the Cuhna reforms, neither
is it likely to be able to increase the intervention price; however, this analysis would
suggest that the level of compensatory payments is not constrained by the UR provisions
(although it is likely to be constrained by budgetary considerations). The USA is likely to
be less constrained than the EC but must reduce the amount of wheat exported with the aid
of the EEP if it is to meet the UR agreement; given the downward trend already apparent in
total EEP expenditure, this unlikely to be a problem for the US government. Note that the
provisions of the 1990 FACT were developed within a political framework which was
concerned with over-production and the costs of agricultural support; hence it contained
provisions to maintain the loan rate below market prices, increase the percentage of land
required to be set-aside under the Acreage Reduction Program, and a fixed Target Pricel2•
Given this policy position, it was not unexpected that the results of this simulation did not
require the USA to change any of the 1990 provisions in 1995 (excepting of course total
EEP expenditure).
12 See section 5.7 for details.
7-1
Chapter 7
Conclusions
The main aim of this thesis was to examine the GATT Uruguay Round to provide an
analysis of the progress of the agricultural negotiations from the Punta del Este Declaration
in September 1986 to the agreed programme for reductions in agricultural protectionism in
December 1993. The opening chapters gave an introduction to the domestic agricultural
support policies of the USA and Western Europe, concentrating on those for the cereals
sector, from the 1930s to the present day; a brief history of the GATT, the treatment of
agricultural trade by the contracting parties and the attempts to reform agricultural trade in
the GATT rounds prior to the UR; and an overview of the agricultural negotiations in the
UR. The empirical analysis of the study has concentrated on a detailed examination of two
significant stages in the UR; the first is the December 1990 meeting which was to have
marked the end of the UR but in the event led to an impasse on the question of agricultural
trade reform resulting in a near collapse of the whole Round. The positions of the three
major players (the EC, the USA and the Cairns Group (CG» at this time were therefore
examined in chapters 4 and 5. The second significant stage examined in this study is the
final agreement; this is analysed in chapter 6 with respect to the compatibility of the agreed
reductions in internal support, import protection and export subsidisation (in the sense that
the reductions in each of the three areas can be achieved simultaneously), and the policy
options open to the USA and EC if they are to continue to provide income support for
farmers. A summary of the results of these analyses is presented below.
7.1 Summary of Results
7.1.1 Analysis of the Autumn 1990 Proposals
An analysis of the use of Aggregate Measures of Support (AMS) in chapter 4 showed that
by the autumn of 1990 there had been some convergence between the major players on the
definition of the AMS to be used. The AMS was based on the DECD's Producer Subsidy
Equivalent (PSE), but incorporated the notion of a fixed reference price and made some
allowance for supply control, although the US and the EC methods for achieving this
allowance were still very different. However, an evaluation of the offers tabled for the EC
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cereals sector, on a comparable basis, indicated that there was still a considerable gap
between the EC and the US and CG proposals. Under the EC proposal, the costs of
supporting the EC cereal sector, as measured by the 'Adjusted PSE' (APSE), would have
been around 4.5 billion ECU higher in 1995 than under either the US or CG proposals (see
table 4.3); EC cereal farmers could thus have been receiving a 1995 'producer price' some
20 per cent higher if the EC's 1990 Uruguay Round proposals, rather than those of the
USA or CG, had been implemented. In addition, a comparison of the APSE with the PSEs
calculated by the DECD indicated that there would have been a very considerable reduction
in the proportion of farmer's receipts made up of governmental support if any of the reform
processes had been ini~iated (since internal farm support in 1995 would have been
considerably lower than 1990 levels in percentage PSE terms). However, the EC's reform
proposal would have resulted in a 1995 value some 15 percentage points above what would
have occurred if either the USA's or CG's had been implemented. Given these divergent
positions, it is perhaps understandable that the USA and CG left the negotiating table in
December 1990.
The differences in the negotiating positions are emphasised further in chapter 5 with the
analysis of the EC's contention that reductions in the AMS would lead to commensurate
reductions in border protection and export subsidisation. The analysis is carried out using
a partial equilibrium, dynamic, stochastic simulation model, covering 7 main trading areas,
for wheat. The results suggest the 1990 proposals to reduce the SMU by 30% could not
have been met using the measures introduced in the Cuhna reforms. In addition, the
reduction in the SMU which would have taken place would have led to a commensurate
reduction in import tariffs but not in export subsidisation. If the analysis is performed
using the EC policies in place at the time of the offer (i.e. the stabiliser mechanism), the
30% SMU reduction can be met; in addition this would have led to a commensurate fall in
import protection and export subsidisation. The EC's argument that separate commitments
in each of the three areas would not be needed to achieve a reduction in internal support,
border protection and export subsidisation is thus proven to have been true at the time of
the proposals. However, it would not have resulted in a reduction in trade-distorting
agricultural support of the magnitude proposed by the USA and CG. Therefore, even if it
had been accepted that the EC's contention was correct, the size of the reduction would still
have proved to be a major sticking point at the abortive 'final' meeting in December 1990.
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7.1.2 The UR Agreement
The final agreement was analysed in chapter 6 with the aim of providing answers to two
questions: (i) can the commitments made in the UR in each of the three areas specified by
the agricultural agreement be achieved simultaneously?, and (ii) what policy options do the
USA and EC have in 199516 when the present policies are due to be reviewed, if they wish
to remain within the terms of the agreement?
On the first question, the analysis showed that the Cuhna reforms have gone a long way
towards ensuring that the EC will be able to meet all of the UR criteria simultaneously, but
both the EC and the USA are likely to have difficulty in meeting the commitment to reduce
the quantity of subsidised exports by 2000 unless they change their policies in 199516.
Under a set of 'base scenario' assumptions 1 which allowed for a continuation of the
policies in place in 1993/94, "theUSA and EC would be able to meet the internal support
reduction and the import tariff condition. However, on the commitment to reduce
expenditure on export subsidies by 2000, the EC would over-shoot the target by 2
percentage points, and the USA by 146%; on the reduction in the quantity of subsidised
exports the Ee would exceed the commitment by 77% and the USA by 7%. This
compatibility problem for the EC can be solved to some extent by making changes to the
model assumptions governing excess demand, or by allowing the $IECU exchange rate to
fall to 0.963 in the base scenario. The changes to the assumptions about excess demand
are discussed later in this chapter, but the analysis of these changes underlines the
important role of the CIS in the world wheat market. The analysis of the effects of the
choice of exchange rate serves to remind the reader that the results presented here are based
on a view of the level of inflation which will be occur over the forecasting period, and of
exchange rates which are taken to be constant at mean 1993 levels for 1993 to 2000; both
of these assumptions may be too optimistic or pessimistic.
The analysis above did, however, highlight that the policy choices of the USA and EC in
199516 are likely to be constrained by the conditions of the UR. In particular, the EC will
not be able to reduce the percentage of land required to be set aside in the Cuhna reforms,
neither is it likely to be able to increase the intervention price; however, compensatory
payments did not appear to be directly constrained by the UR provisions-. Indeed, the
conclusions drawn from the analysis of policy changes were that the EC will have to make
See sections 5.7 and 6.2.1 for details of the base scenario assumptions.
2 Although indirectly they are constrained through the resulting production and consumption patterns and
their effect on the EC's budget
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very large cuts in the support it gives to farmers if it is to fulfil the UR commitment by
2000, given the base scenario assumptions made about excess demand, exchange rates and
inflation. Also, the budgetary pressures will induce the EC to reduce compensatory
payments at the review in 1995. Again changes to the assumptions governing excess
demand, or an $IECU exchange rate nearer to 0.963 in the base scenario, would mitigate
the need for policy changes, although the budgetary problems would persist without a
reduction in the level of compensatory payments.
The USA is likely to be less constrained than the EC, but must reduce the amount of wheat
exported with the aid of the EEP if it is to meet the UR agreement. Given the downward
trend already apparent in total EEP expenditure, this is unlikely to be a problem for the US
government. Note that the provisions of the 1990 FACT were developed within a political
framework which was concerned with over-production and the costs of agricultural
support; hence it contained provisions to maintain the loan rate below market prices,
increase the percentage of land required to be set aside under the Acreage Reduction
Program, and a fixed Target Price>, Given this policy position, it was not unexpected
that the results of this simulation did not require the USA to change any of the policies of
the 1990 FACT in 1995 (excepting of course total EEP expenditure).
7.2 Recol:nised Limitations and Areas for Future Research
As stated in the introduction to this study, the results and conclusions summarised above
are to a large extent dependent upon the the appropriateness of the models used to generate
them. Perhaps inevitably the answers to the questions posed in the thesis are in some way
partial, or warrant further study. Consequently, a retrospective discussion of the
limitations and potential weaknesses of the current analysis is required. In addition, some
of the limitations and weaknesses of this analysis require that further research is carried out
and the specific areas are identified in the discussion below.
The comparison of the APSE with the PSE for 1995 in chapter 4 is made using projections
for the world price of 'cereals' based on trend dollar prices for wheat, generated by an
ARIMA process, with all of the attendant problems associated with forecasts based solely
upon past values of the variable in question. As stated in chapter 4, the levels of pw thus
obtained are baseline figures for comparison. They are generated from a model dominated
3 See section 5.7 for details.
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by a downward trend and based on data from a period when the agricultural support
policies of the industrial nations affected the world market. With the reform process
initiated in December 1993 real wheat prices may fall less quickly over the reform period; a
structural simulation model would have been better equipped to assess the effects of reform
on the trend in world prices. Consequently, the PSEs calculated for 1995 may
overestimate support levels relative to the probable level in 1995. However, as the
conclusions from this analysis are dependent on a comparison of the effects of the US, CG
and EC proposals, rather than on their magnitude per se, this is not as serious a flaw as
first it seemed.
A structural simulation model is developed for the analysis in chapter 5, and the limitations
of this model must now be examined. The first of thes.e is acknowledged in chapter 6,
namely the nature of the excess demand estimations. The fact that the determination of
Chinese imports is exogenous to the model stems mainly from a lack of information about
the structure of the Chinese wheat sector, but is also influenced by the planned nature of the
economy, such that the expected responses of production, consumption and stocking
decisions to price changes do not occur. The information available when the model was
developed suggested that imports of 20 million tonnes by 2000 could be expected. The
changes to this assumed level of imports analysed in chapter 6, however, suggest that
Chinese imports do not have as significant an effect on the world market as those of the
former USSR.
The nature of the import demand function for the CIS (former USSR) was largely
determined by the results of econometric testing in chapter 5; the world market price was
not included in the formulation because it did not prove to be statistically significant. This
is perhaps unsurprising given that the USSR was for many years the recipient of large
quantities of subsidised imports and import credits from the USA and the EC. The
subsidies meant that the concept of an 'world' price was meaningless for the USSR. Also,
the import demand function is determined using historical data under the assumption that
imports by the CIS will continue to follow the same pattern as those of the former USSR.
The economic reform process now underway in the CIS makes forecasting any economic
variable for that area very difficult. Expectations of future import demand range from zero
imports by 2000 to possible exports of 8 million tonnes; the only thing that is certain is that
previous patterns are unlikely to continue.
This uncertainty is also a problem for the third importing area, the Rest of the World
7-6
Group. Import demand for this group is estimated using a trend to represent population
and income growth. However, there are two potential problems with this formulation.
The first stems from the use of the model to forecast 12 years ahead when a trend is being
used; the limitations of trends in this case are well-known to any economist. The second,
however, is potentially more serious. The ROW grouping contains the Eastern European
countries, which like the CIS, are at present undergoing a transformation of their
agricultural economies from predominantly centrally-planned to more market-oriented.
This introduces an additional element of uncertainty about the demand for imports by the
ROW group as a whole. It is widely expected that the Eastern European countries will
reform their agricultural sectors at least to the extent that significantly reduced quantities of
imports will be required+, Indeed these countries may have even become net exporters
by 2000.
The questions raised about the future direction of excess demand are especially important
given that the analysis of the changes to the excess demand assumptions in chapter 6 served
to underline the importance of the role of the CIS in the world wheat market. An avenue
for future research, therefore, would be the development of structural models for the CIS
and other Eastern European countries- in order to provide a fuller examination of the
demand side of the world wheat market. This would be a significant improvement to the
overall model, which at present concentrates on the supply side (mainly because it was
developed to analyse the positions of the USA and EC).
A second limitation of the analyses in chapters 5 and 6 is the treatment of the exogenous
variables. These are estimated using a variety of methods, and essentially result in trend
forecasts. The concerns about predicting values 12 years hence using a trend have already
been stated, but an additional weakness remains in the use of trends in the livestock sector.
The effects of policy changes due to the 1992 Cuhna reforms, or the UR settlement, on the
livestock sector are not accounted for in this model. It is possible that the reforms will
reduce livestock production (and hence livestock numbers) below what they would
otherwise have been. In this case, the model is over-estimating the feed use of wheat in the
USA, EC, Canada and the CG. Also, the derivation of the beef-cattle-equivalent livestock
series takes no account of any possible changes in the energy requirements of individual
animals as these are assumed to be constant at the average 1981-87 value for the EC and
4 See for example Agra Europe In194 no 1600 p P/2.
5 The technical problems involved in such a project, for example the availability of the relevant data, are
readily acknowledged.
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Canada, and the average 1985-90 value for the USA and CG6. On this latter point, data
unavailability means that it is not possible to update the calculations; however the former
weakness could be solved by making the livestock sector endogenous to the model, along
the lines of other multi-commodity, partial equilibrium models (e.g. those of Tyers and
Anderson or Roningen and Dixit). Given the increase in the complexity of the model
which would arise, this was not done for this study, but forms another possible area for
future research.
A final limitation of the simulationmodel used in the current study is that it calculates a net
excess supply function for the EC, making a detailed examination of the border protection
provisions of the UR settlement difficult, and any analysis of the minimum access
commitment impossible. For the USA, the model assumes that there will be no import
tariffs (as theoretically the deficiency payments policy means that consumers in the USA
should be paying the dollar world market price for their wheat even though farmers may
receive a higher price), and that minimum access requirements would be met. This latter
assumption is also made for the EC, but an attempt is made here to calculate an import tariff
(the difference between the world market and internal prices, adjusted for Community
Preference). As stated in chapter 5, several methods of accounting for the simultaneous
importing and exporting of a similar product can be used, for example the Armington
specification, or the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). These were not used in this
study for two reasons. Firstly, neither of the two provide a satisfactory solution to the
problem; the Armington specification places strict restrictions on demand which Alston et
al. (1990) found to be inappropriate in the case of wheat, and while the AIDS is a less
restrictive model of import demand, there is still a serious risk of specification bias.
Secondly, calculation of the AMSs and export subsidies afforded to farmers in the USA
and EC requires a comparison of an internal market price with a measure of the world
market price in the national currency; both of the alternative formulations suggested above
would result in a world price index rather than an estimation of a single price, making the
comparison difficult (though not impossible). Although the results of the model suggest
that the EC will have no difficulty in meeting the required import tariff reductions, recent
data on the percentage of total use? in the EC made up of imports suggest that the 5%
access commitment may be a little more difficult to achieve. Further work aimed at
adjusting the model to estimate trade flows will be needed if a full analysis of the UR
provisions is to be carried out. This will require an examination of the intra-industry trade
6 see appendix AS.7.
7 Imports as a percentage of total use in the EC have fallen steadily from an average 4.43% in 1986-88 to
2.61% in 1991.
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literature to try to identify a suitable theoretical model, and a further review of the available
data.
Although not a potential weakness or limitation of the present analysis, an interesting
improvement to the model would be to give it an 'interactive' slant. An adjustment to the
programme could be made to allow policy changes to occur in any one year, using the
information from previous years or in response to some 'crisis'; at present, policy
decisions for the whole period are made at the beginning of a run of the programme and
cannot be altered during it. This 'interactive' change to the programme would be
particularly useful given that the EC has the ability to change policy variables annually at
the price fixing exercise: The possibility of a temporary 'tweaking' of policies towards the
end of the reform period to produce the desired result by 2QOOcould then be examined.
The areas for potential research presented above by no means form an exhaustive list, but
they are the areas where further study may be most fruitful. The possible developments to
the simulation model indicated in this section would allow a deeper analysis of the effects
of the UR settlement on the policy-making processes in the EC and USA. Given that the
main aim of the agricultural negotiations in the UR was to curtail the trade-distorting farm
policies of the industrialised countries, further study into whether this was achieved by the
final agreement would seem desirable. Moreover, a more complete representation of the
world wheat market would allow for analyses of any future moves to reform agricultural
policies for this sector.
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Appendix A5.2: Data
AS.2.1: World market price
Nominal Real Deflator (a)
Year (US$/tonne) (US$/tonne)
1961 62.10 229.583 27.049
1962 62.83 232.940 26.973
1963 64.30 237.712 27.050
1964 66.14 245.207 26.973
1965 63.93 237.014 26.973
1966 59.52 216.276 27.520
1967 67.24 236.161 28.472
1968 62.46 218.781 28.549
1969 63.20 216.018 29.257
1970 53.27 174.909 30.456
1971 60.00 189.544 31.655
1972 60.00 183.548 32.689
1973 91.00 265.907 34.222
1974 177.00 449.489 39.378
1975 164.00 338.334 48.473
1976 152.00 284.592 53.410
1977 113.00 201.481 56.085
1978 116.00 194.378 59.678
1979 141.00 217.617 64.793
1980 174.00 235.109 74.008
1981 182.00 211.108 86.212
1982 171.00 180.299 94.842
1983 159.00 164.266 96.794
1984 154.00 157.099 98.027
1985 148.00 147.362 100.433
1986 128.00 128.000 100.000
1987 119.83 116.792 102.601
1988 132.67 124.430 106.622
1989 160.58 143.915 111.580
1990 118.30 102.721 115.167
(a) USA wholesale price index, 1986=100
AS.2.2 Canada
PrQdu~liQn CQDsymJ;!tiQD
~
Area Yield Production Feed Use Non-Feed Use Total yearend
Year ('000 ha) (tonneslha) ('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes)
1967 12190 1.32 16137 1789 2788 4577 18112
1968 11907 1.49 17686 1561 2730 4291 23183
1969 10104 1.84 18623 2671 2253 4924 27452
1970 5052 1.79 9022 1880 2768 4648 19980
1971 7854 1.83 14412 2210 2586 4796 15888
1972 8640 1.68 14514 2087 2676 4763 9944
1973 9430 1.75 16460 1918 2683 4601 10089
1974 8934 1.49 13304 1688 2919 4607 8038
1975 9474 1.80 17081 1061 3791 4852 8220
1976 11252 2.10 23587 1990 2848 4838 13318
1977 10114 1.96 19862 2086 2939 5025 12115
1978 10584 2.00 21145 2347 2918 5265 14909
1979 10488 1.64 17184 2445 3040 5485 10721
1980 11098 1.73 17158 2118 3062 5180 8510
1981 12427 2.00 24802 2019 3149 5168 9713
1982 12533 2.13 26737 1825 3273 5098 9973
1983 13697 1.94 26505 2295 3238 5533 9190
1984 13158 1.61 21199 1992 3257 5249 7598
1985 13729 1.77 24252 2062 3537 5599 8568
1986 14239 2.20 31378 3090 3340 6430 12728
1987 13486 1.93 25992 4510 3390 7900 7325
1988 12987 1.23 15993 2330 3530 5860 5052
1989 13627 1.80 24575 2100 3650 5750 6517
~ (Can$/tonne unless otherwise stated) Exchange Constructed expectec
Basic Market (nominal) Constructed wheat price (b rate wheat prices (c)
Year support Wheat (a) Barley Nominal Real $US/l$can. Nominal Real
1967 55.11 79.46 57.41 62.22 218.55 1.0806 nla nla
1968 71.64 81.08 52.82 58.22 203.93 1.0728 nla nla
1969 71.64 74.27 45.93 58.91 201.36 1.0728 nla nla
1970 55.11 72.40 50.52 52.68 172.97 1.0112 56.60 192.75
1971 55.11 61.60 51.44 59.87 189.13 1.0022 52.68 172.97
1972 53.64 96.02 68.89 60.27 184.36 0.9956 57.60 182.15
1973 64.66 205.21 113.90 91.38 267.03 0.9958 60.27 184.36
1974 137.78 193.00 109.00 178.57 453.48 0.9912 91.38 267.03
1975 137.78 172.00 124.00 161.35 332.88 1.0164 143.77 351.13
1976 110.22 124.00 92.00 150.61 282.00 1.0092 161.35 332.88
1977 110.22 123.00 97.00 103.25 184.10 1.0944 138.41 266.32
1978 100.23 154.00 76.00 97.81 163.89 1.1860 103.25 184.10
1979 156.16 202.00 99.00 120.71 186.30 1.1681 97.81 163.89
1980 196.58 226.00 131.00 145.64 196.79 1.1947 120.71 182.33
1981 174.50 235.00 138.00 153.47 178.02 1.1859 139.94 187.04
1982 174.50 205.00 112.00 139.09 146.66 1.2294 146.07 173.82
1983 170.00 208.00 113.00 129.86 134.16 1.2244 139.09 146.66
1984 170.00 214.00 132.00 116.54 118.89 1.3214 128.50 133.24
1985 160.00 238.00 122.00 105.90 105.45 1.3975 116.54 118.89
1986 130.00 221.00 92.00 92.72 92.72 1.3805 105.06 105.45
1987 110.00 177.00 74.00 92.19 89.85 1.2998 92.72 92.72
1988 150.00 221.00 101.00 111.24 104.33 1.1927 92.19 89.85
1989 155.00 238.00 113.00 138.69 124.30 1.1578 111.24 104.33
(a) In store Thunder Bay, 1967-70 CW Amber Durum; 1971-73, West Red
Spring, 14% protein; 1973-89, 13.5% protein.
(b) World market price in US dollars (nominal or real as applicable)
multiplied by the US-Canadian dollar exchange rate.
(c) Minimum of the price last year or the average price of the last 3 years
nla not available
AS.2.3 Cairns Group
(note: The data for the CG as a whole are presented in the first table with the
following tables giving data for the individual countries)
Table AS.2.3.1: Total Cairns Group
f[QgJJ~tiQn CQDSJJml!tiQD S1QW Market Price
Area Yield Production Feed Use Non-Feed Use Total yearend maize
Year ('000 ha) (tonnes/ha) ('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes ('000 tonnes) (US$/tonne)
1960 11419 1.26 14339 1036 10522 11558 2141 nJa
1961 13303 1.23 16396 1513 11680 13193 1553 nJa
1962 13186 1.37 18101 920 12607 13527 1929 nJa
1963 14855 1.43 21225 974 12478 13452 3791 nJa
1964 16244 1.58 25722 2044 11981 14025 5092 nJa
1965 14579 1.23 17864 1616 13055 14671 2000 nJa
1966 16426 1.45 23743 1630 13940 15570 3836 nJa
1967 17669 1.14 20123 2351 14749 17100 4049 48.00
1968 20256 1.33 26851 2357 14191 16548 9919 51.00
1969 18771 1.30 24311 2113 15790 17903 9597 56.00
1970 14574 1.33 19339 2358 15044 17402 5374 61.00
1971 16205 1.38 22334 2571 16852 19423 2836 53.00
1972 16448 1.20 19803 2661 16569 19230 1371 85.00
1973 16988 1.55 26408 2959 17491 20450 3935 123.00
1974 17473 1.52 26642 3134 17803 20937 3378 128.00
1975 19283 1.46 28232 3525 17878 21403 4429 119.00
1976 21587 1.53 32933 4508 17744 22252 5365 113.00
1977 19379 1.25 24213 4058 19209 23267 3242 95.00
1978 19958 1.80 35953 4090 20019 24109 6821 101.00
1979 21965 1.49 32713 3408 19724 23132 6570 115.00
1980 21559 1.35 29097 4646 20784 25430 4334 126.00
1981 21777 1.51 32981 3709 19185 22894 7531 131.00
1982 23748 1.38 32857 5186 21156 26342 4757 110.00
1983 23899 1.86 44489 3780 21796 25576 10330 136.00
1984 21986 1.96 43025 4321 . 20773 25094 10859 136.00
1985 22056 1.71 37748 3704 21051 24755 7575 112.00
1986 22332 1.75 39003 3770 22403 26173 6150 88.00
1987 19497 1.82 35472 4299 22576 26875 5970 76.00
1988 19160 1.97 37669 4538 22896 27434 4628 107.00
1989 19944 1.94 38789 3565 24010 27575 4387 111.00
1990 21074 1.87 39304 3555 25170 28725 5399 109.00
AS.2.3.2: Production
('000 tonnes) New
Year Australia Argentina Brazil Chile Columbia Hungary Zealand Uruguay
1960 7450 3960 350 nJa 145 1768 253 413
1961 6727 5725 250 1031 142 1936 213 372
1962 8353 5700 256 970 162 1959 249 452
1963 8925 8940 100 1136 90 1523 274 237
1964 10037 11260 226 1159 85 2059 250 646
1965 7067 6079 222 1116 110 2358 292 620
1966 12699 6247 299 1346 125 2350 348 329
1967 7547 7320 365 1203 80 3022 442 144
1968 14804 5740 694 1220 105 3361 457 470
1969 10546 7020 1146 1214 72 3579 287 447
1970 7890 4920 1735 1307 55 2718 326 388
1971 8606 5680 2034 1368 45 3915 384 302
1972 6590 6900 694 900 68 4089 376 186
1973 11987 6560 2031 747 73 4498 215 297
1974 11357 5970 2858 734 49 4968 180 526
1975 11982 8570 1788 1003 40 4005 388 456
1976 11800 11000 3216 866 49 5143 354 505
.
1977 9370 5700 2066 1219 41 5315 329 173
1978 18090 8100 2691 893 37 5673 295 174
1979 16188 8100 2879 995 42 3703 306 500
1980 10856 7780 2676 966 46 6077 326 370
1981 16360 8300 2217 686 62 4614 292 450
1982 8876 15000 1849 586 74 5751 301 420
1983 22016 12750 2100 850 78 5968 308 419
1984 18666 13200 1900 1150 79 7367 314 349
1985 16167 8500 4300 1600 59 6578 298 246
1986 16119 8930 5600 1874 76 5793 379 232
1987 12369 8800 6100 1734 77 5748 336 308
1988 14054 8400 5800 1760 62 6975 228 390
1989 14121 10150 5550 1700 84 6509 205 470
1990 15500 11500 4000 1390 85 6159 200 470
Note: No data were available for the other countries; however, the countries here are the largest producers
AS.2.3.3: Area
('000 ha) New
Year Australia Argentina Brazil Chile Columbia Hungary Zealand Uruguay
1960 5439 3599 565 nJa 166 1051 76 523
1961 5958 4421 470 769 160 1014 75 436
1962 6665 3745 270 769 150 1095 92 400
1963 6668 5676 205 751 113 ·1005 83 354
1964 7252 6135 260 748 100 1148 74 527
1965 7088 4601 290 727 120 1125 81 547
1966 8427 5214 350 780 110 1072 93 380
1967 9082 5812 480 718 68 1160 127 222
1968 10846 5837 790 700 90 1328 130 535
1969 9486 5191 1407 743 65 1321 108 450
1970 6479 3701 1895 740 50 1274 98 337
1971 7138 4315 2261 727 44 1273 107 340
1972 7604 4965 1500 712 57 1317 108 185
1973 8948 3958 1839 534 56 1294 67 292
1974 8308 4233 2471 591 37 1324 58 451
1975 8555 5270 2931 686 30 1251 104 456
1976 8956 6428 3540 698 36 1325 96 508
1977 9955 3910 3153 628 34 1311 91 297
1978 10249 4685 2812 580 29 1324 87 192
1979 11153 4787 3832 561 31 1135 86 380
1980 11283 5023 3062 546 38 1276 81 250
1981 11885 5926 1922 432 39 1151 72 350
1982 11520 7320 2828 359 45 1310 71 295
1983 12931 6880 1900 471 46 1355 63 253
1984 12078 5950 1750 510 42 1361 69 226
1985 11736 5270 2800 570 43 1358 67 212
1986 11135 4982 3900 677 44 1318 91 185
1987 9063 4789 3475 577 42 1301 83 167
1988 8927 4700 3450 540 39 1281 53 170
1989 8936 5450 3355 578 48 1242 55 280
1990 10000 6000 3000 480 49 1221 44 280
Note: Yield for the CG was calculated as total CG production divided by total CG area .:
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AS.2.4: European Community '12'
(Note: Data for the EC'12' are presented in table AS.2.4.I, while the derivation of this data is
shown in table AS.2.4.2-AS.2.4.S)
AS.2.4.1 EC'12' Data
ProQY~liQn C~m:mml2tiQn S!Qili
Area Yield Production Feed Use Non-Feed Use Total kntervention Private
Year ('000 hal (tonneslha) ('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes)
1974 15773 3.33 52569 13819.75 30625.25 44445.00 2058 7123
1975 14518 3.11 45124 14610.46 30908.85 45519.31 1879 4840
1976 15473 3.02 46776 10897.10 32270.98 43168.08 1243 4642
1977 13976 3.18 44395 11332.27 31416.27 42748.54 611 4410
1978 15109 3.66 55364 12433.01 32554.04 44987.05 1159 6485
1979 14898 3.77 56199 13708.30 32907.39 46615.69 1768 6450
1980 15704 3.93 61718 14340.33 32500.17 46840.49 2746 5509
1981 15673 3.70 58051 13171.00 31790.00 44961.00 2172 5146
1982 16019 4.04 64750 14191.00 30684.00 44875.00 5769 5062
1983 16119 3.97 63989 15612:00 30596.00 46208.00 3956 4624
1984 16178 5.10 82484 21324.00 31545.00 52869.00 5190 10735
1985 15312 4.65 71201 22597.00 31701.00 54298.00 11079 7021
1986 15707 4.59 72138 23637.00 31552.00 55189.00 8936 7064
1987 15860 4.51 71588 21329.00 31888.00 53217.00 5748 9752
1988 15525 4.84 75097 21362.00 31914.00 53276.00 3367 9233
1989 16246 4.87 79183 21250.00 31256.00 52506.00 6417 7683
1990 15748 5.09 80101 10103 6597
AS.2.4.2 Prices
As an Eemarket price does not exist per se, a proxy was calculated using a production
weighted average of the prices of the 3 largest producers - France, Germany & the UK. Rea:
prices are calculated by deflating the country price before computing the weighted average.
1. Market prices
Wheat
Market price (a) Weights - production Weighted Average Price
(EeUIl OOkg) ('000 tonnes) (ecult)
Year France Germany UK France Germany UK Nominal Real
1974 10.30 12.86 12.06 18549 7761 6126 112.449 394.881
1975 11.19 14.03 10.12 14229 7014 4438 117.808 338.375
1976 12.92 16.62 11.65 15599 6702 4773 136.120 343.146
1977 13.30 17.23 . 12.85 17177 7126 5229 141.686 322.811
1978 13.87 18.00 13.15 20663 8118 6612 146.828 304.702
1979 14.16 18.21 14.99 19202 8061 7169 152.810 291.492
1980 14.96 18.54 16.76 23357 8156 8470 160.716 279.252
1981 16.17 19.09 19.89 22363 8313 8707 176.088 266.191
1982 17.03 20.85 20.41 24987 8630 10317 185.741 248.568
1983 17.42 21.84 21.55 24397 8993 10802 193.290 232.720
1984 16.67 20.98 19.28 32391 10197 14957 181.121 203.074
1985 16.31 18.89 18.98 28091 9779 12022 174.591 183.857
1986 17.09 19.25 16.48 25541 10286 13845 173.673 173.673
1987 16.15 19.12 15.78 25830 9821 11917 166.705 161.960
1988 15.10 17.52 16.09 28557 11856 11726 158.729 149.825
1989 15.55 16.88 16.16 30441 10966 14008 159.674 144.620
1990 14.57 16.29 15.84 31504 11006 13865 152.181 132.769
(a) Soft Wheat selling price
Barley
Market price Weights - production Weighted Average Price
(ECU/lOO KG) ('000 tonnes) (ecult)
Year France Germany UK France Germany UK Nominal Real
1974 9.95 11.96 11.53 9972 7048 9126 110.433 499.149
1975 10.23 12.88 10.11 9336 6971 8513 109.331 412.018
1976 11.83 15.30 11.97 8319 6487 7793 128.743 388.287
1977 11.84 15.78 12.10 10290 7548 10784 129.770 336.928
1978 11.88 15.90 12.02 11321 8608 9837 130.888 295.870
1979 12.83 16.44 14.20 11196 8185 9631 143.033 294.043
1980 13.24 16.46 15.67 11692 8626 10320 149.651 268.377
1981 14.13 16.74 18.44 10231 8687 10227 164.203 248.112
1982 15.22 18.72 19.84 10036 9460 10956 179.695 238.403
1983 15.95 19.67 20.49 8773 8944 9980 187.872 224.994
1984 15.99 20.04 19.05 11511 10284 11067 182.879 205.718
1985 15.32 17.90 18.10 11442 9691 9740 170.069 180.160
1986 15.39 17.53 16.13 10120 9377 10010 163.211 163.211
1987 13.85 17.37 15.43 10400 8571 9226 154.369 148.479
1988 13.11 16.10 16.09 10086 9587 8765 150.365 138.586
1989 13.45 15.27 16.58 9872 9717 8070 150.026 131.810
1990 12.99 14.83 15.68 10002 9195 7895 143.984 120.492
2. Producer Price- Wheat
National Currency Weighted Average Price
per lOOkg ECUltonne (ecult)
Year France Germany UK France Germany UK Nominal Real
1974 59.590 42.600 5.982 103.926 138.155 100.033 111.381 382.171
1975 65.420 47.200 5.575 122.988 154.785 99.548 127.622 364.083
1976 71.370 51.700 7.224 133.529 183.626 116.220 142.879 .356.803
1977 74.570 49.100 8.334 133.016 185.402 127.490 144.678 326.930
1978 79.590 48.750 8.564 138.663 190.720 128.993 148.797 307.046
1979 82.530 48.900 9.592 141.573 194.751 148.393 155.443 294.841
1980 87.820 49.400 9.886 149.634 195.706 165.182 162.326 281.131
1981 98.530 47.600 10.891 163.132 189.347 196.905 176.132 266.518
1982 109.250 49.340 11.404 169.875 207.660 203.479 185.188 247.842
1983 117.590 48.800 12.366 173.672 214.931 210.661 191.109 230.201
1984 114.310 44.820 11.165 166.349 200.259 189.035 178.254 199.985
1985 110.470 41.200 11.294 162.575 185.060 191.755 174.014 183.272
1986 115.520 41.700 11.118 169.887 195.940 165.560 174.076 174.076
1987 110.680 38.530 11.194 159.910 185.938 158.436 164.914 160.199
1988 106.240 36.230 10.512 151.064 174.485 157.710 157.884 149.044
1989 109.200 35.250 10.463 155.440 169.642 157.232 158.704 143.794
1990 100.740 32.510 10.977 145.704 158.431 153.761 150.170 131.033
3. Intervention Price - Wheat
U/A ECU per tonne (a)
Year per tonne Nominal Real (b)
1974 115.53 139.66 403.29
1975 159.93 193.34 494.17
1976 131.00 158.37 356.50
1977 120.06 145.14 298.02
1978 121.57 146.97 276.74
1979 149.17 263.10
1980 155.88 250.07
1981 165.23 234.67
1982 179.27 229.19
1983 184.58 216.28
1984 182.73 201.62
1985 179.44 187.90
1986 172.58 172.58
1987 173.72 168.99
1988 179.44 169.27
1989 174.06 157.74
1990 168.55 146.79
(a) UtA - ECU exchange rate: 1.2089
(b) Deflated using the average price index
5. Price Deflator
4. Commercial Exchange Rate
(nlc per ECU)
Year France Germany UK
1974 5.7339 3.0835 0.5980
1975 5.3192 3.0494 0.5600
1976 5.3449 2.8155 0.6216
1977 5.6061 2.6483 0.6537
1978 5.7398 2.5561 0.6639
1979 5.8295 2.5109 0.6464
1980 5.8690 2.5242 0.5985
1981 6.0399 2.5139 0.5531
1982 6.4312 2.3760 0.5605
1983 6.7708 2.2705 0.5870
1984 6.8717 2.2381 0.5906
1985 6.7950 2.2263 0.5890
1986. 6.7998 2.1282 0.6715
1987 6.9214 2.0722 0.7065
1988 7.0328 2.0764 0.6665
1989 7.0252 2.0779 0.6655
1990 6.9140 2.0520 0.7139
Average
Annual % change Index - 1986=100 Index
Year France Germany UK France Gemiany UK 1986=100
1974 15.10 7.50 17.10 25.43 57.75 20.72 34.631
1975 12.10 6.10 23.60 29.95 62.43 24.99 39.124
1976 10.00 4.20 15.80 34.07 66.49 32.71 44.423
1977 9.60 3.40 14.80 37.86 69.40 38.84 48.702
1978 9.00 2.80 9.10 41.88 71.85 45.59 53.106
1979 10.90 4.30 13.70 46.02 73.92 50.16 56.698
1980 13.50 5.90 16.30 51.65 77.24 58.12 62.336
1981 13.40 6.20 11.20 59.71 82.08 69.44 70.410
1982 11.80 5.10 8.70 68.95 87.51 78.20 78.217
1983 9.70 3.30 4.80 78.18 92.21 85.65 85.344
1984 7.90 2.60 4.90 86.57 95.35 89.96 90.631
1985 6.00 2.10 5.40 94.00 97.90 94.60 95.500
1986 2.90 -0.30 4.40 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.000
1987 3.30 0.80 4.30 103.30 100.80 104.30 102.800
1988 2.90 1.40 5.00 106.30 102.21 109.52 106.007
1989 3.60 3.00 5.60 110.12 105.28 115.65 110.349
1990 3.30 2.70 6.00 113.76 108.12 122.59 114.821
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A5.2.6: Other Areas
Imports ('000 tonnes) Exports ('000 tonnes)
Year USSR Other East. China R.O.W. USSR Other East. China R.O.W.
1960 585 4689 1949 18503 5020 537 2 629
1961 239 5060 4893 19370 5338 352 122 925
1962 242 6037 4892 19822 5744 320 89 1059
1963 9746 6437 5208 21466 2655 253 113 1183
1964 2222 6009 5032 23830 2197 299 115 1675
1965 8549 5914 6282 25558 2631 994 4 1366
1966 3082 4592 5025 31297 4387 1654 30 822
1967 1508 4624 4156 28730 5294 1936 13 1053
1968 215 3976 3537 25104 5829 1784 1 905
1969 1147 3665 5125 27021 6441 995 1 1040
1970 484 6859 3661 29466 7203 505 3 626
1971 3525 5053 2968 30687 5828 907 5 496
1972 15590 4931 5290 30245 1300 824 5 2917
1973 4508 5194 5645 35377 5000 997 5 1119
1974 2500 4038 5746 38748 4000 827 5 1506
1975 10100 5099 2200 39795 500 1038 0 1170
1976 4600 5965 3158 37298 1000 1744 0 1601
1977 6649 4887 8600 39779 1000 1666 0 3179
1978 5142 4707 . 8047 40556 1500 1489 0 3812
1979 12125 6165 8865 43652 500 814 0 2036
1980 16000 5875 13789 43865 500 1219 0 1762
1981 20300 6601 13200 47029 500 972 0 1363
1982 20800 4573 13000 45234 500 1370 0 2469
1983 20500 3757 9600 55488 500 955 0 2820
1984 28100 2528 7400 55754 500 1586 0 2681
1985 15700 3423 6600 50335 500 714 0 2438
1986 16000 3744 8500 53192 500 632 0 3512
1987 21500 3335 15000 57717 500 788 0 4664
1988 15500 2612 15500 57906 500 1729 0 6648
1989 14000 2050 13000 59890 500 1600 0 4339
1990 14000 1300 12500 57393 1000 2300 0 5380
Erodu~tiQn Area
('000 tonnes) ('000 ha) Other
Year USSR Other East. R.O.W. USSR East.
1960 64299 14735 37082 60393 8674
1961 66483 14788 37134 63000 8794
1962 70778 15454 41370 67411 9049
1963 49688 16008 40227 64609 9001
1964 74399 15988 39061 67887 9274
1965 59686 19567 42971 70205 8862
1966 100499 20338 38639 69958 9165
1967 77419 22457 44626 67026 9173
1968 93393 22038 53590 67231 9426
1969 79917 21962 53737 66426 9530
1970 99734 20322 55469 65230 8977
1971 98760 26348 61324 64035 9389
1972 85993 26572 67189 58492 9462
1973 109784 27133 61113 63155 9041
1974 83913 29262 60936 59676 9318
1975 66224 24705 68578 61985 8745
1976 96882 29871 78560 59467 9071
1977 92161 29268 74079 62030 8806
1978 120820 30238 78020 62898 8913
1979 90200 23922 83936 57682 8124
1980 98182 28525 83178 61475 8441
1981 81100 25977 88165 59232 7893
1982 84300 28942 92504 57278 8083
1983 77500 29462 96103 50800 8641
1984 68600 34692 98309 51061 8797
1985 78100 30567 101910 50265 8810
1986 92306 33365 111315 48728 9180
1987 83312 34117 105673 46684 9227
1988 84445 37785 111980 48058 9462
1989 92307 37652 114914 47676 9412
1990 108000 38233 119131 47500 9448
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Data Sources
1. lLS.A
F.A.O. (1990) Agrostat Data Base
I.M.F. (various) 'International Financial Statistics'
Harwood J.L. & Young C.E. (1989) 'Wheat: Background for 1990 Farm Legislation'
USDA ERS Staff Report no AGES 89-56
USDA Economic Research Service (various) 'Wheat Situation Outlook Report'
'Wheat Situation Outlook Yearbook'
'Agricultural Statistics'
'Agricultural Outlook', December 1985
(1990) 'PS & D View '90'
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (various) 'Statistical Abstract of the
USA'
2.E_C
Eurostat (various) 'Agricultural Situation in the Community'
'European Economy: Annual Economic Report', Statistical Annex
F.A.O. (various) 'Production Yearbook'
(1990) Agrostat Data Base
Home Grown Cereals Authority (various) 'Cereals Statisitics'
I.M.F. (various) 'International Finacial Statistics'
International Wheat Council (1992) World Grain Statisitics'
3. Other Areas
F.A.O. (various) 'Production Yearbook'
(1990) Agrostat Data Base
International Wheat Council (various) 'World Wheat Statistics'
(1992) World Grain Statisitics'
OECD (1990) Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy
Equivalents 1979-89' OECD, Paris
USDA (1990) 'PS & D View '90'
AS.3.1 Data for BASES 1M Programme
Data file 1: Unit S
3
89.81,65.318,62.05248,60.14736,119.20308,116.18132,107.97379
2.353871,20.0,20.0,22.5,27.5,27.5
22.5,256.3,927.8,1013.7
38039.739,38039.739,37068.512,35449.8,34316.701
89.432869,65.323898,60.484562,56.416586
172.58,173.72,179.44,87.834,94.375,100.0,103.425,
107.331
159.00,154.00,148.00,96.7941085,98.0271545,100.433276,100.00
102.6009,106.62188,128.0,119.83,132.67
Data file 2: Unit 6
2.52,161436.92,161221.49,162773.14,
23677.92,16375.87,98.692122,94.119064,83.46365
20883.0,21669.0,16231.62,7405.6088,7607.94788
60.0,73.0,141957.0
59.938,38.1,48.03,60.51,0.054502
4.59273,3.70327,191.1095,178.2545,174.0137,187.8716,
182.8795,170.0691,163.21107,154.36942,150.36466
7021.0,11079.0,193.2897,181.1212,174.5905,0.99842,1.1544,
1.1825
692163.04,691394.63,700545.1168,714235.88,736854.99,
744393.64,21324.0,22597.0
321.15,321.82,322.64,323.5,324.62,36686.0,71201.0
9.5273,8568.0,8.1710,8.1137,13729.0
1.224,1.3214,1.3975,1.3809,1.2998,1.1927,24252.0
1.7465073,22056.0,445011.07,451111.89,457306.83,
136.0,136.0,112.0,88.0,76.0,107.0
7575.0,47770.0
1.8943,1.7846,1.7571,48729.0,46684.0,48058.0,68600.0,
78100.0,15500.0
10.831825,-0.0039475,0.08811536,-0.0343831,0.0689261
8500.0,15000.0,15500.0
AS.3.2 Data for BASETEST Programme
Data file 1: Unit 5
5
89.81,65.318,62.05248,60.14736,56.06496,53.0712,119.20308,
116.18132,107.97379,100.0051,94.5273
2.353871,20.0,20.0,22.5,27.5,27.5,10.0,5.0
22.5,256.3,927.8,1013.7,338.8,311.8
38039.739,38039.739,37068.512,35449.8,34316.701,33305.006,
32576.585
89.432869,65.323898,60.484562,56.416586,50.25072,46.08594
172.58,173.72,179.44,174.06,168.55,87.834,94.375,100.0,103.425,
107.331,112.396,117.676
159.00,154.00,148.00,96.7941085,98.0271545,100.433276,100.00
102.6009,106.62188,111.58,115.162,128.0,119.83,132.67,160.58,
118.3
Data file 2: Unit 6
2.52,161436.92,161221.49,162773.14,163921.70,164964.35,
23677.92,16375.87,98.692122,94.119064,83.46365
20883.0,21669.0,16231.62,7405.6088,7607.94788
60.0,73.0,141957.0
59.938,38.1,48.03,60.51,53.72,50.29,0.054502
4.59273,3.70327,191.1095,178.2545,174.0137,187.8716,
182.8795,170.0691,163.21107,154.36942,150.36466,150.0263,
143.984
7021.0,11079.0,193.2897,181.1212,174.5905,0.99842,1.1544,
1.1825,1.1017,1.2734
692163.04,691394.63,700545.1168,714235.88,736854.99,
744393.64,737886.169,744681.987,21324.0,22597.0
321.15,321.82,322.64,323.5,324.62,326.06,327.78,36686.0,
71201. 0
9.5273,8568.0,8.1710,8.1137,13729.0
1.224,1.3214,1.3975,1.3809,1.2998,1.1927,1.1578,1.1603,24252.0
1.7465073,22056.0,445011.07,451111.89,457306.83,467044.205,
478559.091,136.0,136.0,112.0,88.0,76.0,107.0,111.0,109.0
7575.0,47770.0
1.8943,1.7846,1.7571,48729.0,46684.0,48058.0,47676.0,47500.0,
68600.0,78100.0,15500.0
10.831825,-0.0039475,0.08811536,-0.0343831,0.0689261,0.01853,
0.030964
8500.0,15000.0,15500.0,13000.0,12500.0
AS.4 Programme for the complete simulation model
C*******************************************************************
C VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
C*******************************************************************
C Areas - USA (US)
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
RUN
NIT
N/KOUNT
TREND
- EC'12' (Ee)
- Canada (CAN)
- Cairns Group (OG)
- CIS (EE)
- Rest of the World (ROW)
No. of years of the simulation run
No. of iterations in each year (Max. 100)
Count variables
Time trend from 0 to RUN
C The poscript ** indicates either US, EC, CAN, OG or EE
C in the following.
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
ER** exchange rate to the US$
base period yield of wheat
base period yield of a substitute product
area planted in each year
production in each year
direct/non-feed consumption of wheat
feed use of wheat
total livestock munbers, weighted beef cattle
equivalent
producer price of wheat
market price of wheat
domestic price of a substitute cereal
excess supply (net exports)
returns from the individual subroutine, used to
determine
the level of PW in each year (in ALPHA)
total stocks
production change year on year
C
C
C
C
C Policy variables
Y**
YJ**
AREA**
PROD**
CD**
CF**
LIV**
C
C
C
C
C
PFARM**
PMKT**
PJ**
ES**
* *CAL
STK**
PRODCH**
C USA
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C EC'12'
TPUS
YDP
ARP
BASE
LR
LRFOR
EEPI'OT
C
C
C
INTP
SETEC
COMPEC
target price
yield used to calculate deficiency payments
% reduction for the acreage reduction program
base area
CCC loan rate, real terms
FOR loan rate, nominal terms
total expenditure on the export enahncement program
intervention price (used as producer price post '93)
% area set aside under the CUhna type policies
compensatory payments under the CUhna reforms (per
ha)
Other variables
pw world market clearing price, nominal terms
PWDEF deflator for PW
PX1,PX2,Xl,X2 temporary arrays for storing calculated PW
IMPEE net imports by the CIS
C MAIN PROGRAMME
production in the CIS
area planted in the CIS
yield in the CIS
imports by the 'rest of the world' group
imports by China
mean of the variable specified
standard deviation of the variable specified
skewness of the variable specified
kurtosis of the variable specified
C*******************************************************************
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
PRODEE
AREAEE
YEE
IMPROW
IMPCHIN
ME**
SO**
SK**
KU**
C*******************************************************************
PROGRAM WHTSIM
INTEGER N,TREND,I,RUN,R,IFAIL,D86,D88,D87,D89,D90,
* D89PLUS,K,NIT
EXTERNAL G05CCF, G05DDF
REAL YUS, YEC, YCG, YEE, YJEC,AREACANB, YCAN, PCAN, PCANR,
* AREACG,AREAEE,PROPUS,IMPROWB,PRODEE,PX1,PX2,EREC,ERCAN,
* PTEMP,LIVUS,LIVEC,LrvCG,PFARMUS,PFARMEC,PJEC,PJCG,PJUS,
* USCAL,ECCAL,CANCAL,CGCAL,ESUS,ESEC,ESCAN,EPW,STKCAN,
* PW,STKCG,PRIVUS, PRIVEC, FOR, CDUS, PROPCG,EPEC,EPECT,
* PRODCHCAN,CCC,INT,TPUS,YDP,ARP,BASE,LR,POPEC,TOTGRCG,
* LRFOR,EEPTOT,INTP,TOTGRUS,PWTEST,PRODCHROW,LNIMPROW,
* CFCG, LNCDCAN, PT,DEFPW, crus, PWTEMP, SETUS,
* PMKTEC,IMPEE,IMPROW,IMPCHIN,ALPHA,GAMMA,BETA,PHI,DELTA,
* XREF,XBILL,DP,X1,X2,PRODEC,CONSEC,PRODUS,CONSUS,AREAUS,
* PRODCAN,PRODCG,CONSCAN,CONSCG,DEFEC,CFEC,CDEC
REAL LRFORB, AR,EANUS,LNCDUS, EPWT, LNAREACAN, MTAREC
DIMENSION PRODUS(15,200),PRODEC(15,200),PRODCAN(15,200),
* AREAUS(15) ,AREAEC(15) ,AREACAN(16) ,AREACG(16) ,CONSUS (15,200) ,
* CONSCG(15),CDUS(17),CDEC(16),CDCG(15),CFEC(17),ERCAN(18),
* STKUS(15,200),STKEC(15,200),STKCAN(15,200),PRIVUS(15,200),
* STKCG(15,200),CCC(16),INT(15,200),D89(15),PRIVEC(15,200),
* FOR(15,200),ESUS(15,200),ESEC(15,200),ESCAN(15,200),D86(15),
* CGCAL(15,200),PRODEE(15,200),IMPEE(15,200),IMPCHIN(15),
* PW(15,200),PFARMUS(15,200),DEFPW(18),PFARMEC(15,200),
* PMKTEC(15,200),INTP(15),DEFEC(17),EREC(15),PCANR(15,200),
* ARP(17),BASE(17),LRFOR(16),LIVUS(15),LIVEC(18),D88(15),
* LIVCG(15),SET(17),EEPTOT(16),PRODCHCAN(15,200),YUS(15,200),
* TOTGRCG(16),PROPUS(15,200),TOTGRUS(16),REALPW(15,200),
* CONSEC (15),CONSCAN (15),CDCAN (15),POPEC (17),LNCDCAN (17)
DIMENSION PJUS(16),X1(2),X2(2),LNCDUS(16),D90(15),PJCG(18),
* LNIMPROW(15,200),AREAEE(15),D89PLUS(15),
* PRODCG(15,200),IMPROW(15,200),PCAN(15,200),D87(15),LR(16),
. * PRODCHROW(15,200),COMPEC(15),SETEC(15),TPUS(15),PT(17),
* CFCG(15),cruS(15,200),PJEC(18),USCAL(15,200),ECCAL(15,200),
* CANCAL(15,200),MTAREC(15,200),XBILL(15,200),XREF(15,200),
* AMSUS(15,200),AMSEC(15,200)
REAL MEPRODUS,MEPRODEC,MEPRODCAN,MEPRODCG,MEAREAUS,
* MEAREACAN,MEAREACG,MECONSUS,MECONSEC,MECONSCAN,
* MECONSCG, MECDEC, MECDCAN, MECDCG, MECFUS, MECFEC,
* MECFCG, MESTKUS, MESTKEC, MESTKCAN, MESTKCG, MEPRIVEC,
* MEPRIVUS, MEece, MEINT, MEFOR, MEESUS, MEESEC, MEESCAN,
* MEESCG, MEPRODEE, MEIMPEE, MEIMPROW, MEIMPCHIN, MEPW,
* MEREALPW, MEAREAEC, MECDUS, MEYUS, MEPFARMUS,
* MEPROPUS,MEPFARMEC,MEPCAN,MEPCANR,MEPMKTEC,
* MELNIMPROW, MEPRODCHROW, MEXREF, MEXBILL, MEAMSEC,
* MEAMSUS, MEMTAREC, MEANPW, MEANSTKCAN, MEANSTKCG,
* MEANPRIWS, MEANPRIVEC, MEANFOR, MEANINT,
* MEANIMPEE, MEANIMPROW
REAL SDSTKUS,SDSTKEC,SDSTKCAN,SDSTKCG,SDPRIVEC,
* SDPRIWS,SDCCC,SDINT,SDFOR,SDESUS,SDESEC,SDESCAN,
* SDESOG,SDIMPEE,SDIMPROW,SDIMPCHIN,SDPW,
* SDREALPW,SDXBILL,SDXREF,SDAMSEC,SDAMSUS,SDMTAREC
REAL SKSTKUS, SKSTKEC, SKSTKCAN, SKSTKCG, SKPRIVEC,
* SKPRIWS,SKCCC,SKINT,SKFOR,SKESUS,SESEC,SKESCAN,
* SKESCG, SKIMPEE, SKIMPROW, SKIMPCHIN, SKPW,
* SKREALPW, SKXREF, SKXBILL, SKAMSEC, SKAMSUS, SKMTAREC
REAL KUSTKUS, KUSTKEC, KUSTKCAN, KUSTKCG, KUPRIVEC,
* KUPRIWS,KUCCC,KUINT,KUFOR,KUESUS,KUESEC,KUESCAN,
* KUESCG, KUIMPEE, KUIMPROW, KUIMPCHIN, KUPW,
* KUREALPW, KUXREF, KUXBILL, KUAMSEC, KUAMSUS, KUMl'AREC
DIMENSION MEPRODUS(15),MEPRODEC(16),MEPRODCAN(16),
* MEAREACAN (15),MEAREACG (15),MECONSUS (15) ,MECONSEC (15),
* MECONSCG(15) ,MECDEC(16) ,MECDCAN(15) ,MECDCG(15) ,
* MESTKEC(15),MESTKCAN(16),MESTKCG(16),MEPRIVEC(16),
* MECCC(15),MEFOR(16),MEESUS(15),MEESEC(15),MEESCAN(15),
* MEESCG(15) ,MEPRODEE(17) ,MEIMPROW(16) ,MEIMPCHIN(15),
* MEREALPW (15),MEAREAEC (15),MECDUS (15),MEPFARMUS (18),
* MFAREAUS (15),MECONSCAN (15),MECFUS (15),MECFEC (17),
* MECFCG(15) ,MESTKUS(15) ,MEPRIWS(16) ,MEINT(16),
* MEPW(18),MEPRODCG(15),MEPFARMEC(18),MEPMKTEC(18),
* MEPROPUS (16),MEYUS (16),MEPCAN(18) ,MEPCANR(18) ,
* MEIMPEE(16),MELNIMPROW(16),MEPRODCHROW(16)
DIMENSION MEANPW(15) ,MEANREALPW (15),MEANPRIVEC(15),
* MEANPRIWS (15),MEANIMPEE (15),MEANSTKCAN (15),
* MEANSTKCG (15),MEANFOR (15),MEANINT (15),MEANIMPROW (15) ,
* MEXREF(15),MEXBILL(15),MEAMSEC(15),MEAMSUS(15),
* MEMTAREC (lS)
DIMENSION SDSTKEC(15),SDSTKCAN(15),SDSTKCG(15),SDFOR(15),
* SDOCC(lS),SDESUS(15),SDESEC(15),SDESCAN(15),SDPRIVEC(15),
* SDESCG(15),SDREALPW(15),SDSTKUS(15),SDPRIVUS(15),
* SDPW(15),SDINT(15),SDIMPEE(15),SDXREF(15),SDXBILL(15),
* SDMTAREC(15),SDAMSEC(15),SDAMSUS(15),SDIMPROW(15)
DIMENSION SKSTKEC(15),SKSTKCAN(15),SKSTKCG(15),SKFOR(15),
* SKCCC(15),SKESOS(15),SKESEC(15),SKESCAN(15),SKPRIVEC(15),
* SKESCG(15),SKREALPW(15),SKSTKUS(15),SKPRIVUS(15),
* SKPW (15),SKINT (15),SKIMPEE (15),SKXREF (15),SKXBILL (15),
* SKAMSUS(15),SKAMSEC(15),SKMTAREC(15),SKIMPROW(15)
DIMENSION KUSTKEC(15),KUSTKCAN(15),KUSTKCG(15),KUFOR(15),
* KUCCC(15),KUESUS(15),KUESEC(15),KUESCAN(15),KUPRIVEC(15),
* KUESCG (15),KUREALPW (15),KUSTKUS (15),KUPRIVUS (15),
* KUPW(15),KUINT(15),KUIMPEE(15),KUXBILL(15),KUXREF(15),
* KUAMSOS(15),KUAMSEC(15),KUMTAREC(lS),KUIMPROW(1S)
DATA PRODUS,PRODEC,PRODCG,PRODCAN,AREAUS,AREAEC,CONSOS,
* CONSEC,CONSCG,CDUS,CDCAN,CDQG,STKUS,STKEC,ESOS,
* CGCAL,PRODEE,IMPEE,IMPROW,IMPCHIN,INTP,ESEC,ESCAN,
* EREC,TPUS/42167*O.OI
DATA AREACAN, AREACG, CDEC, crus, CFCG, STKCAN, STKCG, CCC, INT ,
* PRIVUS,PRIVEC,FOR,ERCAN,LR,LRFOR,LIVUS,EEPTOT/21160*O.OI
DATA CFEC,DEFPW,DEFEC,ARP,BASE,SET,LIVCG,LIVEC,PT/153*O.OI
* PW,PFARMUS,PFARMEC,PCAN,PMKTEC,PCANR/18000*O.O/PRODCHCAN,
* TOTGRUS,TOTGRCG,PROPUS,YUS,PJUS,AREAEE/9063*O.OI
DATA D86,D87,D89,D90,D89PLUS,D88/90*OI
C
C*******************************************************************
C Read in Policy vars. & World Price in previous two years
C*******************************************************************
C
R=1
READ (5,*) RUN,NIT
READ(5,*) (LRFOR(M),M=1,16), (TPUS(L),L=1,15)
READ (5,*) YDP, (ARP(N) ,N=1,7)
READ(5,*) (EEPTOT(J),J=1,16)
READ(S,*) (BASE(I),I=1,7)
READ(5,*) (LR(I),I=1,6)
READ(5,*) (INTP(L),L=1,1S), (DEFEC(J),J=1,17)
READ(S,*) (MEPW(I),I=1,3),(DEFPW(K),K=1,18)
READ(5,*) (SETEC(J),J=1,15),(COMPEC(K),K=1,15)
C********************************************************************
C Read in Base Level Data
C********************************************************************
C
READ(6,*) MEYUS(l), (LIVUS(L),L=1,15),MEPRIVUS(R),CCC(R),
* (MEPFARMUS(J),J=1,3)
READ(6,*) CDUS(1),CDUS(2),MEFOR(R), (SET(L),L=1,2)
READ(6,*) (PT(J),J=1,2),TOTGRUS(1)
READ(6,*) (PJUS(K),K=1,16),MEPROPUS(1),PREFUS
READ(6,*) YEC,YJEC, (MEPFARMEC(L),L=1,3), (PJEC(K),K=1,18)
READ (6,*) MEPRIVEC (R),MEINT (R),(MEPMKTEC (J),J=l, 3) ,
* (EREC(K),K=1,15)
READ(6,*) (LIVEC(M),M=l,lS), (CFEC(L),L=1,2)
READ(6,*) (POPEC(L),L=1,17),CDEC(R),MEPRODEC(1),
* PREFEC
READ (6,*) MESTKCAN(R), (LNCDCAN(L) ,L=1,2),
* AREACAN (R)
READ(6,*) (ERCAN(K),K=l,lS),MEPRODCAN(l)
READ(6,*) YCG,AREACG(l), (LIVCG(K),K=1,15), (PJCG(J),J=l,lS)
READ(6, *) MESTKCG(l) ,TOTGRCG (1)
READ(6,*) (AREAEE(I),I=1,15), (MEPRODEE(J),J
* =1,2),MEIMPEE(1)
READ(6,*) MELNIMPROW(l), (MEPRODCHROW(K),K=1,6)
READ(6,*) (IMPCHIN(I),I=1,15)
C
C********************************************************************
C Main computations
C********************************************************************
C
IFAIL = 0
TREND=O
N=4
PWTEMP=o.o
PTEMP=O.O
DO 90 J=1,3
MEPCANR(J) = «MEPW(J) IDEFPW(J» *100) IERCAN(J)
MEPCAN(J) = MEPW(J) IERCAN(J)
90 CONl'INUE
D86(1) = 1
D88(3) = 1
D87(2) = 1
D89(4) = 1
D90(S) = 1
D89PLUS(4) = 1
D89PLUS(S) = 1
C
00 10 I=l,RUN
CALL G05CCF(123)
CALL RESET (N,TREND, EPW, lWI'EMP, PTEMP, I,EPWT, EPCAN, EPCANI',
* EPEC,EPECT)
PTEMP = (MEPW(N-3) +MEPW(N-2) +MEPW(N-1) )/3
IF(PTEMP.GT.MEPW(N-1»THEN
EPW=MEPW CN-1)
ELSE
EPW=PTEMP
ENDIF
PTEMP=O.O
PTEMP = (EPW+MEPW(N-1)+MEPW(N-2» /3
IF (PTEMP .GT • EPW) THEN
EPWT = EPW
ELSE
EPWI' = PTEMP
ENDIF
PTEMP=O.O
PTEMP = (MEPCAN(N-3)+MEPCAN(N-2)+MEPCAN(N-1»/3
IF (PTEMP.GT.MEPCAN(N-1) ) THEN
EPCAN = MEPCAN(N-1)
ELSE
EPCAN = PTEMP
ENDIF
PTEMP = 0.0
PTEMP = (EPCAN+MEPCAN(N-1)+MEPCAN(N-2»/3
IF (PTEMP.GT.EPCAN) THEN
EPCANI' = EPCAN
ELSE
EPCANI' = PTEMP
ENDIF
PI'EMP = 0.0
PTEMP = (MEPMKTEC(N-1)+MEPMKTEC(N-2)+MEPMKTEC(N-3))/3
IF (PTEMP.GT.MEPMKTEC(N-1» THEN
EPEC = MEPMKTEC(N-1)
ELSE
EPEC = PTEMP
ENDIF
PTEMP = 0.0
PTEMP = (EPEC+MEPMKTEC(N-1)+MEPMKTEC(N-2»/3
IF (PTEMP.GT.EPEC) THEN
EPECT = EPEC
ELSE
EPECT = PTEMP
ENDIF
C
CALL EESUB(I,N,NIT,TREND,AREAEE,IMPEE,PRODEE,D87,D88,
* D89PLUS,MEPRODEE,MEIMPEE)
CALL USSUB(I,N,NIT,TREND,MEPFARMUS,YUS,MEPW,TPUS,YDP,ARP,
LR,BASE,LRFOR,MEPRIVUS,LIVUS,CCC, SET, PT,PRODUS,
*
*
AREAUS,CDUS,USCAL,DEFPW,EPW,TOTGRUS,MEPROPUS,PJUS,D86,
MEFOR,D87,D88,D89,D90,MEYUS,MECONSUS)
*
CALL ECSUB(I,N,NIT,TREND,PJEC,YEC,YJEC,LIVEC,INT,
* PRIVEC,MEPMKTEC,ECCAL,PRODEC,CFEC,POPEC,DEFEC,
* CDEC,AREAEC,EPECT,D86,INTP,CONSEC,D88,D87,D90,
* MEINT,MEPRIVEC,MEPRODEC,COMPEC,SETEC)
CALL CANSUB (I,N,NIT, TREND, AREACAN, MEPCANR, EPCAN, EPCANT,
* LNCDCAN, CONSCAN, STKCAN, PRODCAN, CANCAL, CFCAN, CDCAN,
* PRODCHCAN,D86,MESTKCAN,MEPRODCAN)
CALL CGSUB(I,N,NIT,TREND,YCG,AREACG,MEPW,PJCG,STKCG,
*
LIVCG,CFCG,CDQG,CGCAL,PRODCG,CONSCG,TOTGRCG,
D86,D87,MESTKCG)*
C
DO 11 K=l,NIT
IF (I.LT.6) THEN
PRODCHROW(I,K) = MEPRODCHROW(N-2)
ELSE
C PRODCHROW(I,K) = 0.0380281
PRODCHROW(I,K) = G05DDF(O.0370281,O.05911359)
ENDIF
LNIMPROW(I,K)=(O.66417*lO.874)+(O.029752*(TREND-
* (O.33583*(TREND-l»»-(0.35548*PRODCHROW(I,K»+(
* O.1193807*MEPRODCHROW(N-3»+(O.33583*MELNIMPROW(N-3»
IMPROW(I,K) = 2.7l828l828**LNIMPROW(I,K)
GAMMA=O.O
ALPHA=O.O
BErA=O.O
PHI=O.O
DELTA=O.O
00 96 J=1,2
Xl(J) = 0.0
X2(J) =0.0
96 CONI'INUE
C
GAMMA = 0.2*EEPTOT(N-2)
ALPHA = USCAL(I,K)+ECCAL(I,K)+CANCAL(I,K)+CGCAL(I,K)
* -IMPEE(I,K)-IMPROW(I,K)-IMPCHIN(I)
BETA =(9225.6/LRFOR(N-2»+(3448.9/EPWT)-«0.03368l/PJUS(N-2»
* *«0.72994*TOTGRUS(N-3»+(0.22226*LIVUS(I»+(16100*D87(I»
* -(25373.0*D89(I»»+(26.317/ERCAN(N»
C
CALL C02AJF(BETA,ALPHA,GAMMA,Xl,X2,IFAIL)
IF( (X1(2) .NE.O) .AND. (X2(2).NE.O»THEN
WRITE (8,*) IMODEL HAS ONLY COMPLEX ROOTS I
WRITE (8,*) IGAMMA I , GAMMA, IBETA I , BErA, IALPHA I , ALPHA
GOTO 800
ELSE IF (X1(2).NE.O) THEN
PWTEMP = X2 (1)
ELSE IF (X2(2).NE.O) THEN
PWTEMP = Xl(l)
ENDIF
C
C
IF«Xl(1).LT.56.500958.0R.X1(1).GT.235.1715).AND. (X2(1)
* .LT.56.500958.0R.X2(1).GT.235.1715»THEN
CALL ENDSUB(X1,X2,I,K)
:EWI'EMP = X2 (1)
ELSE IF«X2(1).LT.56.500958.0R.X2(1).GT.235.1715).AND.
* X1(1).GT.56.500958.AND.X1(1).LT.235.l715) THEN
:EWI'EMP = X1(1)
ELSE IF«X1(1).GT.56.500958.0R.X1(1).GT.235.1715).AND.
* X2(1).GT.56.500958.AND.X2(1).LT.235.1715) THEN
:EWI'EMP = X2 (1)
ELSE
PX1 = Xl(l)
PX2 = X2 (1)
PWTEMP = X2 (1)
ENDIF
00 97 L=l,2
X1(L)=O.O
X2(L)=O.O
97 CONI'INUE
C
IF«PWTEMP*EREC(I».LT.(l.l*INI'P(I»)THEN
PW(I,K) = PWTEMP
ELSE
PHI = BETA+«3478.5/DEFEC(N-l)*EREC(I)*l.2l2795)+
* (28.693*EREC(I)*l.2l2795)+(57.86*EREC(I)*l.2l2795»
IF (I.EQ.l) THEN
DELTA = ALPHA-«34.9466+(4236.64iDEFEC(N-1»+70.1367)
* *INI'P(I»
ELSE
DELTA = ALPHA-«34.9466+(4236.64/DEFEC(N-l»+70.1367)
* *(INTP(I)/l.075l192»
ENDIF
CALL C02AJF(PHI,DELTA,GAMMA,Xl,X2, IFAIL)
IF ((Xl(2) .NE. 0) .AND. (X2(2).NE. 0) )THEN
WRITE(8,*),
WRITE (8,*) 'MODEL HAS ONLY COMPLEX ROOTS'
WRITE (8,*) 'GAMMA' , GAMMA, 'PHI',PHI, 'DELTA' ,DELTA
GOTO 800
ELSE IF (Xl(2) .NE.O) THEN
PWI'EMP = X2 (l)
ELSE IF (X2(2) .NE. 0) THEN
PWTEMP = X2 (1)
ENDIF
c
IF«X1(1).LT.56.500958.0R.X1(1).GT.235.1715).AND.(X2(1)
* .LT.56.500958.0R.X2(1).GT.235.1715»THEN
CALL ENDSUB(X1,X2,I,K)
ELSE IF( (X2(1).LT.56.500958.0R.X2 (1).GT.235.1715) .AND.
* X1(1).GT.56.500958.AND.X1(1).LT.235.1715) THEN
IW(I,K) = X1(1)
ELSE IF«X1(1).LT.56.500958.0R.X1(1).GT.235.1715).AND.
* X2(1).GT.56.500958.AND.X2(1).LT.235.1715) THEN
IW(I,K) = X2 (1)
ELSE
PX1 = X1(1)
PX2 = X2 (1)
IW(I,K) = X2(1)
C
ENDIF
ENDIF
REALPW(I,K) = (PW(I,K)/DEFPW(N»*100
C
C********************************************************************
C Using the calculated world prices, year I, iterations 1 to k,
C to calculate excess supply levels, stocks, EC export refunds,
C US deficiency payments, means for input to year t+1
C********************************************************************
C
C USA
C
IF (I.EQ.1) THEN
PFARMUS(I,K)=REALIW(I,K) *0.51
ELSE
PFARMUS (I,K)=REALPW(I,K) *0.6049
ENDIF
C
IF (I.EQ.1) THEN
PRIVUS(I,K)=8486.6+(O.35466*MEPRIVUS(N-3»-(3391.4*
* «PW(I,K) IEPWT) - (MEPW(N-1) IEPW» )
ELSE
PRIVUS(I,K)=8486.6+(0.35466*MEPRIVUS(N-3»-(3391.4*
* «PW(I,K)/EPWT)-(MEPW(N-l)/EPW»)-(7158.1*D88(I»
ENDIF
C
IF (I.NE.2) THEN
FOR(I,K) = 12423.652-(9225.6*(PW(I,K)/LRFOR(N-2»)
* +(5376.3107*(MEPW(N-l)/LRFOR(N-3»)+(0.SB276*MEFOR(N-3»
* +(4453.3*D86(I»
ELSE
FOR(I,K) = 12423.652-(9225.6*(PW(I,K)/LRFOR(N-2»)+(5376.3107
* *(MEPW(N-1)/LRFOR(N-3»)+(0.58276*(MEFOR(N-3)-4453.3»
ENDIF
C
IF (FOR(I,K).LT.O.O) FOR(I,K)=O.O
C
PROPUS(I,K) = 0.065133+(0.41974*MEPROPUS(N-3»-(0.0336B1*
* (PFARMUS(I,K)/PJUS(N-2»)+(0.046529*D86(I»
CFUS(I,K) = PROPUS(I,K)*TOTGRUS(N-2)
C
CONSUS(I,K) = CFUS(I,K)+CDUS(I)
ESUS(I,K) = PRODUS(I,K)-CONSUS(I,K)-FOR(I,K)-CCC(N-2)
* -PRIVUS (I,K)+MEFOR(N-3)+CCC (N-3)+MEPRIVUS (N-3)
C AMSUS(I,K) = (PREFUS - PFARMUS(I,K»*PRODUS(I,K)
AMSUS(I,K) =«(TPUS(I)*DEFPW(N)/100)-PREFUS)*PRODUS(I,K»
* 11000
C
C EC'12'
C
IF(PW(I,K).GT.(l.l*INTP(I)/EREC(I») THEN
PMKTEC(I,K) = (PW(I,K)*EREC(I»*1.212795
ELSE IF (I.LT.8) THEN
PMKTEC(I,K) = (INTP(I)*0.94)-5.38
ELSE
PMKTEC(I,K) = INTP(I)
ENDIF
IF (I.EQ.l) THEN
PMKTEC(I,K) = INTP(I)
ENDIF
XREF(I,K) = PMKTEC(I,K)-«PW(I,K)*EREC(I»*1.212795)
C
IF(XREF(I,K).LT.O.O) XREF(I,K)=O.O
C
ESEC(I,K) = PRODEC(I,K)-CONSEC(I)-PRIVEC(I,K)-INT(I,K)
* +MEPRIVEC (N-3)+MEINT(N-3)
PFARMEC(I,K) = PMKTEC(I,K) *1.0080354
XBILL(I,K) = XREF(I,K)*ESEC(I,K)
AMSEC(I,K) =«(INTP(I)*1.1)-PREFEC)*PRODEC(I,K»/l000
MTAREC(I,K) = XREF(I,K) *1.1
C
C Canada
C
PCAN(I,K) = PW(I,K) IERCAN(N)
PCANR(I,K) = REALPW(I,K)/ERCAN(N)
STKCAN(I,K) = 4575.9+(0.5047*MESTKCAN(N-3»+(O.28869*
* PRODCHCAN(I,K»-(26.317*(PCAN(I,K)-EPCANT»
ESCAN(I,K) = PRODCAN(I,K)-CONSCAN(I)-STKCAN(I,K)+
* MESTKCAN(N-3)
C
STKUS(I,K) = PRIVUS(I,K)+CCC(N-2)+FOR(I,K)
STKEC(I,K) = PRIVEC(I,K)+INT(I,K)
11 CONI'INUE
C
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT,PRODEC,MEPRODEC)
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT,PRODCAN,MEPRODCAN)
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT, STKCAN, MESTKCAN)
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT, STKCG, MESTKCG)
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT, PRIVUS, MEPRIVUS)
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT, PRIVEC, MEPRIVEC)
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT, FOR,MEFOR)
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT, INT,MEINT)
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT, IMPEE, MEIMPEE)
CALL MEANCAL18 (I,NIT, PW,MEPW)
CALL MEANCAL15 (I,NIT, REALPW, MEREALPW)
CALL MEANCAL18 (I,NIT, PFARMUS, MEPFARMUS)
CALL MEANCAL18 (I,NIT, PMKTEC, MEPMKTEC)
CALL MEANCAL18 (I,NIT, PCAN,MEPCAN)
CALL MEANCAL18 (I,NIT, PCANR, MEPCANR)
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT, YUS,MEYUS)
CALL MEANCAL17 (I,NIT,PRODEE,MEPRODEE)
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT, PROPUS,MEPROPUS)
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT, LNIMPROW, MELNIMPROW)
CALL MEANCAL15 (I,NIT, CONSOS, MECONSOS)
IF (I.GT.5) THEN
CALL MEANCAL16 (I,NIT,PRODCHROW,MEPRODCHROW)
ENDIF
C WRITE(8,*)'MEPRODEC',MEPRODEC(N-2)
C WRITE(8,*)'MEPRODCAN',MEPRODCAN(N-2)
C WRITE(8,*)'MESTKCAN',MESTKCAN(N-2)
C WRITE(8,*)'MESTKCG',MESTKCG(N-2)
C WRITE(8,*)'MEPRIVUS',MEPRIVUS(N-2)
C WRITE (S,*) 'MEPRIVEC' ,MEPRIVEC (N-2)
C WRITE(S,*) 'MEFOR',MEFOR(N-2)
C WRITE(S, *) 'MEINI" ,MEINT(N-2)
C WRITE(8,*) 'MEPW',MEPW(N)
C WRITE(S, *) 'MEPFARMUS' ,MEPFARMUS (N)
C WRITE (S,*) 'MEPMKTEC' ,MEPMKTEC (N)
C WRITE(S,*) 'MEPCANR',MEPCANR(N)
C WRITE(S,*) 'MEPRODEE',MEPRODEE(N-l)
C WRITE(8,*) 'MEIMPEE',MEIMPEE(N-2)
C WRITE(S,*) 'MEYUS',MEYUS(N-2)
C WRITE(8,*)'MECONSOS',MECONSOS(I)
C
10 CONI'INUE
CAlL MOMCAL (PW,RUN,NIT,MEANPW, SDPW, SKPW, KUPW)
CALL MOMCAL (REALPW,RUN,NIT, MEANREALPW, SDREALPW, SKREALPW,
* KURF.ALPW)
CALL MOMCAL(ESOS,RUN,NIT,MEESUS,SDESOS,SKESOS,KUESOS)
CALL MOMCAL(ESEC,RUN,NIT,MEESEC,SDESEC,SKESEC,KUESEC)
CALL MOMCAL (ESCAN,RUN,NIT.MEESCAN, SDESCAN, SKESCAN, KUESCAN)
CALL MOMCAL (CGCAL,RUN,NIT, MEESCG, SDESCG, SKESCG, KUESCG)
CALL MOMCAL(STKUS,RUN,NIT,MESTKUS,SDSTKUS,SKSTKUS,KUSTKUS)
CALL MOMCAL (STKEC,RUN, NIT,MESTKEC, SDSTKEC, SKSTKEC, KUSTKEC)
CALL MOMCAL (STKCAN, RUN, NIT, MEANSTKCAN, SDSTKCAN, SKSTKCAN,
* KUSTKCAN)
CALL MOMCAL(STKCG,RUN,NIT,MEANSTKOG,SDSTKOG,SKSTKCG,KUSTKCG)
CALL MOMCAL(PRIWS, RUN, NIT, MEANPRIWS, SDPRIWS, SKPRIWS,
* KUPRIWS)
CALL MOMCAL(PRIVEC, RUN, NIT, MEANPRIVEC, SDPRIVEC, SKPRIVEC,
* KUPRIVEC)
CALL MOMCAL(XREF' , RUN, NIT, MEXREF , SDXREF', SKXREF, KUXREF)
CALL MOMCAL(FOR,RUN,NIT,MEANFOR,SDFOR,SKFOR,KUFOR)
CALL MOMCAL(INI', RUN, NIT, MEANINT, SDINI', SKINI', KUINl')
CALL MOMCAL(XBILL, RUN, NIT, MEXBILL, SDXBILL, SKXBILL, KUXBILL)
CALL MOMCAL(AMSUS, RUN, NIT, MEAMSUS, SDAMSUS, SKAMSUS, KUAMSUS)
CALL MOMCAL(AMSEC, RUN, NIT, MEAMSEC, SDAMSEC, SKAMSEC, KUAMSEC)
CALL MOMCAL(MI'AREC, RUN, NIT, MEMTAREC, SDMTAREC, SKMTAREC,
* KUMl'AREC)
CALL MOMCAL(IMPEE, RUN, NIT, MEANIMPEE, SDIMPEE, SKIMPEE,
* KtJIMPEE)
CALL MOMCAL(IMPROW, RUN, NIT, MEANIMPROW,SDIMPROW, SKIMPROW,
* KtJIMPROW)
C
C********************************************************************
C Print Routine
C********************************************************************
C
C WRITE(S, *) TITLE
WRITE(S,*) ,
WRITE (8,*) 'WORLD MARKET PRICE - NOMINAL'
WRITE (8,900)
CALL WI'E (RUN, MEANPW,SDfW, SK:EW, KU:EW)
WRITE(8,*) 'EXCESS SUPPLY'
WRITE(S, *)' USA'
CALL WI'E(RUN,MEESUS,SDESUS,SKESUS,KUESUS)
WRITE(8,*) ,
WRITE(8,*)' EC12 ,
CALL WI'E (RUN, MEESEC, SDESEC, SKESEC, KUESEC)
WRITE(8,*) ,
WRITE(8,*)' CANADA'
CALL WI'E (RUN, MEESCAN, SDESCAN, SKESCAN, KUESCAN)
WRITE(8,*) ,
WRITE (8, *) 'CAIRNS GROUP'
CALL WTE (RUN, MEESCG, SDESCG, SKESCG, KUESCG)
WRITE(8, *) ,
WRITE (8, *) ,
WRITE(8,*) 'STOCKS - TOTAL'
WRITE (8, 900)
WRITE(8,*)' USA'
CALL WTE (RUN, MESTKUS, SDSTKUS, SKSTKUS, KUSTKUS)
WRlTE(8,*) ,
WRITE(8,*), EC12'
CALL WTE (RUN, MESTKEC, SDSTKEC, SKSTKEC, KUSTKEC)
WRITE(8,*) ,
WRITE (8, *)' CANADA'
CALL WTE (RUN, ME'ANSTKCAN,SDSTKCAN, SKSTKCAN, KUSTKCAN)
WRITE(8,*) ,
WRITE (8, *)' CAIRNS GROUP'
CALL WTE (RUN, ME'ANSTKCG,SDSTKCG, SKSTKCG, KUSTKCG)
WRITE(8,*) ,
WRITE (8, *) 'PRIVATE STOCKS'
WRITE(8,*)' USA'
CALL WTE (RUN, MFANPRIVUS, SDPRIVUS, SKPRIVUS, KUPRIVUS)
WRITE(8,*) ,
WRlTE(8,*)' EC12'
CALL WTE (RUN, MEANPRIVEC, SDPRIVEC, SKPRIVEC, KUPRIVEC)
WRITE(8,*) ,
WRITE (8, *) 'OTHER STOCKS'
WRITE (8, *)' USA'
WRITE(8,*) 'cee STOCKS'
WRITE(8,*) 'YEAR'
00"67 K=l,RUN
WRITE (8, 911)K,CCC (K+l)
67 CONTINUE
WRITE(8,*) ,
WRITE(8,*) 'FOR STOCKS'
CALL WTE(RUN,MEANFOR,SDFOR,SKFOR,KUFOR)
WRITE(8,*) ,
WRITE (8, *)' EC INTERVENTION STOCKS'
CALL WTE (RUN, MEANINT, SDINT, SKINT, KUINT)
WRITE(S,*),
WRITE (8,*) ,
WRITE (8,*) 'GAIT MEASURES'
WRITE(S,900)
WRITE(8,*) ,
WRITE(S, *) 'AMS'
WRITE (8,*) 'USA'
CALL WTE (RUN,MEAMSUS, SDAMSUS, SKAMSUS, KUAMSUS)
WRITE (8,*) ,
WRITE(S, *) 'EC12 ,
CALL WI'E (RUN,MEAMSEC, SDAMSEC, SKAMSEC, KUAMSEC)
WRITE(8,*),
WRITE(8,*) 'IMPORT PROTECTION - EC'
CALL WI'E (RUN,MEMTAREC, SDMTAREC, SKMTAREC, KUMI'AREC)
WRITE(S,*) ,
WRITE(8,*) 'EXPORT REFUNDS - EC'
WRITE(S,*) 'TOTAL'
CALL WI'E (RUN,MEXBILL, SDXBILL, SKXBILL, KUXBILL)
WRITE (8,*) ,
WRITE(S, *) 'UNIT'
CALL WI'E (RUN,MEXREF, SDXREF, SKXREF, KUXREF)
WRITE (8 , *) ,
C
900 FORMAT(lX, '-----------------------------------------------')
911 FORMAT(lX,I3,F11.2)
C
800 STOP
END
C
C%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
C End of main programme:Subroutinesfollow
C%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
C
C********************************************************************
C Calculationof USCAL, ECCAL, CANCAL & CGCAL
C********************************************************************
C
SUBROUTINE USSUB(I,N,NIT,TREND,PF,Y,MEPW,TP,YDP,ARP,LR,
* BASE, LRFOR,MEPRIV,LIV, CCC, SET,PT, PRODCAL,AREA,
* CD,USCAL,DEFPW,EPW,TOTGR,MEPROP,PJ,D86,MEFOR,D87,
* D88,D89,D90,MEYEXP,MECONS)
EXTERNAL G05DDF
INTEGER N,TREND,I,D87(15),D86(15),D88(15),D90(15),
* D89(15)
REAL PF(18),MEPW(18),YDP,TP(15),ARP(17),LR(16),BASE(17),
* LRFOR(16),MEPRIV(16),LIV(15),CCC(16),SET(17),
* AREA(15),CD(17),USCAL(15,200),DEFPW(18),MEFOR(16),
* PTEMP, MEYEXP (16) ,ERETN, ERETP, AREAP, AREAN, MECONS (15) ,
* LNAREAN,LNERETN,EDP,EPW,TOTGR(16),MEPROP(16),PJ(16),
* PT(17),PRODCAL(15,200),Y(15,200),YEXP,MINP,MAXP,
* PTEMP2,PTEMP3,TST
DATA PTEMP, P,ERETP, EDP,AREAP , LNAREAN, LNERETN,
* ERETN,AREAN,MINP,MAXP,PTEMP2,PTEMP3,TST/14*O.OI
C
PTEMP = (PF(N-3)+PF(N-2)+PF(N-1»/3
IF(PTEMP.GT.PF(N-l»THEN
P = PF(N-l)
ELSE
P = PTEMP
ENDIF
YEXP = (O.30101*2.32)+(O.02934*(TREND-(O.69899*(
* TREND-l»»+(O.69899*MEYEXP(N-3»-(O.20422*D86(I»-(
* O.28253*D88(I»-(O.48283*D89(I»
ERETN = P*YEXP
LNERETN = ALOG (ERETN)
LNAREAN = -3.1226+(2.2902*LNERETN)
AREAN = 2.718281828**LNAREAN
EDP = TP(I) - P
IF (I.GT.5) THEN
PTEMP2= (PTEMP*3) +PF(N-4) +PF(N-5)
MINP= PF(N-5)
DO 44 K=N-4,N-l
TST = PF(K)
IF (TST.LT.MINP) MINP~TST
44 CONTINUE
TST=O.O
MAXP = PF(N-5)
DO 45 K= N-4,N-1
TST = PF(K)
IF (TST.GT.MAXP) MAXP=TST
45 CONTINUE
PTEMP3= (PTEMP2-MAXP-MINP) /3
LR(N-2) = (PTEMP3/DEFPW(N»*100
IF (LR(N-2).LT.85.0) THEN
LR(N-2) = 85.0
ENDIF
IF (LR(N-2).LT.{O.95*LR(N-3») THEN
LR(N-2) = LR(N-3)
ENDIF
C
PTEMP = 0.0
PTEMP = (MEPRIV(N-3)+MEFOR(N-3)+CCC(N-3»/MECONS(I-1)
IF (PTEMP.GT.0.4) THEN
ARP(N-1) = 12.5
ELSE
ARP(N-1) = 7.5
ENDIF
ENDIF
C
ERETP = (EDP*YDP*(1-(ARP(N-1)/100»)+(YEXP*«LR(N-2)
* /DEFPW(N»*lOO)*(l-(ARP(N-l)/lOO»)
PT(N-l) = 108.49-(0.156*ERETN)+(0.022*ERETP)
IF (I.GT.5) THEN
BASE (N-1) = (O.8*BASE(N-2»+(0.2*(AREA(I-l)+SET(N-2»)
ENDIF
SET(N-l)=1.257*«ARP(N-l)/100)*BASE(N-l)*(PT(N-l)/100»
AREAP = ((PT(N-l)/100)*BASE(N-1»-SET(N-1)
AREA (I) = (AREAP+AREAN)
C
CD(N-l)= (O.36897*CD(2»+(262.79*(TREND-(0.63103*
* (TREND-l»»+(O.63103*CD(N-3»
C
IF( (I.NE.3) .AND. (I.NE.5» THEN
TOTGR(N-2) = (0.72994*TOTGR(N-3»+(O.22226*LIV(I»
* +(16100*D87(I»
* -(25376*089(1»
ELSE IF (1.EQ.3) THEN
TOTGR(N-2) = (0.72994*(TOTGR(N-3)-116100»+(0.22226*LIV(I»
ELSE IF (1.EQ.5) THEN
TOTGR(N-2) = (0.72994*(TOTGR(N-3)+25376»+(O.22226*LIV(I»
END1F
IF (1.NE.2) THEN
CCC(N-2)=(8.875*(LR(N-2)-(O.62885*LR(N-3»»+(0.62885*CCC(N-
* 3»+(11997.0*086(1»
ELSE
CCC(N-2)=(8.875*(LR(N-2)-(0.62885*LR(N-3»»+(0.62885*(CCC(N-
* 3)-11997.0»
ENDIF
00 15 K=l,NIT
IF (I.LT.6) THEN
Y(1,K) = YEXP
ELSE
ERROR = 0.0
ERROR = G05DDF(-0.0331463,0.19386949)
IF (ABS(ERROR).GT.O.48467373) THEN
WRITE(8,*) 'US ERROR exceeds 2.5 st.dev.',I,K
ENDIF
Y(1,K) = YEXP + ERROR
ENDIF
PRODCAL(I,K) = AREA(1) * Y(1,K)
USCAL(I,K)=PRODCAL(I,K)-CD(N-1)-«0.065133+(0.41974*
* MEPROP(N-3»+(0.046529*086(I»)*TOTGR(N-2»+(7158.1*
* 088(I»-8486.6+(0.64534*MEPRIV(N-3»-CCC(N-2)+CCC(N-3)-
* (5376.3108*(MEPW(N-1)/LRFOR(N-3»)-(3391.4*(MEPW(N-1)
* /EPW»-12421.653-(4453.3*086(1»+(O.4173*MEFOR(N-3»
15 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
C
C********************************************************************
C EC'12'
C********************************************************************
SUBROUTINE ECSUB (I,N,NIT, TREND, PBA,YB,YBARB, LIV, IN'!',
* PRIV, PMKT,ECCAL, PRODCAL, CF '.pop ,OEF ,CD,AREA, EP'l',086,
* INTP,CONS,D88,D87,D90,MEINT,MEPRIV,MEPROD,
* COMP, SET)
EXTERNAL G05DDF
INTEGER N,TREND,I,D86(15),D88(15),D87(15),D90(15)
REAL PBA(18), YB, YBARB,MEPROD(16) ,LIV(18) ,MEINT(16) ,
* MEPRIV(16),PMKT(18),PTEMP,CF(17),ECCAL(15,200),YEXPBAR,
.
* CD(16),RESPROD,AREA(15),ERETWH,ERETBA,P,PJ,POP(17),
* EPT,CONS(15) ,INT(15,200) ,PRODCAL(15,200) ,PRIV(15,200) ,
* PTEMPBAR, DEF (17),INTP(15) ,COMP(15) ,YEXP, SET(15)
DATA PTEMP, PTEMPBAR, YEXP, YEXPBAR, RESPROD, ERETWH,
* ERETBA,P,PJ/9*0.01
C
YEXP = YB+(0.12569*TREND)-(O.189*D87(I»
YEXPBAR = YBARB+(O.055285*TREND)+(O.26359*D88(I»
PTEMP = (PMKT(N-3)+PMKT(N-2)+PMKT(N-1»/3
IF(PTEMP.GT.PMKT(N-l»THEN
P = PMKT(N-1)
ELSE
P=PTEMP
ENDIF
PTEMPBAR = (PBA(N-1)+PBA(N-2)+PBA(N-3»/3
IF(PTEMPBAR.GT.PBA(N-1»THEN
PJ=PBA(N-1)
ELSE
PJ=PTEMPBAR
ENDIF
PTEMP = 0.0
IF (I.EQ.1) THEN
PTEMP = INTP (I)
ELSE
PTEMP = (INTP(I)*0.94)-5.38
ENDIF
ERE'IWH = YEXP*P
ERETBA = YEXPBAR*PJ
IF (I.LT.8) THEN
AREA (I) = l0439.0+(4329.1*(ERETWH/ERETBA»-(582.08*
* D88 (I»
ELSE
AREA (I) = l0439.0+(4329.1*(ERETWH/ERETBA))-(582.08*
* D88(I»-«SET(I)/100)*15989)
ENDIF
CD(N-2) = (0.21518*CD(N-3»+(125.6*(POP(N-l)-(0.21518*
* POP(N-2»»-(28.693*(PTEMP-(0.21518*PMKT(N-l»»
CF(N-l)=(O.91377*CF(N-2»-(0.56663*CF(N-3»+(0.036836*
* LIV(N»-(0.033654*LIV(N-1»+(0.020869*LIV(N-2»-
* (3487.5*PTEMP/DEF(N-1»+(3178.5*PMKT(N-1)/DEF(N-2»
* -(1971.0225*PMKT(N-2)/DEF(N-3»
CONS (I) = CF(N-l)+CD(N-2)
C
00 15 K=l,NIT
IF (I.LT.6) THEN
PRODCAL(I,K) = AREA(I)*YEXP
ELSE
.ERROR = 0.0
ERROR = G05DDF(0.0,0.16438)
IF (ABS(ERROR).GT.0.41095) THEN
WRITE(8,*) 'EC ERROR exceeds 2.5 st.dev.',I,K
ENDIF
Y = YEXP+ ERROR
PRODCAL(I,K) = AREA(I)*Y
ENDIF
RESPROD = PRODCAL(I,K)-(72632+(2265.0*TREND»
INT(I,K)=1346.6+(0.15348*RESPROD)+(0.62304*(MEINT(N-3»)
C * -(6370.9*D86(I»»+(5002.6*D90(I»
PRIV(I,K) = (0.16162*(PRODCAL(I,K)-MEPROD(N-3»)
* +(102.75*EPT)-(57.86*PTEMP)
C
ECCAL(I,K)=PRODCAL(I,K)-CONS(I)-PRIV(I,K)-INT(I,K)
* +MEPRIV(N-3)+MEINT(N-3)
15 CONl'INUE
RE'IURN
END
C
C********************************************************************
C Canada
C********************************************************************
SUBROUTINE CANSUB(I,N,NIT,TREND,AREA,PCAN,EP,EPT,LNCD,CONS,
* STK,PRODCAL,CANCAL,CF,CD,PRODCH,D86,MESTK,MEPROD)
EXTERNAL G05DDF
INTEGER N,TREND,I,D86(15)
REAL AREA(16),LNCD(17),STK(15,200),CANCAL(15,200),CONS(15),
* PRODCAL(15,200),Y,EP,EPT,CF,CD(15),PCAN(18),PRODCH(15,200),
* LNP,MESTK(16),MEPROD(16),PTEMP,P,Y2
DATA PTEMP,Y,P,Y2/4*0.01
C
PTEMP = (PCAN(N-l)+PCAN(N-2)+PCAN(N-3»/3
IF(PTEMP.GT.PCAN(N-l»THEN
P=PCAN(N-1)
ELSE
P=PTEMP
ENDIF
AREA(N-2) = 2746.5+(0.74514*AREA(N-3»+(4.6239*P)
CF=3420.00
LNCD(N-1) = LNCD(2)+(0.01576*TREND)
CD(I) = 2.718281828**LNCD(N-l)
CONS(I)=CF+CD(I)
IF (I.EQ.3) THEN
Y=1.23
ELSE
Y=1.91
ENDIF
DO 15 K=l,NIT
IF (I.LT.6) THEN
PRODCAL(I,K) = AREA(N-2)*Y
ELSE
ERROR = 0.0
Y2=0.0
ERROR = G05DDF(-0.076087,O.24583326)
IF (ABS(ERROR).GT.O.614583) THEN
WRITE(8,*) 'CANADIAN ERROR exceeds 2.5 st.dev.',I,K
ENDIF
Y2= Y+ERROR
PRODCAL(I,K) = AREA(N-2)*Y2
ENDIF
PRODCH(I,K) = PRODCAL(I,K)-MEPROD(N-3)
CANCAL(I,K)=PRODCAL(I,K)-CONS(I)-4826.1+(O.49677*
* MESTK(N-3»-(O.28219*PRODCH(I,K»+(114.14*EPT)
15 CONTINUE
RE1'URN
END
c
C*******************************************************************
C CairnsGroup
C*******************************************************************
SUBROUTINE CGSUB (I,N,NIT ,TREND, YB,AREA, MEPW, PJ,STK,LIV,
* CF,CD,OGCAL,PRODCAL,CONS,TOTGR,D86,D87,MESTK)
EXTERNAL G05DDF
INTEGER N,TREND,I,D86(15),D87(15)
REAL YB,AREA(16),MESTK(16),MEPW(18),PJ(18),LIV(15),P,
* PTEMP,PJTEMP,CONS(15),Y,PRODCAL(15,200),OGCAL(15,200),
* RESPROD,TOTGR(16),STK(15,200),CF(15),CD(15),PSUB,Y2
DATA PTEMP,PJTEMP,P,PSUB,RESPROD,Y,Y2/7*O.OI
c
PTEMP = (MEPW (N-1)+MEPW (N-2)+MEPW (N-3) )13
IF(PTEMP.GT.MEPW(N-1»THEN
P=MEPW(N-1)
ELSE
P=PTEMP
ENDIF
PJTEMP = (PJ(N-1)+PJ(N-2)+PJ(N-3»/3
IF(PJTEMP.GT.PJ(N-l»THEN
PSUB=PJ(N-1)
ELSE
PSUB=PJTEMP
ENDIF
AREA(N-2)= 6821.4+(O.641*AREA(N-3»+(22.537*(P-PSUB»
TOTGR(N-2) = (O.22319*TOTGR(N-3»+(O.038782*LIV(I»+
* (802*(TREND+26»+(3198.1*D86(I»
CF(I) = O.079934*TOTGR(N-2)
CD(I) = 22403.00+(431.73*TREND)
CONS(I)=CD(I)+CF(I)
DO 15 K=l,NIT
IF (I.LT.6) THEN
Y=YB+ (0.021*TREND)
PRODCAL(I,K) = AREA(N-2)*Y
ELSE
Y2=0.0
ERROR = 0.0
ERROR = G05DDF(-0.03754,0.17264)
IF(ABS(ERROR).GT.0.4316) THEN
WRITE(8,*) 'OG ERROR exceeds 2.5 st.dev.',I,K
ENDIF
Y2= Y+ERROR
PRODCAL(I,K) = AREA(N-2)*Y2
ENDIF
RESPROD = PRODCAL(I,K)-(39003.0+(831.23*TREND»
STK(I,K)= 2124.1+(0.4068*RESPROD)+(0.5441*MESTK(N-3»
C
IF (STK(I,K).LT.O.O) STK(I,K)=O.O
C
OGCAL(I,K) = PRODCAL(I,K)-CONS(I)-STK(I,K)+MESTK(N-3)
15 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
C
C********************************************************************
C Eastern European Imports
C********************************************************************
C
SUBROUTINE EESUB(I,N,NIT,TREND,AREA,IMPEE,PROD,D87,D88,
* D89PLUS,MEPROD,MEIMP)
EXTERNAL G05DDF, GOSCCF
INTEGER N,TREND,I,D87(lS),D88(lS),D89PLUS(lS)
REAL AREA(15),MEIMP(16),Y,MEPROD(17),IMPEE(15,200),
* PROD(15,200),Y2
00 15 K=l,NIT
IF (I.EQ.l) THEN
Y=1.8943
ELSE
Y=1.60732+(O.013622*TREND)+(O.4499*D89PLUS(I»
ENDIF
IF (I.LT.6) THEN
PROD(I,K) = AREA(I)*Y
ELSE
Y2 = 0.0
ERROR = 0.0
ERROR = G05DDF(0.0,0.12591018)
IF(ABS(ERROR).GT.0.31477544) THEN
WRITE(8,*) 'CIS ERROR exceeds 2.5 st.dev.',I,K
ENDIF
Y2= Y+ERROR
PROD(I,K) = AREA(I)*Y2
ENDIF
IMPEE(I,K)= 2968.6+(0.90464*MEIMP(N-3»-(O.18038*(PROD(I,K)
-MEPROD(N-2»)*
* - (6761.7*D88 (I»
15 CONl'INUE
RETURN
END
C
C********************************************************************
C
Range
Termination Routine for 2 Roots Outside of the Specified
C********************************************************************
C
SUBROUTINE ENDSUB(X1,X2,I,K)
INTEGER I,K
REAL X1(2),X2(2)
C WRITE(8,*) 'In year',I,K
C WRITE(8,*) 'Both roots are outside of the 2.5 st.dev. range'
C WRITE (8,*) 'Xl is' ,x1(1) ,X1(2)
C WRITE(8,*) 'X2 is',x2(1),X2(2)
RETURN
END
C
C********************************************************************
C Subroutines for calculating means of variables with differing
array
C size
C********************************************************************
C
SUBROlrrINE MEANCAL18 (I, NIT, ARRAY, ME)
INI'EGER I, NIT
REAL ARRAY(15,200),ME(18),SUM
ME(I+3) = 0.0
SUM=O.O
DO 1 K=l,NIT
SUM=SUM+ARRAY(I,K)
1 CONTINUE
ME (I+3) = SUM/NIT
RETURN
END
c
C********************************************************************
c
SUBROlrrINE MEANCAL17 (I, NIT, ARRAY, ME)
INTEGER I, NIT
REAL ARRAY (15, 200) ,ME(17),SUM
ME(I+2)=0.0
SUM=O.O
DO 2 K=l,NIT
SUM=SUM+ARRAY(I,K)
2 CONI'INUE
ME (I+2) =SUM/NIT
RETURN
END
c
C********************************************************************
c
SUBROlrrINE MEANCAL16 (I, NIT, ARRAY, ME)
INI'EGER I, NIT
REAL ARRAY (15, 200) ,ME(16) , SUM
ME(I+1)=O.O
SUM=O.O
DO 3 K=l,NIT
SUM=SUM+ARRAY(I,K)
3 CONI'INUE
ME (I+1)=SUM/NIT
REI'URN
END
C
C********************************************************************
C
SUBROUTINE MEANCAL15 (I, NIT, ARRAY, ME)
INTEGER I
REAL ARRAY(15,200),ME(15),SUM
ME(I)=O.O
SUM=O.O
00 4 K=l,NIT
SUM=SUM+ARRAY(I,K)
4 CONl'INUE
ME (I)=SUM/NIT
REI'URN
END
C
C********************************************************************
C Reset subroutine for expected world prices etc.
C********************************************************************
C
SUBROUTINE RESET (N, TREND, EPW, PW, P, I, EPWT, EPCAN, EPCANT,
* EPEC,EPECT)
INTEGER N, TREND, I
REAL PW,P,EPW,EPWT,EPCAN,EPCANT,EPEC,EPECT
IF (I.NE.l) THEN
TREND = TREND+ 1
N=N+l
PW=O.O
P=O.O
EPW=O.O
9 EPWT = 0.0
EPCAN = 0.0
EPCANl' = 0.0
EPEe = 0.0
EPECT = 0.0
ENDIF
RETURN
END
C
C********************************************************************
C Subroutines to calculate the moments of the probability dist.
C********************************************************************
C
SUBROUTINE MOMCAL (ARRAY,RUN,NIT,ME, SO,SK,KU)
REAL ARRAY(15,200),ME(15),SO(15),SK(15),KU(15),SUM1,
* SUM2 , SUM3 , SUM4
INTEGER RUN, NIT
DO 10 I=1,RUN
SUMl = 0.0
SUM2 = 0.0
SUM3 = 0.0
SUM4 = 0.0
DO 20 K=l,NIT
SUMl = SUMl+ARRAY(I,K)
20 CONl'INUE
ME(I) = SUMl/NIT
DO 30 J=l,NIT
SUM2 = SUM2 + (ARRAY(I,J)-ME(I))**2
SUM3 = SUM3 + (ARRAY(I,J)-ME(I))**3
SUM4 = SUM4 + (ARRAY(I,J)-ME(I))**4
30 CONl'INUE
SO(I) = SQRT(SUM2/NIT)
SK(I) = SUM3/NIT
KU(I) = SUM4/NIT
10 CONl'INUE
REl'URN
END
C
C********************************************************************
C OUtput subroutine
C********************************************************************
C
SUBROUTINE WTE (RUN,ME, SO,SK,KU)
INTEGER RUN
REAL SD(15),SK(15),KO(15),ME(15)
WRITE(8,900)
WRlTE(8,901)
00 12 I=l,RUN
WRlTE(8,902) I,ME(I),SD(I),SK(I),KO(I)
12 CONI'INUE
900 FORMAT(lX, 'YEAR' ,7X, 'MEAN',lOX, 'ST.DEV.' ,lOX, 'SKEWNESS',
* lOX,'KURTOSIS' )
901 FORMAT(lX, ,------
* ')
902 FORMAT(lX,I3,F12.2,F13.2,F18.2,F23.2)
RETURN
END
•
